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Abstract 
Currently, separate accounting under the arm’s length principle fails to 
allocate the income of multinational entities to the jurisdictions that give rise to those 
profits. In light of this problem, this thesis examined an alternative approach, 
referred to as the unitary taxation approach to the allocation of profit, which arises 
from the notion that as a multinational group exists as a single economic entity, it 
should be taxed as one taxable unit. Thereafter, profits are allocated to the respective 
jurisdictions using a formulaic approach. However, the plausibility of a unitary 
taxation regime achieving international acceptance and agreement is highly 
contestable due to its implementation issues, and economic and political feasibility. 
Drawing on the experiences of the existing jurisdictions that have applied 
formulary apportionment at a national-level, this thesis contributes to the existing 
literature by examining the unitary taxation approach in the context of a developing 
country. Using a case-study approach focusing on Freeport-McMoRan and Rio 
Tinto’s mining operations in Indonesia, this paper compares both tax regimes against 
the criteria for a good tax system - equity, efficiency, neutrality and simplicity. This 
thesis evaluates key issues that arise when implementing a unitary taxation approach 
with formulary apportionment based on the context of mining multinational firms in 
Indonesia. These issues include: (1) the definition of a unitary business, (2) the 
definition and scope of the tax base, and (3) the formula design. Finally, the findings 
are discussed within the context of a case-study.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
A robust and efficient international tax system is the cornerstone of global 
economic resilience. Increased globalisation and the growth of information 
technologies have dramatically changed the way businesses operate. Multinational 
entities now account for approximately 25% of the world’s gross domestic product, 
and consequently, the issue of international profit allocation becomes increasingly 
important towards ensuring that these entities are being taxed appropriately in the 
countries where the profits are earned (OECD, 2010b).  
The arm’s length principle, in combination with the separate entity approach, 
is the current prevailing method for allocating the income of multinational entities by 
determining the amount of income, expenses, and profits to be recognised for income 
tax purposes in relation to transactions between associated entities (OECD, 2010b). 
According to the arm’s length principle, the conditions of commercial and financial 
transactions between affiliated entities should be treated independently.  
In reality, commonly controlled affiliates usually enter into transactions 
aimed at minimizing tax expense through a profit-shifting strategy, such as transfer 
mispricing, capital and loan re-structuring, or an intangible assets royalties’ 
agreement. One of the major consequences is that these entities are able to relocate 
taxable income from high-tax countries to low-tax countries (Buettner & Georg, 
2007; Desai, Foley, & James, 2006; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008). The mismatch 
between the highly integrated multinational entities and the fragmented approach of 
a separate entity taxation system creates a number of theoretical and implementation 
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issues when allocating the profits of multinational entities earned in the respective 
jurisdictions that generate those incomes. 
Against this background, this thesis considers an alternative to the arm’s 
length, separate entity approach referred to as the unitary taxation regime. The 
unitary taxation approach arises from the notion that multinational entities operate in 
an integrated manner in a form of a single economic entity - despite being separated 
legally and geographically. Therefore, the income of these multinational entities 
should be taxed as one single entity. The profits of these multinational entities are 
usually allocated using a formula that reflects the factors deemed to produce the 
income. Unitary taxation is related to the concept of group taxation. It can be used 
with or without a formulaic apportionment method. Unitary taxation with formulary 
apportionment is theoretically superior to the arm’s length, separate-entity approach, 
as it better reflects the underlying integrated nature and economic substance of 
multinational entities (Buettner, Riedel, & Runkel, 2008; Mintz, 2003). 
Proponents favour formulary apportionment because it is relatively simple, 
removes incentives or possibilities for transfer mispricing, and does not rely on the 
identification of comparable information. However, one of the biggest hurdles is that 
formulary apportionment would require international agreement and acceptance with 
regards to the appropriate formula, the definition of a unitary business, and the basis 
on which the profits were calculated (McLure & Weiner, 2000; Mintz, 2008-2009; 
Weiner, 2005a).  
Both taxation regimes are subject to different criticisms. A variety of 
empirical approaches across different disciplines have been employed in an attempt 
to examine the plausibility of unitary taxation with apportionment. Economists 
compared corporate distortions created by separate accounting and formulary 
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apportionment (Gordon & Wilson, 1986; Nielsen, 2010; Riedel & Runkel, 2007). 
Thus far, the empirical evidence for profit-shifting under separate accounting is 
concrete (Devereux & Maffini, 2006), but the effort to quantify distortions under the 
formulary apportionment approach reveals contradicting results (Goolsbee & 
Maydew, 2000; Klassen & Shackelford, 1998). 
Given that the decision to adopt or reform any tax regimes requires 
comparison between plausible alternatives, this thesis compares both taxation 
regimes against the ‘criteria for a good tax system’, as the guiding principles to 
achieve objective analysis. In reflecting the European Union (EU)’s experiences in 
considering unitary taxation through the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) project, the 2003 Bolkestein Report stated that: ‘It would be unrealistic to 
expect Member States to enter into negotiations on a new method without a 
comparison between the old (separate accounting) and the new (formula 
apportionment) (as cited in Devereux & Loretz, 2007, p. 1). The first research 
question compares both taxation regimes based on their function of international 
profit allocation against the ‘criteria for a good tax system’.  
Research Question 1: When comparing both separate accounting and unitary 
taxation with formulary apportionment tax regimes against the ‘criteria for a good 
tax system’, which taxation approach is better for the purpose of international profit 
allocation? 
 
This thesis argues that a unitary taxation approach based on formulary 
apportionment would help to achieve this aim by reflecting the economic realities of 
the multinational entities, as one element of paradigm shifts from taxing legally-
separated entities to recognizing its underlying economic substance. However, a 
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review of the literature reveals that unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is 
not without its own critics. For instance, some authors argued that formulary 
apportionment might create economic distortion and incentive for factor 
manipulation if the chosen factors to apportion income failed to approximate the 
underlying economic activities of the multinational entities, and if these entities were 
able to structure their business activities for tax planning purposes (Gordon & 
Wilson, 1986; Gresik, 2007). Others suggested possible implementation structures 
associated with the definition of a unitary business, determination of the sales 
destination, the interactions between different corporate tax systems and possible 
formula-choice, instead of rejecting the formulary apportionment approach (Avi-
Yonah, 2008; Weiner, 2005b, 2007).  
Despite acknowledging the theoretical shortcoming of a unitary taxation 
regime, this thesis proposes that such issues should be addressed carefully, instead of 
rejected outright. The second part of this thesis examines what the appropriate design 
for a unitary taxation regime should be.  
Research Question 2: What should a theoretically sound unitary taxation regime 
with formulary apportionment regime look like for the purposes of allocating the 
profits of the unitary business?  
Research question 2a.  How should a theoretically sound unitary taxation regime 
with formulary apportionment be designed? 
Research question 2b.  How should unitary taxation in the context of developing 
countries be implemented? 
Research question 2c. Is there a need for a sector-specific formula? 
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The analysis of the second set of research questions suggests that a 
theoretically sound formulary apportionment regime could be achieved through 
careful definition of the scope of unitary business and selection of the apportionment 
factors and weightage that reflect the economic substance of multinational entities. 
This thesis also argues that there is no need for a sector-specific formula, as a 
traditional equally-weighted three factors formula based on sales, labour and assets 
should provide an appropriate approximation of the income generating factors of 
multinational entities.  
Nevertheless, developing countries should not succumb to pressure from 
developed countries to accept an apportionment factor that puts too much emphasis 
on the sales factor, especially in industries such as mining, where the presence of a 
small consumer market would result in low revenue (Durst, 2014b). 
 For example, developing countries could consider the inclusion of the 
extraction factor tied to the production level. However, as developed and developing 
countries have different political and economic interests, it is important to achieve a 
consensus in terms of the tax base definition and apportionment formula, in order to 
avoid the risk of double taxation. 
This thesis focuses on developing countries and the mining sector for several 
reasons. First, developing countries have been affected by the current system of 
international taxation in several ways. The recent report by Christian Aid (2009) 
outlined the aggregated economic loss of tax revenue totaled to $189 billion per year, 
which could be used for development. Developing countries are also more 
vulnerable to the global structure of secrecy, as they have less ability to enforce and 
administer the proper usage of the arm’s length principle.  
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Second, developing countries are in a position that is very different from 
developed or OECD member countries. For instance, developing countries would 
benefit more from source-based taxation, as they are capital-importing countries. In 
contrast, developed countries would prefer residence based taxation, as they are net 
exporters of capital (Kobetsky, 2011). Finally, the mining sector is an important 
revenue source for developing countries; however, the opportunities for profit 
shifting are higher than other traditional industries due to its industry characteristics 
(Matthiason, 2011). 
 The issue here was to investigate the design of a theoretical, unitary taxation 
regime that could achieve a fair, neutral, and yet simpler system for different taxing 
jurisdictions and the corporate taxpayers. Within the context of developing countries, 
the issue of attribution of profits is especially relevant to the mining sector. 
1.2 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
Picciotto called for more attention into the issue of corporate income 
taxation, especially in the context of developing countries (Picciotto, 2012). The 
research undertaken in this thesis is also timely, and particularly relevant for several 
reasons. First, the current separate accounting taxation system is unable to tax the 
income of multinational entities in the jurisdictions that give rise to it, resulting in 
massive economic losses for the host government, especially those of developing 
countries (Christian Aid, 2008; McNair & Hogg, 2009). Second, mining is a strategic 
commodity, and is likely to remain so for some time. In the sector, it has special 
characteristics relating to its risk involvement and the fact that it is an exhaustible 
resource with an uncertain level of reserves. These characteristics are likely to 
complicate the design of the tax system. Third, the mining industry was chosen due 
to its economic significance for developing countries, and because the unique 
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characteristics of this industry may further exacerbate the difficulties and weaknesses 
arising out of the application of the arm’s length principle in allocating profits 
(PWC, 2012a). 
Indonesia, as the country context, is suitable for the case study for a number 
of reasons. First, there is a relative lack of research that investigates the suitability 
and applicability of current and alternative tax reform to distribute multinationals’ 
worldwide income within the context of developing countries. Second, Indonesia’s 
loss of tax revenue from bilateral trade mispricing was estimated to reach $2.6 
billion GBP in 2007 in tax revenue from transfer pricing, which is legal in the 
current separate accounting based on the arm’s length principle (Christian Aid, 
2009). Third, the mining sector is also significant in regards to the frequency of 
transfer pricing due to its unique business model (McNair & Hogg, 2009). Fourth, 
the mining industry is economically significant with an approximate contribution of 
close to 5 percent of Indonesian’s gross domestic (PWC, 2012a). Indonesia is the  
world’s largest exporter of thermal coal, as well as second in tin, third in copper and 
fourth in nickel (Lieokomol, 2013). 
The Indonesian mining industry’s value of production is expected to double 
from USD 82.6 billion in 2010 to USD143 billion in 2016; with annual growth rates 
to reach approximately 10 percent (Business Monitor International, 2012). For these 
reasons, mining multinational entities with operations in Indonesia provide an 
opportunity to examine the issue of international profit allocation from the 
perspective of developing countries. Lastly, it is important to note that this thesis 
considers an optimal taxation regime from the perspective of taxing authorities, 
instead of those of multinational entities. 
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1.3 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS 
Existing research explores unitary taxation with formulary apportionment 
from theoretical and empirical perspectives. Most of this research focuses on the 
existing jurisdictions that have applied unitary taxation regimes, such as the United 
States, Canadian provinces, Swiss cantons, and the proposed European Union 
Common Consolidated Tax Base (EU CCCTB). To the best of my knowledge, there 
is limited research on the unitary taxation regime in the context of developing 
countries. In viewing the issue of international profit allocation, the International 
Monetary Fund (2013, p.4) adopted a broader perspective of international profit 
allocation tax reform by expanding the work programme to include developing 
countries, where it stated: 
‘…recognition that international tax framework is long overdue. Though the 
amount is hard to quantify, significant revenue can also be gained from reforming it. 
This is particularly important for developing countries, given their greater reliance 
on corporate taxation, with revenue from this taxation often coming from a handful 
of multinationals.’  
Developing countries are often faced with different issues and conditions, 
such as the lack of resources and experts to administer complex international tax 
rules; while at the same time there is also a need for attracting overseas investment 
into the countries. Aligned with the view of the International Monetary Fund (2013) 
and Picciotto (2012), this thesis recognises the difference between developed and 
developing countries, and that the unique positions of developing countries should be 
included in analysing the issue of international profit allocation. This thesis seeks to 
fill that gap in the literature. 
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This thesis also goes a step further by examining and suggesting a possible 
approach to a unitary taxation regime, by focusing on the mining sector in Indonesia. 
In a broader context, mining taxation has always been designed separately from 
other industries. Even if a unitary taxation regime is not adopted internationally or 
across industries, the mining sector is an area that is suitable for this alternative form 
of taxation. In this sense, this thesis is also closely related to the body of literature 
that focuses on corporate income taxation of the mining industry. 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
The remaining chapters are organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides the 
institutional background for the discussion of the current arm’s length, separate 
entity accounting approach along the Indonesian domestic taxation regime and the 
unique nature of the mining industry. Chapter 3 reviews the literature related to the 
alternative form of taxation regime referred to as the unitary taxation or global 
formulary apportionment. Chapter 4 provides a review of existing literature and tax 
guidelines to determine the theoretical framework for evaluating the separate 
accounting and unitary taxation with apportionment approaches or methods. 
Chapter 5 discusses the research design used to address the research questions. 
Chapter 6 compares both taxation regimes against the theoretical framework as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 7 provides suggestions for the definitional and 
design issues of a unitary taxation regime and provides case study illustrations. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. 
Chapter 2: Institutional Background 10 
Chapter 2: Institutional Background 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is increasing concern that current international taxation rules have 
failed to allocate income in the jurisdictions that give rise to it. As a consequence, 
the current income allocation approach has so far failed to prevent base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS) from occurring due to sophisticated tax planning by 
multinational entities aimed at shifting profits (from high tax to low tax jurisdictions) 
in ways that erode the taxable base (OECD, 2013). This chapter aims to examine 
whether the current taxation rules are sufficient to allow for the allocation of taxable 
profits to jurisdictions that generate those incomes.  
First, Section 2.2 provides the background of the key principles and issues 
governing the taxation of multinational entities. Second, Section 2.3 covers the 
arm’s length, separate-entity accounting approach in the context of international 
profit allocation. Next, Section 2.4 provides a review of existing empirical and 
theoretical arguments against the arm’s length principle. Section 2.5 examines 
existing theoretical arguments for and against the unitary taxation regime. Section 
2.6 discusses the general overview of the Indonesian corporate income taxation 
regime. Finally, Section 2.7 examines the uniqueness of the mining industry and 
Section 2.8 concludes the chapter.  
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2.2 BACKGROUND 
Multinational entities earn income across multiple jurisdictions. For this 
reason, international income is subjected to different national tax laws. Each 
jurisdiction operates a separate accounting system for determining corporate taxable 
income, where a firm’s local affiliate is taxed based on taxable income as declared 
on its tax return. As there is no global body that oversees international taxation, 
domestic tax rules of a given jurisdiction are applied to cross-border flows, taking 
into account that such flows may be subject to taxation in more than one jurisdiction. 
Currently, the international tax principle for attributing profits is governed by 
Article 7 (2) of the OECD, which states (OECD, 2010b):  
‘Where an enterprise of one of the Contracting States carries on business in 
the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein, 
there shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment 
the profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and independent 
enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar 
conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a 
permanent establishment.’ 
According to Article 5 (1), the concept of a permanent establishment is 
primarily constituted by a fixed place of business through which the business of an 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on in the host country (OECD, 2010b). 
Basically, there is a need to maintain a sufficient economic presence in the form of a 
fixed business place within the State for the State to exercise its taxing rights. The 
following are generally considered, prima facie, as constituting permanent 
establishments: a branch, a warehouse, a factory, a mine or place of extraction of a 
natural resource, or a place of management (OECD, 2010b). Once the taxing right is 
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determined, profits that result from cross-border transactions are usually taxed at the 
source (where the income is earned) or residence jurisdiction (where the enterprise 
receives it).  
A government has the right to levy taxes on the income earned by the 
multinational entities that operate within its border, typically in the form of branch, 
locally domiciled subsidiaries of a foreign parent, and joint venture (OECD, 2010a).  
The foreign parent remains liable for the branch’s obligations and liabilities in the 
country. In contrast, subsidiaries of a multinational entity have limited liability. In 
other words, taxation of the subsidiary is on the subsidiary's income alone, and when 
properly structured and operated, the liabilities of the subsidiary are not attributable 
to the parent corporation. (OECD, 2010a; Vincent, 2005). The source jurisdiction 
has the right to levy a tax on business profits that are attributable to a permanent 
establishment, such as a branch of a multinational entity, as well as to a domestic 
subsidiary owned by the foreign multinational group. The source country has the 
primary taxing rights, as its government provides benefits to the multinational 
entities while engaging in income-producing activities within its borders (Guzmán & 
Sykes, 2008). However, in general, the source country has limited rights to tax 
passive income, including royalties, interest, capital gains and dividends.  
The concept of permanent establishment provides the basic nexus to 
determine whether taxing rights exist with respect to certain business profits of 
foreign multinational entities (non-resident taxpayer). On the other hand, the 
residence country would have the right to tax its resident’s income, as the resident 
benefits from the public services provided for them by the country where the 
business is incorporated (Picciotto, 2012).  
 13 Chapter 2: Institutional Background 
With the advancement of information technologies enabling multinational 
entities able to generate income in the respective jurisdictions without maintaining 
an adequate physical presence (Spengel & Schäfer, 2003), the concept of permanent 
establishment is increasingly irrelevant in ensuring an adequate taxation of the 
income between the taxing rights of the source and residence jurisdiction.  
In some cases, the same business profits may be subject to competing claims 
by the source and residence jurisdiction. Tax treaties aim to seek some form of 
compromise between these jurisdictions. For instance, where the entities operating 
the permanent establishment is a part resides in a different jurisdiction from the 
group parent company, the residence country is required to relieve double taxation, 
either by allowing a foreign tax credit or by exempting the relevant income from its 
taxes. Correspondingly, the source country would have limited rights to tax passive 
income (Picciotto, 2005). 
From a practical point of view, the distinction between residence and source 
is very difficult to apply to multinational entities that operate in an internationally 
integrated manner. Furthermore, as both source and residence jurisdictions have the 
right to tax, the issue of double taxation may arise. In this sense, it can be difficult to 
assign the right to tax between the country of the source residence of the capital 
owner and the country of the source of income. The difficulties in applying source-
based and residence-based taxation to determine taxing rights creates a loophole for 
multinational entities to engage in strategies to shift profits from high tax to low tax 
jurisdictions.  
 In response to the issue of double taxation and the assignment of taxing 
rights, current international tax rules rely on tax treaties. The treaty principles for 
allocating the business profits that may be taxed by a country with the taxing rights 
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based on the source or residence taxation concept are based both on the separate 
entity and the arm’s length principle. 
Multinational entities are able to structure transactions that avoid taxation in 
both source and residence jurisdictions. Multinational entities can minimize tax 
payable by shifting activities, risks, or assets to a low tax jurisdiction overseas 
(OECD, 2013). 
The recurring theme of this thesis is the issue of income misallocation 
manifested in the form of BEPS. The BEPS can be seen as the failure of a 
fragmented approach based on the separate entity principle in reflecting the high 
degree of economic integration and globalization of multinational entities. In 
addition, the concept of permanent establishment in establishing the nexus of taxing 
rights can be easily circumvented by the multinational entities, thereby avoiding 
double non-taxation according to source and residence taxation. 
The arm’s length principle forms the fundamental basis of current transfer 
pricing rules, and is important for both taxing jurisdictions and corporate taxpayers 
as it determines in large part the income and expenses, and therefore taxable profits, 
of associated entities in different tax jurisdictions. Accordingly, transfer pricing rules 
based on the arm’s length principle attribute jurisdiction to tax profits or income 
arising out of cross-borders transactions among the different countries in which a 
multinational entity conducts business (OECD, 2013, p. 36). The next section 
provides a background discussion of the arm’s length principle, which is the 
prevailing method for transfer pricing standard endorsed by the OECD for the 
purpose of taxing multinational entities. The OECD maintains that the arm’s length 
principle is the international standard for determining transfer prices. 
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2.3 THE ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE 
The arm’s length principle was introduced in the 1920s by the League of 
Nations Model Tax Conventions, to serve as the international consensus on the issue 
of profit allocation. In 1963, the arm’s length principle was included in Article 9 of 
the Organisations of Economic Corporations and Development (OECD) Model Tax 
Convention, and in 1980 the United Nations adopted the same principle into the UN 
Model Double Taxation to prevent cross-border income taxation raised through the 
overlap of source and residence jurisdictions. In connection with the taxation of 
multinational entities, the OECD provides the authoritative definition of the arm’s 
length principle in determining business profits in Article 7, and in dealing with 
associated affiliations in Article 9. The arm’s length principle has been subject to 
several revisions in 1979, 1984, 1995, and with the latest 2010 guidelines (OECD, 
2010b, 2010c).  
The authoritative statement of the arm’s length principle is found in 
paragraph 1 of Article 9. ‘[Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two 
[associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from 
those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which 
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by 
reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of 
that enterprise and taxed accordingly.’  
The United Nations approach to the arm’s length principle is also consistent 
with the OECD guidelines (United Nations, 2011, 2013). Specifically, paragraph 3 
of the Commentary on Article 9 on the United Nations Model Convention states that: 
“With regards to transfer pricing of goods, technology, trademarks and 
services between associated enterprises and the methodologies which may be 
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applied for determining correct prices where transfers have been on other than 
arm’s length terms, the Contracting States will follow the OECD principles which 
are set out in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. These conclusions represent 
internationally agreed principles and the Group of Experts recommends that the 
Guidelines should be followed for the application of the arm’s length principle 
which underlies the article.”  
In general, the arm’s length principle serves two functions. First, the arm’s 
length principle assigns taxing rights to jurisdictions involved in cross-border 
transactions in the form of tax treaties. Second, the arm’s length principle guides the 
transfer pricing rules in determining transfer prices of related party transactions. 
Treaty rules for taxing business profits are also closely related to the 
attribution of profit to a permanent establishment under Article 7 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention. According to the principle, the concept of permanent 
establishment is connected to the physical presence in the country, and also extended 
to the situations where the non-resident carried on business in the country through a 
dependent agent. In other words, the concept of permanent establishment serves as a 
nexus to assign taxing rights with respect to the business profits of a non-resident 
taxpayer. In general, when a multinational entity engages in cross-border intra-trade 
transactions, it affects the taxable profit of more than one jurisdiction. Jurisdictions 
are allowed to collect profits that originated from the country. The share of profits is 
then determined by the transfer pricing rules, which require related parties to allocate 
income as if it would be allocated between independent entities in the same or 
similar circumstances (OECD, 2010b). 
The arm’s length principle is also the underlying principle for transfer pricing 
rules for determining the amount of income, expenses, or profits to be recognized for 
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income tax purposes in relation to intra-trade transactions between affiliated entities. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines identifies the separate entity approach as the 
most appropriate method for achieving equitable results and minimizing the risk of 
double taxation (OECD, 2010b). The OECD further noted that the appropriate 
application of the separate entity approach to intra-group transactions should be 
based on the arm’s length principle, in which individual group members must be 
taxed separately and independently. However, such an approach in allocating 
business profits has been increasingly criticized for failing to keep pace with the 
changing business environment (Picciotto, 2012). 
Interestingly, even the OECD acknowledges that there is a mismatch between 
the national-based taxation approach and difficulties in drawing clear borders 
between the source and residence jurisdictions to multinational entities that operate 
internationally in an integrated manner (2010a, pg 28): 
‘There is a more fundamental policy issue: the international common 
principles drawn from national experiences to share tax jurisdiction may not have 
kept pace with the changing business environment. Domestic rules for international 
taxation and internationally agreed standards are still grounded in an economic 
environment characterised by a lower degree of economic integration across 
borders, rather than today's environment of global taxpayers, characterised by the 
increasing importance of intellectual property as a value-driver and by constant 
developments of information and communication technologies.’ 
2.4 THE THEORETICAL PROBLEMS WITH SEPARATE ACCOUNTING, 
THE ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE 
The OECD acknowledges the fundamental problem associated with the arm’s 
length, separate entity approach, but maintains that the arm’s length principle should 
Chapter 2: Institutional Background 18 
govern the evaluation of transfer prices in cross-border transactions among related 
affiliates based on international consensus (OECD, 2010b).  
The OECD expresses a strong sentiment about the theoretical soundness of 
the arm’s length principle. In Article 1.15, it states: 
“A move away from the arm’s length principle would abandon the sound 
theoretical basis described above and threaten the international consensus, thereby 
substantially increasing the risk of double taxation. Experience under the arm’s 
length principle has become sufficiently broad and sophisticated to establish a 
substantial body of common understanding among the business community and tax 
administrations.” 
It has been highlighted in the literature that the mismatch between the 
national-based taxation system and the globally integrated business activities 
undertaken by the multinational entities create theoretical and implementation 
weaknesses (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007 & Durst, 2008; Avi-Yonah, 2000, 2005; 
Avi-Yonah, 2010; Morse, 2010). The practical issues cause other problems to the 
existing tax system, such as increasing administrative burdens for both the taxpayers 
and tax administrators, increasing uncertainty in applying the tax regime, 
incentivizing income-shifting behaviour, and promoting tax competition among 
different countries. Such problems erode the tax base, lower government revenue 
and severely threaten the integrity of the tax system (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007; 
Avi-Yonah, 2002; Avi-Yonah & Tinhaga, 2013).  
However, the OECD’s view is highly contested. Several academics question 
the theoretical soundness of the arm’s length principle and even advocate for a 
fundamental reform (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007; Avi-Yonah, 2010; Morse, 2010). 
Accordingly, although international agreement and consensus are important aspects 
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of international taxation, the assumption that the arm’s length principle is 
theoretically sound has received much criticism (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2010). 
The OECD contends that the arm’s length principle is able to allocate income 
appropriately between the associated entities. However, the next section highlights 
the issue of profit allocation at the conceptual and theoretical level with regards to 
the separate-entity or separate accounting approach. 
2.4.1 The artificiality of the arm’s length principle 
The multinational entity exists due to the economies of scale, as well as other 
benefits that arise out of such integration. In this sense, the multinational group as a 
whole is larger than the sums of its parts (Markusen, 1995). Due to this integration, it 
is impossible to divide the group into separate entities. Accordingly, the arm’s length 
principle fails to reflect the economic reality in which multinational entities operate, 
as the issue of profit allocation emerges when the different legal entities are under 
common control and form an economic entity. By attempting to divide a 
multinational group based on its legal form into separate taxable entities, the arm’s 
length principle ignores the underlying economic substance of the multinational 
group. Contrary to the very reason as to why multinational entities exist, application 
of the arm’s length principle would clearly fail to reflect the economic unity of the 
group. Accordingly, as it is impossible to draw a clear line between integrated parts 
of the group, any attempt to undertake such division for computing taxable income 
earned by different subsidiaries within the group would not be arbitrary (Martens-
Weiner, 2006; Weiner, 1999, 2005b). 
Furthermore, given that there is no divergence of interests between two 
parties; the process from such division would create an artificial incentive and 
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discretion to determine the arm’s length prices in the most beneficial way for the 
multinational group (McLure Jr, 1984; Steinmo, 2003).  
For example, a parent company may exert influence over the subsidiary 
indirectly and in such a way that allows business decisions that distort the tax base of 
the source and residence jurisdictions and that are also difficult to prove in court 
based on the economic substance doctrine. In doing so, the parent of a multinational 
entity may exert control over the operational and financial decisions of the 
subsidiary, such that the subsidiary enters into business arrangements that provide 
advantages to the parent or vice versa. Foley, Greenwood, and Quinn (2008) report 
on a case study based on NEC Electronics (NECE), the semiconductor subsidiary of 
a Japanese multinational entity, that expensed excessively high R&D expenditure to 
develop microchips used in NEC’s phones and then billed its parent at low transfer 
prices based on the arm’s length principle to enhance the competitive position of its 
parent’s products. 
Michael Durst also argued that (Durst, 2010, p. 249): 
“A second fundamental flaw in the arm’s-length system, which has become 
increasingly evident over the past decade, is that by treating different affiliates 
within the same group as if they were free-standing entities, the system respects the 
results of written contracts between those related entities. These contracts have no 
real economic effects, as the same shareholders stand on both sides of them, but 
they nevertheless are given effect under the arm’s-length standard.” 
2.4.2 The arm’s length principle fails to reflect the underlying economic 
substance of the multinational entities 
The theoretical shortcoming of the arm’s length principle is particularly acute 
in relation to the concept of permanent establishment. Article 7 of the OECD model 
convention provides that a Contracting State may not tax business profits therein 
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unless they are attributable to a permanent establishment (OECD, 2010b). The 
OECD is currently authorizing that the profits to be attributed to the jurisdictions 
would depend on the permanent establishment’s earned profit at arm’s length, as if it 
were a legally distinct and separate enterprise engaging in the same economic 
activities. As such, businesses structure their activities in such a way that they are 
able to shift passive income taxation to the residence country, while providing for 
source taxation of active income based on the concept of permanent establishment, 
resulting in tax base erosion to the source jurisdiction (Avi-Yonah, 2002). This 
creates a real issue in the context of the mining industry, and the debate centres on 
how to balance between the source taxation, where the mines are, and residence 
taxation, where the companies are incorporated.  
To illustrate, mining multinational entities establish their headquarters in 
developed countries (such as Australia) and usually mine in resource-rich developing 
countries, the source country. They are able to shift the profit out of the source 
country, yet do not repatriate the profits back into Australia (the residence country). 
Accordingly, they can shift profit to countries through transfer pricing by setting up a 
range of administrative services such as HR and IT in low-tax jurisdictions such as 
Singapore and Bermuda (Nick Matthiasson, 2011). The ambiguity regarding transfer 
pricing occurs in the way charges are applied and provided by these supportive 
departments.  
In a similar way, multinational entities are able to assign mining rights to 
subsidiaries located in low-tax jurisdictions and charge the use of rights to the mine 
operations in the source jurisdictions. Frequently, finance is provided by subsidiaries 
belonging to the same multinational group, which owns the mining operations, 
involving recurrent interest payments and a range of related fees, thus limiting the 
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tax base in the source jurisdiction (Guj et al., 2014). The valuation of services and 
R&D and technical expertise is often complex and difficult to evaluate based on the 
arm’s length principle. The development of an e-commerce and global trading 
platform allows mining firms to facilitate complex related-party transactions 
(Spengel & Schäfer, 2003). 
The increasing separation between tax and economic substance undertaken 
by a multinational entity, especially in the mining sector, raises the question as to 
whether the arm’s length, separate-entity accounting approach is still capable of 
appropriately recognising the doctrine of the economic substance of companies that 
are part of a multinational entity. The boundaries between source and residence 
jurisdictions are increasingly difficult to ascertain given the emergence of hybrid 
forms of co-operation networks that extend beyond the ability to recognise the 
attributes of intercompany participation, or ownership of property (Avi-Yonah & 
Clausing, 2007; Avi-Yonah, 2009; Morse, 2010). Thus, the boundaries of an 
economic entity are represented by groups of relationships where it is difficult to 
determine whether there are any divergent interests between these groups. This 
creates the potential problem of double taxation or double non-taxation in both 
source and the residence countries, and creates the potential problem in which the 
residence countries are supposed to consider the source country’s taxes in order to 
assess the taxes due on their residents’ foreign earned income. Questions are being 
raised as to whether the current rules ensure a fair allocation of taxing rights on 
business profits, in particular, within the concept of permanent establishment.  
2.4.3 The arm’s length principle creates artificial incentive for multinational 
entities to engage in profit-shifting behaviour 
Multinational entities have an incentive to engage in tax-motivated 
transactions to reduce or avoid paying taxes (Desai & Hines, 2003; Desai & 
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Dharmapala, 2006). Current transfer pricing rules based on the arm’s length 
principle create an artificial incentive in which multinational firms and their tax 
advisors are able to shift profit to low-tax countries. First, multinational enterprises 
can set distortive transfer prices for intra-trade transactions within the group. To 
illustrate, the multinational has an incentive to set a low transfer prices charge to a 
subsidiary located in a low-tax jurisdiction, as it thereby enlarges the profit taxed at 
the low-tax location and keeps taxable profit low at the high-tax jurisdiction. Second, 
multinational enterprises are able to shift profits by locating real business activities 
(jobs, assets, and production), and relocating specific business functions and 
investment decisions (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007; Avi-Yonah, 2010; Grubert & 
Mutti, 1991). For instance, multinational firms may alter the debt-and-equity ratios 
of affiliated subsidiaries in high-tax and low-tax countries in order to maximize 
interest deductions in high-tax countries and taxable profits in low-tax countries. The 
OECD responds :“Multinational enterprises are free to organise their business 
operations as they see fit” and “Tax administrations do not have the right to dictate 
to an MNE how to design its structure or where to locate its business operations” 
(OECD, 2010b, p.9). In order to determine the extent to which separate accounting is 
flawed, there is a need to review empirical evidence on profit shifting behaviour, its 
impacts on revenue and tax base allocation.  
Direct evidence of profit shifting activities by setting distortive transfer prices 
has been shown by examining transfer pricing distortions. In 2003, Clausing used 
data from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics on international trade prices for 1997, 
1998 and 1999. She found that when the US intra-firm traded with low-tax 
jurisdictions, the export prices were lower, and import prices were higher. An 
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increase of foreign corporate tax rate by 10% reduced the US intra-firm export prices 
by 9.4% and raised US intra-firm import prices by 6.4% (Clausing, 2003).  
Ideally, the profitability of corporate investments should be driven by real 
business decisions and not by tax rate differences. Based on this reasoning, a strand 
of literature attempted to indirectly measure evidence of profit shifting by comparing 
corporate profitability across different countries. In earlier contributions, Grubert and 
Mutti (1991) and Hines Jr and Rice (1994) used aggregated country-level data for 
1982, comprising 33 and 59 host countries respectively. They suggested that a 1% 
increase in the corporate tax rate lowered profits by 6%. Studies based on the firm-
level data also yielded similar findings. 
Other papers examined profit-shifting behaviour by investigating the decision 
of the US to locate in international tax haven jurisdictions. Desai, et al. (2006) 
suggested that larger firms and those with a higher proportion of intra-trade 
transactions and R&D, were most likely to use a tax haven. Tax havens permit 
multinational entities to allocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions. 
Profit shifting behaviour has also been studied based on the location of intangible 
assets and service units (R&D, management and administration) within a corporate 
group. Similarly, profit-shifting activities are also more likely to be present in 
multinational entities with high intangibles assets and high amounts of firm-specific 
transactions (Devereux & Maffini, 2006; Grubert, 2003).  
In terms of economic effects, multinational entities are benefiting from 
profit-shifting at the expense of national tax revenue. From 2005 to 2007, Australia 
lost €1.1 billion in tax revenue to the European Union (McNair & Hogg, 2009, p. 
20). In the same period, the United States lost USD 1.5 billion in tax revenue to other 
jurisdictions (McNair & Hogg, 2009, p. 27). Although it is difficult to prove whether 
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the findings are due to transfer pricing manipulation or other forms of tax planning, 
the OECD tentatively suggests that data on foreign direct investments may indicate 
the existence of profit shifting from high-tax jurisdictions to low ones. For example, 
in 2010, Barbados, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands combined, received more 
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (5.11 per cent) than Germany or 
Japan. In the same year, those three jurisdictions injected more investments into the 
global economy (4.54 per cent) than Germany (OECD, 2013). By the same token, 
tax base redistribution also affects the income allocation among countries. Huizinga 
and Laeven (2008) provided evidence on profit shifting activities by modelling 
opportunities and incentives generated by cross-country tax differences and also 
from tax differences between affiliates in different host countries. They showed that 
profit shifting by multinational entities lead to a substantial redistribution of national 
corporate tax revenues. Many European nations appear to gain revenue from profit 
shifting by multinational entities, largely at the expense of Germany.  
Theoretically, multinational entities are able to exploit cross country tax 
differences through merger and acquisitions, given that two firms from different 
countries are merged into a single multinational group. Mergers and acquisitions can 
create transfer pricing issues from a tax regulatory point of view. Merger and 
acquisition deals create a platform for the interaction between transfer pricing and 
purchase accounting by critically determining the allocation of the purchase price 
among the target company’s tangible and intangible assets, thereby influencing the 
deciding factor on the financing structure of the proposed transaction (PWC, 2012b). 
From this perspective, merger and acquisition under the arm’s length, separate 
accounting tax system creates the opportunity for profit shifting. 
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Huizinga and Voget (2009) showed that international taxation had materially 
affected organisational decisions of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. A 
simulation based on the elimination of worldwide taxation by the US showed an 
increase in the proportion of parent firms locating back to the US from 53% to 58%. 
In the context of debt-equity structuring, Desai et al. (2004) used US firm-level data 
to show that tax rates were strongly associated with the use of debt by affiliates. 
They estimated that a 10% increase in the corporate tax rate was associated with a 
2.8% higher affiliate debt as a percentage of assets. Internal debt was shown to be 
more sensitive to tax rate changes; in which a 10% increase in the tax rate raised 
affiliate debt by 3.5%. 
The income-shifting undertaken by the multinational entities has also created 
other detrimental effects, such as promoting tax competition among different 
countries. These countries exert downward pressure on statutory rates (Gordon & 
MacKie-Mason, 1995) and tax credits (Haufler & Schjelderup, 2000), in order to 
attract foreign direct investment. According to one Google spokeswoman, “The 
reality is that most governments use tax incentives to attract foreign investment,” 
and such incentives are “…one of the reasons Google located one of our 
headquarters in Ireland” (Schechner, 2014).  
Thus far, this study has presented empirical evidence that both developed and 
developing countries are affected by the profit shifting behaviours made possible by 
the flaws in the current taxation system. Christian Aid estimated that capital flows 
from trade mispricing into the EU and the US from non-EU countries from 2005 to 
2007 had reached more than $1 trillion. Tax revenue from these inflows would have 
raised about $121.8 billion a year in additional revenue (McNair & Hogg, 2009). 
Furthermore, Oxfam estimates tax revenue loss from shifting profits out of 
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developing countries is approximately $50 billion a year (Oxfam International, 
2000). The estimated tax loss through tax havens under the current arm’s length, 
separate accounting approach resulted in developing countries losing almost three 
times what they received in aid (Christian Aid, 2008; McNair & Hogg, 2009).  
All of the studies presented above may suffer from the issue of endogeneity 
and should be interpreted carefully. In these studies, the observed corporate tax 
effects were assumed to be solely influenced by income shifting behaviour. Fuest 
and Riedel (2010) also pointed out that the measurement issue in trying to quantify 
the loss of tax revenue from shifting behaviour should also be interpreted carefully. 
It is reasonable to state that the existence of incentives and opportunities to shift 
income under the arm’s length, separate accounting taxation regime also undermines 
the integrity of the international tax system.  
2.5 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
APPLICATION OF THE ARM’S LENGTH, SEPARATE 
ACCOUNTING APPROACH 
This section examines the implementation issues of the application of the 
arm’s length principle underlying the transfer pricing rules, such that it creates 
difficulty in (1) applying transfer pricing methods to intra-group transactions, (2) 
creates uncertainty and complexity, and (3) creates administrative burdens for both 
taxpayers and tax administrators. 
2.5.1 The problem in applying the transfer pricing method 
The arm’s length principle seeks to adjust profits among different parts of the 
multinational entity independently; it follows the separate entity approach in which a 
multinational entity group is viewed as separate entities rather than inseparable parts 
of a single unified business (OECD, 2010b). The following section examines the 
application of the arm’s length principle to determine the transfer price for the intra-
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trade transactions as endorsed by the OECD - the “traditional transfer pricing 
methods” and the “transactional profit methods” (OECD, 2010b).  
            2.5.1.1 Traditional transfer pricing method 
Traditional transfer pricing methods are related directly to the transferred 
good or service based on the comparability of related and unrelated transactions. As 
such, any other activity involving the companies is not incorporated into the pricing 
of the transaction. The traditional transaction method to apply the arm’s length 
principle is the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale price 
method, and the cost plus method (OECD, 2010b, p. 63). 
The comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) compares the product or 
services transferred in a controlled transaction to the price charged in a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction in comparable circumstances. Two conditions must be met 
in order for an uncontrolled transaction to be comparable to a controlled transaction. 
First, that there are no differences between the comparable transactions based on 
market price. Second, there should be reasonable, accurate judgements to eliminate 
the effects of material differences. If a CUP is applicable, an internal comparable 
review should be made, as these transactions have a similar relationship to the 
transaction under review. In other words, the transfer pricing is decided according to 
the “comparability analysis”, where the application of the arm’s length principle 
should be based on the conditions that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled 
transactions. 
The resale price method makes use of resale price to an unrelated 
independent party in a series of transactions to ascertain the sale price between two 
parties by subtracting the service fee component or a margin from the resale price. 
Generally, the resale price method is used with sales, marketing, and distributions 
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activities. This method is suggested for use when the payment for service is related 
to a relatively simple function. The level of the margin is determined by the function, 
risk, and asset value. The product component is not as important as the CUP, as the 
main function can be performed by another service company. Comparability has to 
be addressed between the products or services transferred, and the product 
differences can have an effect on the profit level (OECD, 2010b). 
The cost plus method uses cost base as the price indicator in a controlled 
transaction in which the transfer price then consists of the cost base plus a margin. 
The costs can be categorised into three broad categories namely (1) direct costs of 
production, (2) indirect production costs, (3) operating expenses. All three traditional 
transfer pricing methods; namely comparable uncontrolled price (CUP), resale price, 
and cost plus, rely on the use of comparable data to determine transfer prices 
(OECD, 2010c). A transaction is considered comparable if there are no differences 
between the transactions being compared that could materially affect the respective 
conditions being examined, or that any differences can be eliminated by reasonably 
accurate judgements (OECD 2010a, section 2.6). Attributes of a transaction that have 
to be comparable include the characteristics of goods or services transferred, the 
functions performed, the assets used and expected risks by the respective parties, the 
contractual terms, the economic circumstances of the parties, as well as their pursued 
business strategy (Musgrave, 1983). 
            2.5.1.2 Transactional profit method 
Transactional profit methods examine the profit effects arising from the intra-
trade transactions. Profits generated due to intra-trade transactions are used as an 
indicator of whether the transaction is affected by conditions that differ from the 
arm’s length price (OECD 2010b, s2a). Transactional profit methods are classified 
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into transactional net margin method and transactional profit split method (OECD 
2010b, s2.1). 
First, the net margin method examines the net profit in relation to an 
appropriate basis the tax payer realises from a controlled transaction. The basis could 
be revenues, costs, or assets. The OECD suggests that this method should only be 
used when one of the parties involved in the transaction makes valuable, unique 
contributions, as this is a one-sided method. If the comparables used are not 
considered close comparables, appropriate adjustments have to be made. It is 
difficult to determine the actual transfer price of the traded good, given that the 
target is the profit level indicator and not the resale price (OECD 2010b, s2b). 
Second, the transactional profit-split method uses functional and risk analysis 
to split profit between the parties involved in the intra-trade transaction (OECD, 
2010b, s2c). The approach of profit splitting is different from other transfer pricing 
methods, as the price or the profit generated from the transaction itself is not 
compared to external sources.  
The contribution analysis is essential in evaluating the relative value of the 
related parties’ contribution to the functions, or with regards to the transferred goods 
or services (OECD, 2010b, s2c). This method can be applied for highly integrated 
operations, where one of the one-sided methods would not be appropriate, or in cases 
where parties to the transaction make unique and valuable contributions. However, 
the profit-split method can be difficult to implement, as identifying the allocation 
key is not straight forward.  
In addition, it can be difficult to assess the correct costs carried by each 
involved part, as well as the actual profit generated from the transaction.  The OECD 
highlighted that despite the flexibility of this model, it is unlikely that one party 
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involved in the transaction will get an extreme profit, as all parties are being 
assessed. As such, the attempt to assess the right distribution of a reliable profit split 
based on the arm’s length principle can prove to be difficult and makes this method 
less prevalent (OECD, 2010b s2.58-2.67). 
            2.5.1.3 High complexity and uncertainty 
In order to apply the arm’s length principle in determining transfer prices, 
there is a need to obtain information on the relevantly comparable item. The 
underlying assumption in the case of CUP,  a method recommended by the OECD,  
is that the buyer would not accept a price above the market price, whereas the seller 
would not accept the price below (OECD, 2010b). In theory, the arm’s length prices 
should be equal to those that would be arrived at as a result of the bargaining process 
between independent entities. Prices may reflect the bargaining power of the 
involved parties.  
The arm’s length principle is also complex. The application requires that a 
comparison be made between a controlled transaction and a transaction selected on 
the open market on a transaction-by-transaction basis. A transaction is comparable to 
another if none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared 
could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology (e.g. price 
or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the 
effect. In reality, however, the determination of market prices is a dynamic process 
that inevitably produces a range of arm’s length prices susceptible to managers’ and 
tax administrators’ interpretations. 
It should also be mentioned that the current application of the arm’s length 
principle, guided by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, is arbitrary (OECD, 
2010b). The OECD states that both taxpayers and administrators should set the 
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transfer prices at a “reasonable estimate” based on reliable information. However, in 
reality, comparable data is simply just not available. In response to such an issue, the 
OECD advises both parties to “exercise judgement” to ascertain the reasonable 
estimate. Individual enterprises do not usually publish the details of their related 
party transactions due to confidentiality concerns. What is more problematic is that 
neither multinational enterprises, nor tax administrators have clear standards to 
evaluate the “reasonableness” of the arm’s length principle.  
Both developed and developing countries are keenly aware of the challenges 
posed by transfer pricing. Of particular note are developing countries lack of 
effective transfer pricing regimes, legislation, and sufficient administrative capacity 
to effectively implement the legislation, or both. These countries may be losing 
significant tax revenue as a result of both intentional and unintentional transfer 
mispricing. Several high profile court disputes highlight the ambiguity and 
complexity in applying and enforcing the arm’s length principle. For example, 
India’s tax office demanded tax payables of 30 billion rupees ($490 million) from 
Vodafone India Service Private. Vodafone India Service Private was charged for 
under-pricing shares in a right issue to its parent (Thomson Reuters, 2014). One of 
the largest disputes over the appropriate application of transfer pricing among related 
party transactions for taxable income by Glaxo SmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. 
& Subsidiaries (“GSK”) Internal Revenue Service resulted in a tax payment of $3.4 
billion to the Internal Revenue Service (Internal Revenue Service, 2006). These 
cases showed that it is difficult and complex to apply enforcement when 
sophisticated tax planning is being applied to determine the multinational entities’ 
taxable profit. 
 33 Chapter 2: Institutional Background 
            2.5.1.4  The arm’s length principle creates administrative burden 
As mentioned earlier, the application of the arm’s length principle can be 
arbitrary in certain cases. Complexity and uncertainty create administrative burdens 
for both the multinational enterprise and tax administrator. From the taxpayer's 
perspective, the administrative burden is reflected in compliance costs. The 
application of the arm’s length principle requires the multinational enterprise to 
obtain a substantial amount of data to justify its choice of transfer prices on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis. Corporate taxpayers need to justify the conditions 
for a transaction and the time it takes, and need to justify that these are consistent 
with the arm’s length principle. As such, there is an increasing need for 
documentation requirements in order to justify the chosen transfer prices. Empirical 
evidence shows that firm-specific transactions are problematic with the application 
of the arm’s length principle (Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003).  
On the other hand, the tax administrator needs to examine and evaluate 
significant numbers and types of cross-border transactions. The tax administrator 
would need to review the presented documentation by the taxpayer, increasing the 
need for tax audits on reviewing and challenging transfer pricing issues and the 
steady rise in the number of complicated and unique transactions within the 
multinational group. It is also challenging to gather information about comparable 
data, and the market conditions at the time the transactions took place. Such 
evaluation processes require vast amount of data that may not be readily available. 
The increasing business functions spread across several jurisdictions and the number 
of firm-specific intra-trade transactions will significantly influence administration 
and compliance costs. Existing literature provides evidence that US multinational 
entities have approximately 140 percent higher tax compliance costs compared to 
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domestic companies (Slemrod & Venkatesh, 2002). Similarly, in the European 
context, transfer pricing documentation is related to a significant increase in 
compliance costs, from 135 to 178 percent (European Communities, 2004; p. 41). In 
addition, the Internal Revenue Service of the United States has estimated that 31% of 
US multinational entities were spending between $100,000 and $1 million dollars 
annually on contemporaneous transfer pricing documentation (US Department of the 
Treasury, 2003). 
Before examining the plausible alternative for income allocation, commonly 
referred to as a unitary taxation regime, in Chapter 3, the following section provides 
the country and industry backgrounds of the Indonesian tax system and the 
characteristics of the mining industry. This thesis focuses on the context of 
developing countries, as these countries often have different needs and 
administrative capacities than those from the OECD member nations. For instance, 
Picciotto (2012, p14) pointed out that many poor developing countries do not have 
the resources to apply the complicated and time-consuming checks on transfer 
pricing endorsed by the OECD approach. 
2.6 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF INDONESIAN TAX SYSTEM 
The current Indonesian tax system is governed by Indonesia Income Tax Law 
(IITL). IITL is the tax law governing the multinational enterprise’s corporate income 
tax in Indonesia, based on a credit system that employs separate accounting based on 
the arm’s length principle. The IITL is based on the source-taxation principle, which 
stipulates that companies incorporated or domiciled in Indonesia are subjected to 
income tax on worldwide income. Consistent with the permanent establishment 
concept, branches of foreign companies are taxed only on those profits derived from 
activities carried on within the borders of Indonesia. However, the investment law 
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requires that a multinational entity that operates wholly or mostly in Indonesia as a 
separate business unit be organized under Indonesian law and reside in Indonesia. 
Branches are usually not permitted, except by foreign banks and oil and gas 
companies. In this sense, the Indonesian government has the right to tax income of 
resident subsidiaries of a multinational entity with a parent company or headquarters 
located outside of Indonesia’s borders (PWC, 2012a; PWC Australia, 2014).  
In line with the OECD’s position in applying the arm’s length principle to 
allocate multinational income, the IITL contains transfer pricing provisions under 
Article 18, which requires that all intercompany transactions be conducted in 
accordance with “fairness” and “common business practice”. The article’s 
implementing regulation PER-43/PJ/2010 (PER-43), which adopts the arm’s length 
principle, was promulgated by the tax authority on 6th September 2010. 
Amendments to this regulation were introduced by regulation PER 32/PJ/2011 
(PER-32)/PER-43, which mandates the preparation of transfer pricing 
documentation and provides the guidelines for establishing the arm’s length nature 
of the transactions (Deloitte, 2014; PWC, 2012a; PWC Australia, 2014). 
Specifically, articles 4, 23, 24 and 26 of IITL provide principles in determining 
taxable income based on the arm’s length principle, and it operates as one of the 
measures to counter tax avoidance and or evasion.  
The income of the multinational entities is taxed at a flat rate of 25%. The 
definition of income is based on the substance over form rule as: “Any increase in 
economics capacity received by or accrued by a taxpayer from Indonesia, as well as 
from offshore, which may be utilised for consumption or increasing the taxpayer’s 
wealth, in whatever name and form…” (PWC Australia, 2014). This rate applies to 
Indonesian companies and foreign companies operating in Indonesia through a 
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subsidiary of a foreign parent. The tax rate is reduced by five percentage points for 
listed companies that have at least 40% of their paid up capital traded on the stock 
exchange. Small and medium-scale domestic companies (that is, companies having 
gross turnover of up to IDR 50 billion) are entitled to a 50% reduction of the tax rate. 
The reduced rate applies to taxable income corresponding to a gross turnover of up 
to IDR 4,800,000,000. 
In applying the arm’s length principle, the use of comparable data is also 
problematic in the Indonesian context (Winarto, 2009). The lack of comparable data 
is a common issue for both developed and developing countries, although it is 
magnified for developing countries such as Indonesia, due to the smaller size of their 
economies and smaller number of independent entities operating in their markets that 
can be looked to for comparisons. In this case, there is a question as to whether 
regional comparable data can be used in the absence of local comparable data. 
Unfortunately, the OECD transfer pricing guidelines do not address such a concern.  
The practice of transfer pricing in multinational entities can potentially lower 
Indonesian tax revenue. Indonesia lost US$ 8.5 billion dollars in transfer mispricing 
between 2001 and 2010 (Kar & Freitas, 2012). Therefore, Indonesia provides a 
suitable country context to study the issue of international profit allocation. To 
address this matter, Indonesia has anti-avoidance provisions related to transfer 
pricing in Article 18 paragraph (3) Income Tax Law (Deloitte, 2014). This regulation 
obliges taxpayers who transact with related parties to apply the arm’s length 
principles by conducting comparability analysis and documenting every step in 
justifying the arm’s length price or profit. Since Indonesian guidelines are 
formulated based on the OECD guidelines, the shortcomings of the arm’s length 
principle described earlier are also extended to the Indonesian version. 
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Lastly, the Indonesian government treats mining multinational entities as a 
special sector, whereby, under the prevailing Income Tax Law no.36/2008 (“Tax 
Law”), the Government may issue a specific Government Regulation governing 
taxation of a mining business. The Government provides special tax treatment in 
order to attract investment from mining multinational entities. To date, the 
Government Regulation on mining taxation has not been an issue. Specifically, those 
companies that engage in mining are governed by a contract of work for income tax 
calculation (Deloitte, 2014, p. 8).  
2.7 UNIQUENESS OF MINING MULTINATIONAL ENTITIES 
The mining multinational entity and the industry within which it operates are 
significantly different from those of a non-mining multinational entity. The global 
mining industry is dominated by a few major players that operate in an integrated 
manner (Otto, 2001; Matthiason, 2001). Unlike the traditional industry, mining 
market is an oligopoly, in which the market prices are controlled by a few dominant 
players (Otto, 2001). The implication is that comparable data for the mining sector 
are controlled by a few parties that may specialize only in a range of mining 
products. Typically, there are various stages in the mining supply chain, from 
exploration to sales of refined metals that would involve related party transactions. 
These stages, including sales of mineral products, use of transfer of tangible and 
intangible assets, services transactions, royalties and financial arrangements, present 
an inherent transfer pricing risk. (Guj, et al., 2014, p. 8). 
Throughout these stages of mining production, there is an inherent risk of 
transfer pricing manipulation due to the non-availability of comparable data. The 
legally separate entities operate in each location as if they were a separate profit 
centre. The mining multinational entities could structure the ownership of know-
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how, designs, patents, and rights and assign them to low-tax subsidiaries. Services 
transactions and financial arrangements, which include corporate and support 
services, management services, technical services, R&D, financial and insurance 
services, marketing and transport could also be structured in an advantageous way to 
shift the profit by the mine operation in the source country, at a price where the 
comparable data is scarce. Hence, there may be limited publicly available market 
pricing data. It is also harder to find reliably quoted benchmark prices for unfinished 
mineral products and to monitor the quantity and quality of output. The lack of 
information may result in a failure to identify the most appropriate benchmarks 
available for determining the gross margin, as well as ascertaining ‘the specific 
adjustments’ in determining the appropriate pricing for the use of transfer of tangible 
and intangible assets. In this sense, the arm’s length principle creates a fundamental 
practical issue in using comparable data that appears to be difficult to resolve, 
especially in the context of the mining industry. From this perspective, mining 
multinational entities provide a suitable avenue to study the issue of international 
profit allocation. The inherent characteristic of the mining industry also poses 
challenges to applying the arm’s length principle, which will be discussed further. 
The first unique feature of a mining multinational entity is its business 
structure. The majority of mining multinational entities incorporated their parent 
companies in developed countries such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, while their mines and administrative operations are often 
located in resource-rich developing countries. A unique business structure results in 
difficulties in evaluating and enforcing transfer prices according to the arm’s length 
principle, as different mines often produce resources that consist of a different level 
of trade components (Williamson, 1975).  
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The use of subsidiaries in a tax haven is also very common among mining 
multinational entities. Nearly 70-80% of mining companies such as Transfigura and 
Rio Tinto, have their sales and marketing departments located in low-tax countries, 
such as Singapore (E&Y, 2012). Another similar study by Nick Mathiason, funded 
by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mapped out 6,038 subsidiaries 
owned by ten of the world’s most powerful extractive industry multinational entities 
(Matthiasson, 2011). The report revealed extractive multinational entities 
incorporated 6,038 subsidiaries in the secrecy jurisdictions. Secrecy jurisdictions 
refer as jurisdictions that purposely create regulation for the primary benefit and use 
of those non-resident in their geographical area (Matthiasson, 2011). The figure 
represented 34.5% of the total subsidiaries incorporated outside the home country. 
Mining multinational entities were able to export finishing goods through affiliates 
located in the secrecy jurisdictions. Although the findings were based on journalistic 
investigations and are not intended to claim that the multinational entities with 
subsidiaries in tax havens are engaging in tax avoidance, the report shows the 
complicated nature of the mining sector.  
Second, the determinants of transfer prices also differ among industries and 
the extent of related party transactions among the mining multinational entities are 
different from the non-mining multinational entities. The mining industry itself, 
unlike manufacturing, is heterogeneous and is governed by the arm’s length market 
that is one of long-term contracts. The mining contract is also unique in the way that 
it is tied to location and the depository underground. The contract terms depend inter 
alia on its purity and gravity, size of the ship transporting the cargo, and credit terms. 
In addition, the contractual terms can be valuable (Williamson, 1975). Given that the 
mining market, mining contract, and mining products are not homogeneous, this 
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challenges the ability to obtain comparable information for the application of the 
arm's length principle. Lall (1979) suggested that the lack of comparable data in the 
mining sector created more possibilities of manipulating transfer prices compared to 
other industries. 
Third, the mining industry is governed by a long production cycle. Mining 
companies typically have four phases of operations; namely exploration and 
evaluation, development, production, and closure and rehabilitation (PWC, 2012a). 
The long production phase in mining operations creates a higher risk of exposure 
during the exploration and evaluation stage (Daniel, Keen, & McPherson, 2010). It is 
common for mining multinational entities to use derivative financial instruments to 
mitigate both existing and potential risks. In addition, the volatility resulting from the 
requirement to measure commodity prices and foreign currency receivables and 
payables at fair value increases the financial risk to the mining multinational entities, 
as well as the absence of comparable economic data to determine the arm’s length 
transfer prices. 
Fourth, during the different phases of production, the host government will 
introduce different mining taxes, incentives, tax-holidays, and deductibility 
concessions. The long production cycle also creates opportunities for firms to exploit 
tax incentives. Certain regulations, such as PerMen 24 of the Indonesian regulation, 
allows certain activities (such as exploratory drilling and sampling, infrastructure 
construction, contract mining and overburden removal, hauling and barging) to be 
carried out by external parties located in different jurisdictions (PWC, 2012a, p. 7). 
Often, there is no clear cut between movements from one production phase to 
another phase, which enables opportunities to distort inter-jurisdictional allocation of 
service costs. 
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The fifth unique feature of a mining multinational entity is that mining firms 
have a finite life. In many cases, the mining firms exist for the purpose of extracting 
mineral reserves in the area governed by mining licenses or rights, with the majority 
of shares often held by mining finance companies. Similarly, the use of joint venture 
schemes is common in extractive industries; where individual organisations may 
have finite lives, but not the group (Luther, 1996).  
Sixth, extractive sectors often involve complex technical and financial 
processes that require a high degree of expertise. Multinational entities, rather than 
governments, often do much of the accounting for tax payments, especially in 
developing countries. High reliance on taxes on profits encourages cost inflation and 
facilitates mispricing by companies. Luther (1996) argued that resource-rich 
countries tended to have a high degree of integration into the global economy, but 
through a limited number of channels. These provide opportunities to incentivizing 
tax avoidance opportunities. Underreporting the volume or quality of the resource 
produced (e.g., through biased oil volume measurements or misreporting of ore 
grade) is also common, especially when measurement involves technical expertise 
and equipment. Accurate volume reporting for tax purposes is a major concern in 
many countries, including such high-profile cases, such as Iraq and Nigeria 
(McPherson & MacSearraigh, 2007). 
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Table 1. Mining development cycle and risk level for transfer mispricing 
Mining development cycle Possibility of tax evasion channelled 
through transfer mispricing 
Licensing High, through setting fiscal framework 
Exploration High, through expenditure inflation 
Development High, through procurement over-
invoicing 
Production High, through transfer mispricing and 
over-invoicing 
Trading and Transportation High, through transfer mispricing and 
under-invoicing 
Refining and marketing Medium, through smuggling of untaxed 
of subsidised products 
End phase High, through early exit or false 
bankruptcy 
Source: (Al-Kasim, Soreide, & Williams, 2008; Kolstad & Soreide, 2009) 
 
The above table shows that at different phases of mining activities, there are different 
types of risks and opportunities involved in for transfer mispricing. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the arm’s length principle was analysed at the theoretical and 
practical level. This chapter is useful to orientate readers on the institutional 
background, highlighting the causes of the potential problems with the application of 
the arm’s length principle in the context of international profit allocation. 
It is worth noting that despite the increasing difficulties in the applying arm’s 
length principle, the OECD continues to support the application of the arm’s length 
principle as the primary profit allocation method among the associated entities based 
on international consensus. Political concerns will remain an important hurdle in the 
reform agenda; and even a theoretically superior taxation mechanism may easily fail 
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if it does not achieve international consensus. The problems of the arm’s length 
principle are likely to continue or even worsen, as the principle may not always 
account for the economies of scale created by the integrated business. E-commerce 
also allows businesses to conduct their economic activities without any physical 
establishment. The lack of comparable data in determining the appropriate usage of 
the arm’s length principle incentivises and provides multinational entities with the 
scope to engage in tax-motivated transactions and production-shifting.  
Indonesia is representative of the jurisdiction where tax administrators fail to 
tax income in the jurisdictions that give rise to those profit. The underlying caused 
may be due to intentional or inability to control transfer pricing. Furthermore, the 
inherent characteristics of the mining industry may require a taxation system that is 
different from non-mining multinational entities. This chapter can also be seen as an 
initial review of the suitability of the arm’s length principle as a profit allocation 
mechanism in an integrated global economy, which will be examined in Research 
Question 1 in Chapter 6. The next chapter provides a review on the commonly 
suggested income allocation method referred to as a unitary taxation method. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines an alternative method for international profit allocation 
referred to as a unitary taxation regime. First, Section 3.2 introduces the concept of 
unitary taxation and formulary apportionment. Second, Section 3.3 examines the 
underlying principles that guide the unitary taxation regime - the origin and 
destination principles. Next, Section 3.4 provides an overview of the theoretical 
benefits and Section 3.5 reviews the theoretical drawbacks of unitary taxation and 
formulary apportionment compared to the existing arm’s length, separate-entity 
taxation. Section 3.6 discusses the implementation and design issues in connection 
with defining the unitary business and the apportionment formula. Finally, Section 
3.7 concludes the chapter.  
3.2 A UNITARY TAXATION REGIME WITH FORMULARY 
APPORTIONMENT 
Unitary taxation is not a new concept. As early as 1970, theoretical studies 
had already proposed unitary taxation using formulary apportionment as a viable 
alternative to the arm’s length principle as a means of determining the proper level of 
profits across taxing jurisdictions (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1973). A unitary taxation 
approach is based on the underpinning theory that a multinational entity exists as a 
single economic entity that decentralises its operations and functions across 
jurisdictions in order to tap the benefits from being present at each of the locations 
(Mahoney, 2009). The integration theory further explains that multinational entities 
flourish because of the synergies of an integrated network that helps to achieve 
economies of scale and competitiveness in the global marketplace (Beamish & 
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Banks, 1987; Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 1995). Accordingly, the profits generated 
as a group are larger than the sum of its parts, and any attempt to allocate income 
based on the group legal ownership structure cannot yield a reasonable estimation of 
the related parties’ appropriate net income (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007).  
Unitary taxation looks beyond the concept of a separate legal entity that 
exists under the current system; rather it focuses on the underlying economic 
activities of the group. In this manner, any profits arising out of the intra-trade 
transactions would be disregarded, as there is no third party involved. The worldwide 
income of a multinational group is consolidated into a single taxable unit through 
consolidation of the tax bases of affiliated entities. As such, there is no need to 
identify or quantify income earned by separate affiliates or subsidiaries located in 
different jurisdictions or to isolate those intra-group transactions. From this 
perspective, a unitary taxation approach is better at reflecting the economic 
substance of the multinational entity (Mahoney, 2009). 
The terms unitary taxation and formulary apportionment are commonly used 
interchangeably. In general, a unitary taxation approach is used together with 
formulary apportionment. However, they are different and should be differentiated 
based on an analytical approach. For instance, the OECD does not explicitly clarify 
the difference between these two terms. The OECD simply describes global 
formulary apportionment as the non-arm’s length approach to profit allocation on a 
consolidated basis among the associated entities in different jurisdictions based on a 
pre-determined formula (OECD, 2010b).  
In contrast, Weiner explained that unitary taxation and formulary 
apportionment were different. She pointed out that a unitary taxation approach was 
“The process of combining the functionally integrated operations of a multiple-entity 
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affiliated corporate group that operates as a single integrated operation of a 
multiple-entity affiliated corporate group that operates as a single economic 
enterprise into a single unit for the purposes of determining the taxable unit.” 
(Weiner, 2007).  
On the other hand, formulary apportionment is the process of allocating the 
taxable income of single or a multiple entities using a formula. The typical 
apportionment formula includes factors such as payroll, assets, and sales, which 
quantify the actual geographical location of its activities according to the real 
economic activities in each place. The allocation formula and its relative weights 
represent a policy choice for income allocation based on approximation, rather than 
achieving perfect precision over the economic activities of multinational entities. 
The formulary apportionment acts an approximation mechanism that allocates 
income, while ignoring the distinctive conditions of multinational entities’ 
investments in different jurisdictions (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2010).  
A unitary taxation approach is commonly operationalized using formulary 
apportionment for assigning the consolidated tax base into “A portion of the total 
income of a company and its branches that operate in several locations to each 
individual location” (Morse, 2010). Thereafter, the consolidated tax bases will be 
apportioned to the taxing jurisdictions according to economically significant 
formula.  
Accordingly, formulary apportionment could be applied to different levels of 
unitary taxation. From this perspective, unitary taxation can be viewed to exist along 
a spectrum that is dependent on the definition of the unitary business and the degree 
of tax base consolidation that will be apportioned by a formulaic approach. At the 
lower level of the spectrum, tax base definition would entail a limited combination of 
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profit/loss after separate accounting (Ting, 2013). Complete consolidation of income, 
expenses, and tax attributes across the corporate group occurs in full consolidation 
systems, and would be considered at the high end of the spectrum (Siu, et al., 2014). 
The level of consolidation could also be assigned based on geographic 
boundaries, such as state level, national level, or within an integrated market such as 
the European Union. Similarly, the level of consolidation can be applied to some 
sources of business units of a multinational entity and to certain types of income. For 
such an approach, there is a need to distinguish these sources of income from other 
sources, but this does not require group-wide consolidation efforts. That is, a 
formulary apportionment does not require a unitary taxation regime; however, a 
unitary taxation regime will require formulary apportionment for allocation 
purposes. 
Against this background, one of the most fundamental issues in 
implementing a unitary taxation approach is contending with the definitional issue of 
how to define a unitary business, the scope of the tax base and the apportionment 
formula. This definition influences the level of consolidation, the scope of the tax 
base, and the part of the tax base that is subjected to income apportionment. After the 
definitional issues have been addressed, there is then a need to examine appropriate 
factors to be included in the apportionment formula. 
Currently, the unitary taxation approach is only applied at the state level, 
such as federal states in the United States, the Canadian provinces, and Swiss 
cantons. The furthest attempt to consider cross-countries group taxation has been 
undertaken by the European Union Common Consolidated Tax Base (CCCTB) 
project for its member countries. As such, it is appropriate to note that existing 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 48 
literature that has studied formulary apportionment based on these jurisdictions differ 
in their degrees of tax consolidation and apportionment formula.  
Many proponents of unitary taxation argue the difficulties in achieving 
international coordination and consensus, especially on the definition of unitary 
taxation, the extent of tax base consolidation and the use of pre-determined formula, 
thereby increasing the risk of double taxation - that form the fundamental 
implementation bloc of any unitary taxation system (OECD, 2010b, p. 36). The 
OECD has taken a strong position that any reform away from the arm’s length 
principle would violate the international consensus necessary to prevent the risk of 
double taxation.  
On the other hand, it is arguable that even in the current system there is no 
true international consensus, as the determination of the arm’s length principle is 
often arbitrary and subject to different interpretations on a range of transfer prices 
(Picciotto, 2012). Undoubtedly, the formulary apportionment has its own 
imperfections, as shown in the US and Canadian experiences, and one would expect 
the same challenges to occur in the context of international taxation. Against this 
background, this thesis argues that it is necessary to examine the theoretical 
arguments for and against the unitary taxation regime in comparison with those of 
the arm’s length principle before rejecting it outright. 
Before examining the theoretical advantages of unitary taxation, the next 
section discusses the principle of origin and destination principles as the guiding 
principles of a unitary taxation regime. If unitary taxation is to be pursued, there is a 
need for a paradigm shift of taxing rights from allocation based on source and 
residence taxation, to allocation on the basis of the principles of origin and 
destination. 
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3.3 ORIGIN AND DESTINATION PRINCIPLES 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the current international tax system for 
assigning taxing rights is based on the principle of source and residence jurisdiction, 
which is no longer relevant to a globalised world economy (Devereux & Feria, 
2014). For this reason, there is a need to re-examine the fundamental principles of 
international tax system. This chapter, therefore, sets out the basic principles to 
consider the potential reform option based on a unitary taxation regime in the context 
of its comparative advantages over the current system in Chapter 6 and the 
associated implementation issues in Chapter 7.  
In general, a unitary taxation based on the principle of origin and destination 
has been proposed as a plausible alternative to taxing multinational entities in the 
context of international profit allocation. Unlike the separate accounting approach 
with the arm’s length principle that depends on resource and source-based taxation, 
unitary taxation is closely related to the concept of origin and destination principles. 
Under the destination principle, income is taxed in the jurisdiction where it is 
consumed, based on the economic theory of demand, regardless of the location of the 
income producing activities (OECD, 2007). In this sense, the destination and origin-
based taxation principles are more aligned with the globalised nature of world 
economy (Devereux & Feria, 2014). 
The residence principle under factor income taxation is parallel to the 
destination principle under consumption taxation. The concept of residence taxation 
normally implies that taxes are levied on factor income in the country where the 
taxpayer resides and the destination principle implies the taxes are levied on 
commodities in the country where consumption takes place. However, residence and 
destination jurisdictions are not necessarily the same place. Just as residence 
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principle taxation results in taxation where the taxpayer resides, even if domestic 
residents consume abroad (OECD, 2007). 
On the other hand, the source principle under factor income taxation is 
parallel to the origin principle under consumption taxation. Both concepts refer to 
the place where income is generated. However, the concept of source is normally 
associated with the place where income is earned and the concept of origin is 
normally associated with the place where goods and services are produced (OECD, 
2007). 
3.4 THEORETICAL ADVANTAGES OF UNITARY TAXATION 
This section examines the following theoretical advantages proposed by the 
implementation of a unitary taxation regime: (1) better reflection of the underlying 
economic substance of multinational entities, (2) elimination of the tax incentives to 
shift income, (3) promotion of simplicity in the tax system.  
3.4.1 Better reflection of the underlying economic substance of multinational 
entities 
Global formulary apportionment aims to approximate the economic 
substance of a multinational entity by apportioning the worldwide income using a 
formula. Factors within the apportionment formula would reflect the economic 
activity undertaken by the multinational group. In this sense, the global formulary 
apportionment is better at reflecting a highly integrated business network and 
provides greater consistency with economic reality compared to the separate 
accounting approach.  
Under a unitary taxation approach, multinational entities’ global incomes are 
consolidated and the share that is taxed by each national jurisdiction depends on the 
share of the subsidiaries’ economic activity that occurs in a particular country. 
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Furthermore, unitary taxation does not create an artificial legal distinction among 
different types of firms across geographical and judicial areas of the individual 
subsidiaries, and regardless of whether multinational entities are organised as 
subsidiaries, branches or hybrid entities. Without the artificial distinction, Eichner & 
Runkel (2008) supported that the separate-accounting approach was inconsistent 
with the economic reality of the operations of related groups in an international 
context. 
When unitary taxation allocates income with formulary apportionment, it is 
argued that a truly precise definition of economic value is unlikely to happen. 
Nevertheless, formulary apportionment provides a reasonable, administrable, and 
conceptually satisfying compromise that is better than separate accounting to reflect 
the global economy. The underlying rationale to use the allocation formula, which 
includes typical factors such as assets, sales, and labour, is to reflect the underlying 
economic substance undertaken by multinational entities. In this sense, the 
apportionment formula should reflect the location of economic activity engaged in 
by multinational entities. 
In the context of Europe, James R. Hines Jr. (2010) analysed financial 
information of large multinational entities using regressing profits on factors 
commonly used in formulary apportionment. Results showed that formulary 
apportionment might distort actual income attributable to a given country if the 
three-factor apportionment formula failed to reflect the economic activities of those 
firms. Hines used 2004 cross-sectional firm-level data for European companies. With 
a sample size of 11,103 and using weighted least squares, he estimated that when a 
three-factor formula of sales, plant, property, and equipment (PP&E), and labour 
(either labour compensation or number of employees) were taken into account, both 
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sales and PP&E were statistically significant and positively correlated with profit, 
indicating that formulary apportionment reflected the underlying economic activity 
of the firm (Hines Jr, 2010). 
In a more recent study, Rassier and Koncz-Bruner (2013) measured majority-
owned foreign affiliates of US parents and showed that the reattribution from these 
foreign affiliates to the parents was relatively small, with less than 5 percent of the 
value-added attributed to these subsidiaries to US parents under separate accounting. 
Additionally, in their preliminary work, they applied formulary apportionment to 
imports and exports between US parents and their foreign affiliates. Results yielded 
a relatively large decrease in imports - approximately 3 percent of published total 
private service imports, but the effects of export remained low with a minimal GDP 
effect at approximately 0.1%. They concluded that formulary apportionment 
reflected a better picture of measured output by industry sector and country that was 
more in line with economic activity and more consistent with expectations than 
separate accounting.  
Against this background, unitary taxation with an apportionment mechanism 
is theoretically superior. The concern with regards to the choice of the factors is 
considered a practical implementation issue that should be addressed separately and 
would not undermine the theoretical soundness of such an approach. 
3.4.2 Eliminates the tax incentive to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions 
Within this integrated related group, allocating income and expenses across 
different jurisdictions is complex and conceptually challenging. The worldwide 
income is generated by interactions between subsidiaries or affiliates across 
countries. Such allocations also generate opportunities for multinational entities to 
reduce worldwide tax payable by shifting income to low tax jurisdictions through 
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application of transfer pricing under the arm’s length principle. Despite strict 
regulations and monitoring, existing literature has provided empirical results in line 
with the existence of such practices. For example, Pak and Zdanowicz (2002) found 
that a US company paid $3,050 per litre for mineral water imported from the 
Netherlands, $ 8,252 per wristwatches imported from China, but sold airplane seats 
for only 10 cents to China. 
With formulary apportionment, there is no need to “estimate” arm’s length 
prices in the absence of appropriate comparable transactions or benchmarks. 
Picciotto (2012) highlighted the benefits of formulary apportionment over the current 
arm’s length principle to allocate profit as the following: 
1. The need for detailed scrutiny of internal accounts and pricing and the 
negotiation of adjustments under the arm’s length principle. 
2. The need to deal with profit shifting within the firm, especially using 
tax havens by complex anti-avoidance measures. 
3. Source and residence attribution rules. 
 In particular, some researchers suggest formulary apportionment as an 
alternative to the complexities of determining transfer prices and applying the arm’s 
length standard in the determination of international tax payable by multinational 
groups. Martens-Weiner (2006) discussed in depth issues related to replacing 
separate accounting for companies operating in Europe with a system of formulary 
apportionment for the European Union as an approach to address the transfer pricing 
issue. 
In related work, Fuest, Hemmelgarn, and Ramb (2007) found that smaller 
European countries, such as Ireland and the Netherlands, that are currently securing a 
relatively large tax base under the separate accounting method, would have their tax 
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base shrink under formulary apportionment. On the other hand, larger countries with 
a higher tax rate, such as Germany, Italy, France or Great Britain, would have their 
tax bases enlarge. It is also worth noting that both Ireland and the Netherlands are 
considered tax havens according to the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy 
Index (Tax Justice Network, 2013). Clausing (2009) studied the economic impact on 
the United States due to income shifting by US multinational firms based on 
regressions that considered how profit rates (profit to sales ratio) depended on 
affiliate country tax rates. She found that the yearly regression results varied for the 
period studied, from 1995 to 2004. One representative calculation found that in 
2002, US corporate profits would be $170 billion higher in the absent of income 
shifting. Other repercussions included the loss of additional generated profits of $54 
billion in tax revenue, assuming additional profits were taxed at an effective tax rate 
of 32%. 
Other studies have estimated similar results. Shackleford and Slemrod (1998) 
estimated that formulary apportionment raised tax liabilities for some industries and 
firms while lowering burdens for others. The oil and gas industry would see an 
increase in tax liabilities of 81% compared with 29% for all other firms in their 
study. They found that revenues would increase by 38% under a three-factor 
formulary apportionment system. More recently, Clausing and Lahav (2011), 
extended Slemrod and Shackelford's (1998) paper by examining the effects of policy 
choices across the US using data from 1986 to 2012. Similarly, they found that 
formulary apportionment would increase tax revenue, albeit to a lesser extent, at 
around 23%. 
Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2007) argued that their proposed system of 
formulary apportionment, which included sales as a single factor, would prevent 
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profit shifting by multinational groups and thus protect the US tax base. However, 
formulary apportionment does not solve the profit shifting problem entirely, and 
such opportunities still exist via the relationships of the group with non-consolidated 
affiliates. Nevertheless, given that it is usually more difficult to exert financial and 
operational control over non-affiliates subsidiaries to create a favourable transfer 
pricing strategy, profit-shifting under formulary apportionment would be more 
difficult and complex, and multinational entities have the ability to use transfer 
pricing by re-locating their taxable income to low-tax countries would be 
significantly reduced (Avi-Yonah, et al., 2008). Mintz and Smart (2004) studied the 
effects of taxable income based on sampling data from the Canadian Customs and 
Revenue Agency for the period of 1986 to 1999, with part of the multijurisdictional 
firms required to allocate income to Canadian provinces by formula. The findings 
indicated that for firms that were required to apply formulary apportionment, taxable 
income was far less sensitive to the tax rate, indicating less income shifting. 
When the apportionment formula is applied against a unitary taxation 
approach, each part of the multinational entity contributes to the overall profits of the 
entity. The accounting for income earned in each jurisdiction is no longer relevant. 
Unlike separate accounting, the focus shifts from the individual transactions to the 
contribution made by the separate parts of the entity. Without the use of uncontrolled 
comparable data, the formulary apportionment approach would replace major 
elements that create fundamental problems for taxation of multinational entities 
under the arm’s length principle (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007). As multinational 
entities want to reduce tax payable to the host government and taxing authorities 
want to collect their fair share of tax, there will always be conflict of interest 
between both parties. Accordingly, incentives for income shifting are significantly 
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reduced and will also encourage less tax-distorted decisions regarding the location of 
economic activity. 
3.4.3 A simpler tax regime 
A move to formulary apportionment would, to a great extent, overcome 
direct profit shifting and transfer pricing problems by neutralizing most transfer 
pricing strategies in intra-group transaction. These highlighted benefits would 
prevent tax liability manipulation under global formulary apportionment that reflects 
an internationally integrated and connected business entity that is taxed as a unitary 
business. As such, even if the multinational group established subsidiaries in low tax 
jurisdictions or a tax haven, the transfer prices within the group would be eliminated, 
and the group would declare a combined taxable income. Therefore, unitary taxation 
with apportionment would eliminate the incentive to set up subsidiaries in the tax 
haven that aims to engage in tax evasion or avoidance. Intrinsically, profit shifting 
would be eliminated because intra-group transactions would be ignored, in addition 
to artificial income earned through transfer pricing to low-tax jurisdictions. This 
would, therefore, simplify the current international tax system (Tax Justice Network, 
2013).  
From the lens of a developing country, under the proliferation of global and 
multilateral standard-setting and policy enforcing organisations such as the United 
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and OECD, the development of 
international tax norms are often spearheaded by the developed countries and the 
developing countries follow suit. However, the capability to administer and enforce 
the tax systems is clearly weaker in developing countries. Moving away from 
separate accounting, and its vulnerabilities to income shifting, would allow a 
substantially simplified international tax system.  
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Based on unitary taxation with apportionment, the implication would 
eliminate many of the costly compliance requirements under the current system, such 
as the contemporaneous documentation rule, resulting in huge administrative savings 
for corporate taxpayers and the government. The move to apportioning income based 
on observable economic activity as compared to finding comparable data would 
bring about greater certainty in the international tax system, as businesses are 
utilising information technologies to manage and structure their operations (Spengel 
& Schäfer, 2003).  
The lack of resources and technical capacity in most-developing countries to 
obtain useful information on taxpayers, and counter tax evasion and avoidance 
practices by some multinational group significantly perpetuates the problem. In the 
past, many developed countries have adopted measures to prevent profit outflows 
from their borders, such as general anti-avoidance rules, thin-capitalisation rules, and 
specific transfer pricing legislation, and controlled foreign company (CFC) rules. 
These strategies often focus on deterring, detecting, and responding to aggressive tax 
planning. However, these measures do not exist in many developing countries, and 
the enforcement methods might be overburdening for the multinationals. In a recent 
survey conducted by E&Y, 85% of multinational entities considered transfer pricing 
as their top priority, stating the concern on the increasing complexity of transfer 
pricing documentation of pricing policy and calculations to avoid penalty 
assessment. The multinational entities rely on documentation to justify that their 
revenues are legitimate (E&Y, 2012). Therefore, developing countries would need a 
much simpler tax system to distribute multinationals’ income.  
Multinational entities are faced with high compliance costs when dealing 
with many different tax systems. In Europe, formulary apportionment under a 
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common consolidated corporate tax base approach simplifies the losses offset of one 
subsidiary against gains in another within the nation. A Commission survey in the 
context of the European Union showed this would immediately benefit 50% of non-
financial and 17% of financial firms. It would also remove tax impediments to intra-
group reorganisations. Tax compliance would reduce by approximately 7% in 
recurring tax-compliance costs and over 60% for opening a subsidiary in another 
nation state (European Commission, 2011a). However, the cost for tax 
administration might not be reduced as much, due to the need to operate two systems 
in parallel. One would expect similar situations to surface in an international context 
(Roin, 2008). 
3.5 THEORETICAL DRAWBACKS OF UNITARY TAXATION WITH 
APPORTIONMENT 
Unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is not without its 
shortcomings. International agreement and cooperation have to be achieved over the 
definition of a unitary business, in addition to the definition of the enforcement of 
application of formula. As a unitary taxation approach consolidates income and 
apportions income according to an approximation, it inevitably has to deal with 
distortion issues.  
3.5.1 International agreement and co-operation 
When countries decide to embrace unitary taxation into the design of their 
domestic tax regime, they have to surrender part of their sovereignty in order to 
achieve international consensus. Thus, in order to implement a unitary taxation 
approach, there is a need to seek consensus to shift the way income is allocated from 
using the arm’s length, separate accounting approach to using a unitary taxation 
based on a formulaic approach. Specifically, OECD states that achieving 
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international agreement is hard, and thus formulary apportionment would create 
double taxation or non-taxation of income (OECD 2010b, s3.64). The fact that the 
OECD endorses the arm’s length principle is not because of its theoretical or 
practical superiority, but rather its international acceptance (OECD, 2010b). 
Achieving consensus is challenging given that the pace of a tax system 
depends on the complexity and mobility of the relevant tax base, and countries 
would seek to maximise their own interests (Avi-Yonah, 2012). The United States 
and Canadian experiences with formulary apportionment and value-added tax 
administration in many countries have demonstrated the challenges in determining 
which part of the income is subjected to apportionment, and how to define sales 
destination and the tax base. It may appear that in a global context, achieving 
international consensus on a unitary taxation regime seems challenging. 
Furthermore, the arm’s length principle is deeply embedded into current 
international tax treaties. Nevertheless, there is compatibility between the formulary 
apportionment model and existing international tax rules – in particular, the bilateral 
tax treaty network. The arm’s length principle forms the fundamental principles of 
all tax treaties and is therefore considered binding, but the embodiment in the treaties 
is insufficient to create a customer international law ban on unitary taxation, as 
article 7(4) is embodied as well (Avi-Yonah & Tinhaga, 2013). Thus, developing 
countries should be able to apply unitary taxation, as many developing country 
treaties contain article 7(4). 
Once a unitary taxation regime is implemented, there will be changes in the 
tax base and overall tax revenue among different jurisdictions. For instance, in the 
context of the EU CCCTB, corporate revenue under the European formulary 
apportionment version, overall tax revenue would be likely to decline by 2.5% if 
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companies could choose whether to participate. By contrast, if formulary 
apportionment is to be applied mandatorily, total tax revenue would be likely to 
increase by more than 2%, especially in higher tax countries such as Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom (Devereux & Loretz, 2008). Accordingly, one would expect 
opposition from countries that would have their tax base reduced once a unitary 
taxation is in place, thereby limiting the success to achieve international 
collaboration.  
The issue of international coordination and integration, although difficult, is 
not impossible to overcome. Morse (2010) suggested the United States could 
unilaterally adopt a destination sales based formulary apportionment system in the 
hope that system usage would be adopted by the other nations. Importantly, the 
design of a unitary taxation regime should consider different positions and 
perspectives of other nations so that the interests of various nations are weighed 
appropriately, in order to achieve greater chances for acceptance. 
3.5.2 Economic distortions 
Formulary apportionment would result in certain unavoidable economic 
distortions. From the perspective of neoclassical economy, tax distortions are caused 
by income shifting activities between capital and labour, profit shifting strategies 
across different jurisdictions, and the taxation effects on business location and 
foreign direct investment. Distortions opportunities can happen when there is no 
consensus or uniform application of the tax base definition and the apportionment 
formula, as jurisdictions may pursue their own interests (OECD 2010, para 3.65) 
Formulary apportionment may distort a company’s business decisions if 
profits are apportioned according to firm-specific factors such as labour, sales, and 
investment decisions. The economic decision can also be distorted by the incentive 
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effects for both the multinational entities that operate in different jurisdictions and 
for the government that shapes the structure of formulary apportionment, thus, also 
contributing to the incentive for tax competition. The interactions between 
apportionment formula with the firm’s factor choices create tax competition.  
Gordon and Wilson (1986) compared formulary apportionment to property 
taxation in a stimulation based on identical countries. The findings showed that tax 
competition was harmful under both types of taxes, but that welfare was lowest when 
the formulary apportionment tax was applied. Anand and Sansing (2000) provided 
further explanations on why firms preferred certain formula models despite the 
traditional same weighting model that would result in the greatest aggregate social 
welfare. They employed an obligatory formulary apportionment application where 
the apportionment choices were varied based on economic incentives of States to 
select different apportionment formula. The major findings included social welfare 
being maximized when States coordinated on the choice of apportionment formulas. 
Second, States would in general have unilateral incentives to deviate from any such 
coordinated solutions. States that imported natural resources had incentives to 
increase their sales factors. On the other hand, States that exported natural resources 
would prefer apportionment factors based on production. These predictions 
connected the variation in choices of apportionment formulas according to the 
State’s degree of exports and imports. However, the results were limited, in a sense 
that some inputs were completely immobile, and tax rates and bases were not only 
exogenously given, but also equal across the region.  
In an oligopolistic industry, such as the car industry and the oil industry, it 
has been shown by Schjelderup and Sorgard (1997) that transfer prices trade off tax 
incentives against strategic incentives. The strategic role of the transfer price 
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emerges because the multinational utilises transfer pricing as an instrument to 
capture market shares in local markets and thereby increase its profit. Under 
imperfect market competition, such as oligopolistic, a change from the current arm’s 
length principle to formula apportionment does not eliminate the problem of profit 
shifting via transfer pricing (Nielsen, Raimondos–Møller, & Schjelderup, 2003). The 
authors conducted the study based on theoretical models that assumed countries 
agreed on the international tax principle (either in the form of separate accounting or 
formulary apportionment) but set their own tax rate. When comparing both taxation 
regimes, findings showed that a shift to formulary apportionment approach would 
not eliminate tax spill-overs (Nielson, Pascalism, & Guttorm, 2010). 
Gupta and Hofmann (2003) considered the impact of formula choices, tax 
rates, and other policy choices, such as investment incentives on capital expenditure 
effects over the period 1983 to 1996. In the specifications that employ fixed effects, 
the effects of tax policy measures were smaller than in other specifications, but still 
statistically significant. They noted that revenue losses associated with lower tax 
burdens were more likely consequential than the effects on investment magnitudes. 
Klassen and Shackelford (1998) considered the effect of sales weights in the 
apportionment formula to manufacturing revenue, their measure of sales, over the 
period revenues were sensitive to the tax rate applied to sales. 
Another alternative for evaluating economic distortions created by corporate 
taxation is to compute the deadweight loss. Deadweight loss represents the 
difference between the losses incurred by the consumer and the producer and the 
amount of tax collected. Hines Jr (2010) evaluated the accuracy of formulary 
apportionment rules from the perspective of ownership decisions. Findings showed 
that more than 76% of the time income allocated using an equally-weighted three 
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factors formula based on property, employment, and sales, exceeded predicted 
income. While 35% of the time allocated income exceeded three times the predicted 
income. As a result, formula choices might distort investment decisions in 
connection with international mergers and divestitures by shifting taxable income 
between operations in jurisdictions with differing tax rates. However, they suggested 
that the associated deadweight loss could be minimized by choosing an appropriate 
formula.  
Proponents of formulary apportionment state that the adoption of global 
formulary apportionment will create a certain kind of perverse incentive. First, the 
origin-based incentives based on sales factors would create a certain kind of 
incentive for firms to merge, so as to reduce their tax obligations. This cross-border 
merger distortion applies if all firms have adopted destination sales formulary 
apportionment (DSFA) and tax rates differ across jurisdictions (Gordon & Wilson, 
1986). At this stage, current literature is unable to ascertain the extent of the 
productive activity location incentives produced by origin-based incentives, such as 
business to business sales, and by cross-border merger distortions under global 
DSFA. However, in relative comparison between current corporate tax reform 
measures, especially those adopted domestically, global DSFA has less avenues to 
amend the law or change international consensus if the results are undesirable. 
Incremental measures do not present the same degree of combined uncertainty and 
inflexibility.  
Proponents also argue that an open and discrete formula under the 
multilateral formulary apportionment regime to allocate group profits to different 
countries would be preferred to the current transfer pricing regime, which often 
involves arbitrary judgements and negotiations between multinational entities and 
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tax officials. For instance, the European Commission has criticized the current 
regime as arbitrary in its allocation of the group’s profits among countries (European 
Parliament, 2011).  
The argument that formulary apportionment results in more economic 
distortion than separate accounting, however, might be attenuated in several 
dimensions. First, existing research finds more aggressive tax competition or 
stronger cross-border tax externalities under formulary apportionment, as compared 
to under separate accounting. These studies have commonly excluded some crucial 
externalities that may arise under separate accounting, the most important being 
transfer pricing manipulation by taxpayers. After taking into account transfer pricing 
manipulation, the tax competition and revenue effects of the choice between 
formulary apportionment and separate accounting seem to be ambiguous. More 
fundamentally, it is questionable whether the externality and tax competition effects 
of formulary apportionment or separate accounting taxation can be logically 
compared, as it has been asserted that the set ups of the two methods are simply too 
different for any comparison to be meaningful.  
The existing studies illustrate an important point about distortion and formula 
choices. The actual economic distortions are heavily dependent on the choice of 
apportionment factors. Therefore, this thesis argues that the distortions are 
theoretical drawbacks of formulary apportionment that should be addressed and 
should not be the basis for rejection. The practical implementation issues of formula 
choices should be designed to address such distortions.  
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3.6 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES: THE DESIGN OF A UNITARY 
TAXATION REGIME 
As mentioned earlier, unitary taxation with an apportionment regime is not 
free from conceptual weaknesses, but these problems do not seem any greater than 
what exists under the arm’s length, separate accounting approach. Any reform of the 
corporate taxation system would doubtless have its weakness, but the matter is in the 
comparative advantages that reform would bring. The construction of any tax system 
necessarily involves choosing between competing alternatives. The next section 
reviews and analyses the implementation rationales and issues of the following 
taxing jurisdictions - the United States, Canada, the EU in the context of proposed 
CCCTB, and Switzerland. Thereafter, the practical aspects of a unitary taxation 
regime will be discussed in connection with (1) how to define a unitary business; (2) 
the scope of the tax base; (3) the definition and determination of the allocation 
formula; (4) the weighting factors within the formula. 
3.6.1 Experiences of existing jurisdictions 
The following section examines experiences of existing jurisdictions that 
have applied formulary apportionment at state, province, and cantonal-levels, as well 
as the proposed unitary taxation regime for the European Union internal market. 
3.6.1.1 The United States experiences 
The United States approach to defining unitary taxation differs across 
different states (Weiner, 2005a). The United States experience reflects the strong 
attempt by US states to protect their own sovereignty. Under the US approach the 
distinction between business and non-business income is made. Business income is 
allocated among taxing jurisdictions, while non-business income is allocated to 
specific jurisdictions (Weiner, 2005b). Business income includes income arising 
from transactions and activities in the ordinary course of business, and includes 
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income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management and 
disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayers’ regular trade or 
business operations. All other income, other than business income, is considered 
non-business income. Most US states follow this approach and divide the tax base 
between business and non-business income, with few other states following the 
alternative allocation approach. 
In the United States, state tax administration is required to identify whether 
there are factual connections to the state associated with the business income. Such a 
requirement has led to a long and troubling history, under which it is necessary to 
identify separate unitary businesses within a taxpayer’s overall operations and 
separately apportion the income from each of those operations. 
 It is unlikely that formulary apportionment at an international level would 
require a distinction between business and non-business income. Although it seems 
theoretically attractive to assign a distinction between business and non-business 
income, studies suggest that it is difficult to implement and has been subjected to 
considerable litigation in the United States (Hellerstein, 2001).  
Moreover, neither the place of a commercial domicile, nor any other proxy 
for corporate residence, has a compelling claim that it constitutes the actual and 
exclusive source of most non-business income. Furthermore, the attribution of non-
business income to the place of corporate residence would create incentives for 
member States to compete for the right to tax such income; the result might be a 
“race to the bottom” in the tax rates on non-business income and thus to 
opportunities for tax planning. Lastly, as a practical matter, for most taxpayers 
during most tax years, business income is almost certainly far more significant than 
non-business income. 
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            3.6.1.2 The European Union Common Consolidated Tax Base (EU 
CCCTB) 
The proposed EU CCCTB unitary taxation approach relies on an ownership 
test to determine the presence of the control of the parent company. EU CCCTB is 
different from other unitary taxation approaches because it is optional. When a 
resident taxpayer chooses to consolidate the tax base, the entity first forms a group 
that consists of all of its permanent establishments located in EU member states. 
Consistent with the nexus of legal ownership, in the context of EU CCCTB, all 
member states that are involved in a group taxation regime require qualifying group 
members to be aligned through ownership (European Commission, 2011a). Once 
identified, all of the tax bases of the group members are consolidated (European 
Commission, 2007a). In this sense, all intra-group transactions are disregarded for 
tax purposes (European Commission, 2007a). Accordingly, there is no need to assess 
withholding and other taxation sources associated with intra-group transactions 
(European Commission, 2007b). 
Qualifying subsidiaries and permanent establishments within the European 
Union are included in the definition of ownership. For a subsidiary to be eligible for 
consolidation (group membership for companies), the parent company must have the 
right to exercise over 50% of the voting rights, ownership of over 75% of the 
company’s capital, or over 75% of the rights giving entitlement to profit. The 
resident subsidiaries of the foreign parent company and their subsidiaries and 
resident permanent establishments must also form a group (European Commission, 
2007c). 
Despite being without a central taxing authority, the European Commission 
also suggests referral to the International Accounting Standards as a starting point to 
determine the common tax base (European Commission, 2007a). In terms of the EU 
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CCCTB project, the issue of the tax base is focused on achieving a common 
consolidated tax base. A CCCTB is a single set of rules that a multinational entity 
operating within the European Union (EU) could use to calculate their taxable 
profits. This would mean that a company would only have to comply with one EU 
system for computing its taxable income instead of dealing with up to 27 different 
sets of rules. It is not designed to harmonize tax rates, but instead would ensure 
consistency between national tax systems in the EU (European Commission, 2007a). 
            3.6.1.3 The Canadian Provinces 
The Canadian provinces define a unitary business through the presence of a 
permanent establishment that is part of a multinational group within Canada. If there 
is a presence of a permanent establishment in more than one province, its income 
would be divided according to separate accounts or, if separate accounts were not 
available, according to the ratio of gross receipts of the permanent establishment to 
the corporation’s total gross receipts. Provinces are required to use the same taxable 
income definition and base as the federal government. The same rules and 
definitions are generally also applicable for determining provincial residency and the 
same methods of allocating the tax base among the provinces.  
 The Canadian system is also unique, as it is relatively uniform in its unitary 
approach compared to other jurisdictions. The weakness of the unitary taxation 
approach in Canada is that it does not allow for tax base consolidation among 
affiliated entities. The lack of consolidation can be seen as similar to a separate 
accounting system for determining which part of the business is considered the same 
economic entity for determining taxable income. Thus, it is likely that the incentive 
to shift income would be present (Siu, et al., 2014). 
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            3.6.1.4 Swiss Cantons 
Under the Swiss unitary taxation approach, a unitary business is considered a 
single multinational entity, with its permanent establishments within Switzerland. In 
this sense, only the income of a multinational entity at an individual corporation 
level is consolidated. Accordingly, only income from a branch is included, while 
those incomes of subsidiaries or other affiliated entities are excluded.  
In Switzerland, income is classified into business and non-business income. 
All business incomes are consolidated. Business income also includes investment 
property income derived from primary and secondary domiciles, as well as income 
from foreign permanent establishments and properties, plus dividends or capital 
gains on foreign participants. Other income, such as passive income of the 
multinational entity, is allocated to special tax domiciles and then apportioned 
between the primary and secondary tax domiciles (Siu, et al., 2014, p. 33 & 34). 
At first glance, the Swiss approach may seem similar to that of Canada 
because of its lack of consolidation approach. Nevertheless, the Swiss adopt a 
uniformity approach in their tax accounting practices in terms of uniform tax 
administrative procedures appeal and enforcement. 
 On top of that, there is a constitutional prohibition against double taxation, 
which is applied stringently by the Swiss court (Siu, et al., 2014, p. 33 & 34). Thus, 
despite the lack of a consolidation approach, the Swiss unitary taxation approach is 
generally uniform compared to the Canadian and the United States versions. It is 
unlikely that developing countries could achieve such a tax uniformity and court 
efficiency while using a unitary approach similar to that of Switzerland. 
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3.6.2 Defining the unitary business 
The first step in implementing a unitary taxation regime is to address the 
central issue of how to define a unitary business (Hellerstein & McLure Jr, 2004, p. 
204). The definition of what constitutes a qualifying group is an important 
consideration as it affects the extent to which the income would be apportioned 
(Agundez-Garcia, 2006). The definition of a unitary business would require the 
decision to differentiate the extent and the qualifying criteria on which a 
multinational group should be consolidated. The definition of a unitary business 
could be defined based on the nexus of legal ownership and/or economic substance 
(Agundez-Garcia, 2006). 
 Ideally, a unitary taxation approach should be implemented across all legal 
entities that are under common control. A legal ownership test is the most straight 
forward way to determine the presence of control. In theory, legal ownership entails 
the ability to govern and exert control of the affiliated companies in order to gain 
economic benefits. To illustrate, parents or the controlling company would have the 
ability to influence the subsidiary’s patents or production techniques or realise 
economies of scale. These economic benefits are difficult to allocate based on 
separate geographic accounting, as these do not exist if transactions are coordinated 
through the open market. Thus, legal ownership justifies the necessary requirements 
for the existence of an economic entity that justifies the arm’s length principle with 
formulary apportionment. In determining legal ownership, there is a need to consider 
the presence of voting stock or equity. In comparison to the presence of equity, 
voting rights demands allow more control for the investee. However, the differences 
between equity and voting rights are only applicable if they deviate from each other, 
such as in the context of none-voting shares. To what extent these differences exist 
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will depend on the corporation law of the respective jurisdictions. Alternatively, 
control exists when parents own, directly or indirectly through subsidiaries, more 
than 50 percent of the entity’s voting power. Thus, a simple majority ownership of 
voting rights should be regarded as the minimum requirement.  
Alternatively, an ownership threshold of 75% or even 100% could be used to 
define the taxable unit. Thus, the unitary business would exclude affiliates that are 
separately owned, such as franchisees or manufacturers under a long-term contract. 
Those affiliates with a minority ownership stake should also be part of a unitary 
business if they are under the common control of the firm with that stake (Picciotto, 
2012, p. 10). Accordingly, Picciotto also suggested the use of a wider test of 
‘control’ for those affiliates with minority ownership, so as to prevent avoidance 
opportunities. The common control should be a presumption that the affiliated 
entities are part of a unitary business. Although in theory it seems easy to assign a 
definition to the concept of unitary business, in reality, existing jurisdictions adopt 
different versions of unitary business. 
A unitary taxation regime defines a multinational group in terms of a single 
economic unit, and can be viewed as ‘corporate group taxation’ (Ting, 2010; Siu, et 
al., 2014). One could argue that defining unitary business using an economic 
substance is more theoretically aligned than the legal ownership test, given that the 
underlying rationale for the use of formulary apportionment is based on the 
economic integrations among cross-border related party transactions, making it 
difficult to determine the source of income from such activities on the basis of the 
arm’s length, separate accounting taxation regime.  
In line with the rationale to justify a unitary taxation regime - which is to 
reflect the underlying economic substance of a multinational group and the 
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difficulties of defining a consolidated group (or “combined group”), Hellerstein & 
McLure Jr (2004, p. 206) support a legal ownership test, rather than one based on 
determining economic substance in defining the unitary group. Other possible 
control tests that could be used to determine the presence of common control in a 
minority stake affiliate include the presence of a significant number of related party 
transactions, the use of common services, and the presence of centrally directed 
management. 
In addition to satisfying the control test based on legal ownership, the 
definition of a unitary business could also be approached from the perspective of 
economic relationship. The economic relationship can be viewed as a group of 
affiliates, (1) with business activities or operations that result in a flow of value 
between the affiliates, or (2) that are integrated with and dependent upon, or 
contribute to each other (Picciotto, 2012). As there is no economic relationship, there 
is no need to eliminate transactions among the related affiliates (Durst, 2013b). The 
flow of value can be demonstrated when members of the group demonstrate one or 
more of functional integrations, centralized management, and economies of scale. 
Affiliates are integrated and part of the group if they are dependent upon or 
contribute to each other under many of the same circumstances that establish the 
flow of value. 
3.6.3 The scope of the tax base 
The objective of unitary taxation is to determine the appropriate amount of 
taxable income by deciding the tax base against which the formula is to be applied. 
In doing so, there is a need to address the question of how to define the tax base 
(Avi-Yonah, 2008; Avi-Yonah, 2007; Avi-Yonah, 2010; Avi-Yonah & Margalioth, 
2007; Morse, 2010). 
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What determines the common rules for the calculation of taxable profits 
requires agreement regarding which rules should be used. Normally, existing 
jurisdictions that have applied a formulary apportionment regime, such as the United 
States and Canada, rely on a federal tax base definition as a natural starting point for 
the definition of the common tax base. Picciotto (2012) suggested that for those 
jurisdictions without a central taxing government, such as the European Union, it 
was possible to achieve a common definition of the tax base by referring to the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) requirements for the determination of 
taxable profits. 
 In the current practise, US multinational entities have to calculate the 
earnings and profits of Controlled Foreign Companies (C.F.C) to be included in the 
Subpart F and the foreign tax credit. That information will be likely to remain in a 
formulary apportionment regime (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007). Non-US 
multinational entities could use a financial reporting requirement as the base for 
calculating worldwide income. Such an approach is also similar to the European 
Commission’s recommendations, where multinational entities are allowed to use 
their home state base for tax purposes. However, such an approach might not be the 
most favourable, as it creates a disparity between US and non-US based 
multinationals. Such disparity would probably be no greater than it is under current 
transfer pricing regimes, which often operate from measures of income as 
determined under local accounting systems. 
The use of uniform accounting for world-wide financial reporting purposes 
can be used for calculating the global profit for the integrated group (Avi-Yonah & 
Clausing, 2007, p. 30). The common definition of a tax base could also be 
operationalised through combined reporting, where the multinational entities prepare 
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financial reports that cover the whole group and not only those affiliates of it that 
operate in the country or countries applying to the unitary system. Each 
multinational entity may also be allowed to use its domestic accounting standards for 
calculating the global tax base. For instance, for reporting purposes, US 
multinational entities would use the Generally Accepted Accounting Practice 
(GAAP) for tax reporting in IAS jurisdictions, instead of preparing additional 
financial reports under GAAP and IAS. This proposal would help to align book and 
tax income, and to prevent inflating book income for financial reporting purposes. 
Although the accounting standards provide a reasonable starting point to 
define the tax base, such an approach may be problematic in several ways. First, 
accounting standards are promulgated by private organisations, such as the 
International Accounting Standard Committee (IASC). Second, accounting standard 
setters would not have considered tax purpose as their main priority. Third, not all 
countries apply the same accounting standards. This implies that multinational 
entities would have to prepare accounts in accordance with different forms of 
national GAAP and then adjust their accounts according to the certain modifications 
rule in order to create a single tax base (Durst, 2013c).  
Nevertheless, while it is ideal to have a harmonised tax base, having a 
common tax base is not an absolute must for a unitary taxation approach. As 
McIntyre (2004) pointed out, the formulary apportionment system operated in the 
US-state level works well without a harmonised tax base, although harmonisation of 
the tax base simplifies the existing tax system. Nevertheless, tax harmonization 
requires that all jurisdictions manage to achieve consensus on a common tax base 
definition. 
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In summary, once the definition of the tax base is decided, the next issue to 
address is the scope of the tax base that is subjected to apportionment. As discussed 
earlier, there is no necessary connection between unitary taxation and formulary 
apportionment; in which formulary methods can be used to allocate the income of a 
single corporate taxpayer deriving income from multiple jurisdictions, as well as the 
income of a group of related taxpayers.  
However, failing to extend the tax base of a formulary apportionment system 
to include all members of an integrated group would invite abuse. The task here is to 
focus on which area should be apportioned. The scope of a tax base can be further 
classified into a combined tax base approach or alternative activity-by-activity 
approach (Durst, 2013b). From the experience of the United States, the scope of the 
tax base could also depend on the whether there is a need to include income based on 
its nature (business and non-business income). 
3.6.3.1 A combined tax base approach 
Any design of a unitary taxation approach has to contend with the scope of 
the tax base against which the apportionment formula will be applied. As described 
earlier, the scope of a tax base could be contained in relation with certain activities or 
department functions – the activity-by-activity approach. Alternatively, a tax base 
could entail a single tax base consisting of multinational entities’ combined income 
from all sources – on a combined income basis (Durst, 2013c). 
Ideally, a full-fledged, combined tax base approach would reflect the 
underlying economic substance of multinational entities. Thus, it is theoretically 
superior compared to the activity-by-activity approach, as it does not attempt to 
separate the income according to business functions (Spengel & Wendt, 2007). 
Rather, the income is recognised as being earned by one economic entity. 
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Paradoxically, this also results in more administrative challenges when trying to 
consolidate all sources of global income. 
Under a combined-income formulary apportionment system, there is a need 
to provide clear guidance for identifying which parts of the entities are included in 
the taxpayer’s combined income. Thus, from this perspective, the definition of a 
unitary business has to be clear and concise. Another important question is: as 
multinational entities often engage in a wide range of business activities; can the 
same apportionment formula sensibly allocate income earned across different 
industries? 
Durst (2013c) acknowledged that any attempt to answer the question had to 
be based on theoretical analysis that could be limited by its subjectivity. 
Nevertheless, he suggested a relatively simple formula should be able to deliver 
suitable apportionment results that appropriately consider the general economic 
value drivers, such as human inputs, physical assets, and access to a market.  
3.6.3.2 Activity-by-activity formulary apportionment approach 
Durst suggested a limited type of a formulary apportionment regime where 
the apportionment formula was applied to the tax base that constitutes global income 
of a particular business segment or activity (Durst, 2013b, p. 902). As the current 
practice of multinational entities is that they often prepare financial accounts based 
on business segments, he argued that the extent of such a practice could be used to 
define the scope of the tax base. He also stated that the scope of the tax base could be 
dependent on (1) the extent of functional differentiation among different business 
segments, as well as (2) the availability of reliable financial information related to 
the respective segments. 
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Under the current separate accounting approach, multinational entities 
already prepare segmented global accounts, in which the income and expenses for 
each of the company’s divisions are determined separately. Therefore, the 
consolidation and full disclosure required under a unitary taxation approach could be 
built upon the existing company-level information of separate accounting. Under 
these circumstances, when using a regime that applies its apportionment formula on 
an activity-by-activity basis, it would make sense to apply the apportionment 
separately to the taxpayer’s global combined income from the two divisions.  
3.6.3.3 Business and non-business income 
The next step after determining the scope of the tax base is to decide whether 
there is a need to distinguish the income of multinational entities into business and 
non-business income. Ideally, a formulary apportionment should be applied to all 
sources of income earned by the multinational entities. Alternatively, a formulary 
apportionment regime could be applied to certain types of income based on its 
sources – business or non-business. The United States and Switzerland adopt 
apportionment methods by distinguishing income between business and non-
business. In general, business income is consolidated and allocated among the taxing 
jurisdictions, while non-business income is directly assigned to a jurisdiction. 
The question as to whether there is a need to differentiate income into 
business or non-business depends on two issues. First, from the fiscal tax policy 
perspective, whether the distinction between business and non-business income is 
important. Second, whether the administrative benefits outweigh the increased 
accuracy of income assignment (Hellerstein & McLure Jr, 2004). 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the distinction between business and non-
business income can be attractive, as income should be assigned to the jurisdiction 
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that gives rise to it – the source country (Spengel & Schäfer, 2003). In general, if the 
type of income can be separated and accurately ascertained to the jurisdiction that 
generates that income, then that income should be directly allocated to that 
jurisdiction. As such, formulary apportionment can be restricted to those incomes 
arising out of the integration of multinational entities as an economic group. In 
general, based on the United States and Swiss formulary apportionment approaches, 
business income is consolidated and allocated among the taxing jurisdictions, while 
non-business income is directly assigned to a jurisdiction (Siu, et al., 2014). From a 
practical point of view, separating business from non-business income (such as 
investment income), can be administratively challenging, as it requires subjective 
judgement (Durst, 2013a). There is a need to separate activities that create income 
that belongs to an economic group as a whole. This approach would require 
separation of expenses matched to different categories of income. 
 Accordingly, there are many channels in which multinational entities could 
structure transactions in such a way that business income would be classified under 
non-business income. Thus, the distinction of income would undermine the benefits 
of the consolidation approach. Durst (2013a) suggested that if such a distinction 
were to be made between business and non-business income for use internationally, 
it would create incentives to engage in tax avoidance. 
In conclusion, considering the practicality of distinguishing different 
categories of income, it might be more appropriate not to distinguish income into 
business or non-business. 
 
3.6.4 The apportionment factors 
Once the definitional issue of a unitary business and the scope of a tax base 
have been determined, the next step is to examine the appropriate apportionment 
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formula to be applied against the tax base. Ideally, the determination of formula 
choices is required to approximate the business activities undertaken by 
multinational entities in the respective jurisdictions, and should reflect the factors 
that generate income for those activities.  
However, as argued by Weiner (1999) the actual choice of apportionment 
formula is less crucial compared to the definition of the formula and factors of the 
apportionment system. The early US states experience indicates that consensus on 
the same formula is more important than choosing any particular formula. In the 
broader sense, the apportionment formula could incorporate a whole range of factors 
that are deemed to have a causal relationship to the income producing activities.  
In 1929, sixteen US states used a number of apportionment factors for tax 
base allocation, such as property, payroll, sales, manufacturing costs, purchases, 
expenditures for labour, accounts receivables, net cost of sales, capital assets, and 
stock of other companies. However, too many apportionment factors complicate the 
apportionment process, thus resulting in double taxation across multi-states (Weiner, 
1999b). In recent years, most US states has reduced the use of multiple 
apportionment factors to a single apportionment formula based on a sales factor 
(Durst, 2014a). 
There seems to be no genuine conceptual reason for prioritizing certain 
objectives as to how income should be allocated to a different jurisdiction. However, 
as a guideline, the apportionment formula would require a combination of origin-
based supply and destination-based demand factors that address political 
considerations (Durst, 2014a). It has also been observed in the United States and 
Canada’s experiences, that over time there has been a shift towards the use of a 
fewer number of factors that can be classified into the origin of income, such as 
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labour and capital, and the destination-based factors based on sales (Avi-Yonah & 
Clausing, 2007).  
In principle, a multinational entity earns income from capital input. Thus, 
economic theory suggests apportioning income according to the location of capital. 
However, in reality, capital is not the only factor that generates income. Apart from 
capital contribution, labour input is also an income-generating factor of production. 
Thus, one would argue that the apportionment formula should also include the labour 
contribution to income, either by the number of employees or by the amount of 
compensation.  
Accordingly, Musgrave (1984) argued that the formula should represent both 
the supply and the demand sides of income. Property and payroll reflect the supply 
side of income, while sales and gross receipts reflect the demand side of income. To 
reflect the market where consumption occurs, sales should be measured on a 
destination basis. By including sales into the apportionment formula, the 
apportionment system reflects the notion that demand creates value. As the 
apportionment formula uses firm-specific factors to apportion income, the effective 
tax rate on each factor changes with the company’s factor choices. 
 Thus, from the economic perspective, a multinational’s decision regarding 
investment, employment, and sales may be distorted because its income is attributed 
using a formula. For instance, if the pre-determined formula includes the capital 
factor, an increase in investment in that location, ceteris paribus, would increase the 
effective tax rate for that firm. In a similar way, one would argue that firms are 
discouraged from engaging in additional investing activities in that location as if the 
same would happen with any firm-specific factor. 
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Existing jurisdictions have employed different forms of apportionment 
formula. Most US states use a formula based on the three factors of sales, payroll 
and property, although many states have moved to a formula that more heavily 
weights sales or uses destination-sales exclusively (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007). 
The Canadian provinces use a nationally uniform formula based on equally-weighted 
sales and payroll. Exclusion of the capital factor would appear to reduce investment 
related distortions.  
At an international level, developing countries, being net-exporting, would 
presumably prefer production factors in their formula, while the net importers (the 
developed countries) would favour the sales factor more heavily instead. This 
observation may explain why US states prefer the sales factor, given that the US has 
one of the largest consumer markets in the world. Thus, an emphasis on the single 
sales factor in the apportionment formula may not be neutral for other production 
countries (Avi-Yonah, 2009; Avi-Yonah, 2010; Morse, 2010).  
Apart from the political concerns, any attempt to design the apportionment 
formula would have to deal with two competing practical issues. As explained by 
Durst, the apportionment formula would need to be simple, but at the same time 
capable of apportioning income earned across multiple business activities (Durst, 
2014a). Additionally, the factors within the apportionment formula need to be 
precise, such that the apportionment formula is not easily manipulated. At the same 
time, different jurisdictions would benefit from different apportionment formula, 
therefore, there is a need to achieve consensus on the apportionment factors and their 
respective weights so that the taxation system remains equitable at the inter-nation 
level concerning the dividing rule (Wellisch, 2004). 
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As a starting point, this section reviews three key factors commonly used by 
the US states, Canadian provinces, Swiss Cantons, and those discussed within the 
proposed EU CCCTB project: (1) the property factor; (2) the payroll or 
compensation factor; (3) the sales factor. Thereafter, the main arguments on how to 
define those factors in terms of valuation and location will be reviewed. Lastly, this 
chapter discusses the main arguments for and against the respective implementation 
issues commonly associated with the inclusion of each of these factors in a 
formulary apportionment system. 
3.6.4.1 The traditional three-factor apportionment formula 
One of the first issues to address in designing the apportionment formula is to 
determine the appropriate number of factors in the formula. Proponents of the 
formulary apportionment system have proposed different factor combinations. The 
European Commission believes that it is necessary to have more than one factor to 
fully reflect and provide precision to the apportionment mechanism. In terms of 
political feasibility, the European Commission argues that a multiple-factor formula 
would allow more flexibility in reaching agreement among countries on the 
definition and weighting of the factors (European Commission as cited in Durst, 
2014a). While Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2007) suggested a single factor formula 
based on destination sales.  
Despite the compelling economic reasons to pursue a tax reform that would 
promote growth and efficiency, the number and the weighting of the factors 
themselves would eventually require a compromise between technical and political 
factors. Although different proponents provide equally compelling reasons for their 
recommendations with regards to the number of factors and their relative weight, 
 83 Chapter 3: Literature Review 
there is no real evidence that deviating from the traditional three-factor formula 
promotes economic development. 
Nevertheless, for a conceptual starting point to analyse this design issue, 
Durst (2014a) suggested a look at the generic formula based on equally-weighted 
property, sales, and payroll factors. The three-factor formula was first used in 1957, 
in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), drafted by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.. Historically, the 
three-factor apportionment formula was devised to be used in manufacturing and 
merchandising companies (Picciotto, 2012). Accordingly, the traditional formula 
would not be as applicable to the service industry, or to certain types of income, such 
as passive income and capital gains.  
3.6.4.2 The property factor 
Historically, the US apportionment formula is rooted in the use of the 
property factor. In the early 20th century, multistate business in the United States 
was dominated by the rail transportation and manufacturing industries, defined 
extensively by their physical presence (Morse, 2010). Thus, the use of the property 
factor provides a natural reference for locating the tangible property by using the 
relative amounts of value generated by those physical assets. In general, the US 
apportionment formula includes real and tangible personal property but excludes 
intangible property factors, such as financial assets, loans, equity holdings, and 
intellectual property assets. Therefore, the inclusion of a property factor focuses on 
basing the apportionment formulas in connection with the geographic distribution of 
the taxpayer’s tangible property. 
As a general rule, the real and tangible personal property is located within the 
State’s boundaries, either in the form of owned or rented property (Durst, 2014a). 
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Special rules apply concerning mobile and in-transit property, construction in 
progress, property in international waters, government-owned property and property 
that is temporarily not in use. For example, the numerator of the property factor may 
include mobile property according to the share of total time spent in the state during 
the year according to its destination.  
To illustrate, the inclusion of the property factor into the formula calculation 
can be assigned to the numerator of the property factor based on its state of location 
or use. If the property is in transit at year-end, it is included in the numerator of the 
destination state. Mobile or movable property is included in the numerators of each 
state in which it is represented during the year, based on the relative time in each 
state. The denominator includes all real and tangible personal property owned and 
rented by the business entity used in generating business income wherever it is 
located (Weiner, 2005b). 
However, in practice, it can be difficult to assign a value to the property. The 
process of property valuation often involves comparison with the market price that 
constitutes a similar method in applying the arm’s length principle in the transfer 
pricing rules. As valuing property is a subjective exercise, there is a risk where the 
property factor tends to undervalue short-lived assets and may both over and under 
values long-lived properties due to inflation and different depreciation periods. 
Arguably, while the use of the property factor may have been relevant in the 
past, in today’s business environment, more businesses are operating more on the 
basis of intangible property. Thus, it is inappropriate to base an apportionment factor 
solely on the property factor, as it fails to reflect the company’s relative income-
generating potential in the various jurisdictions in which it operates. In saying that, 
physical assets would remain an important value generator.  
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In relation to the intangible property, it can be problematic to assign value 
and locate the presence of the assets. As a result, one may argue that the inclusion of 
intangible property may create opportunities for distortions, as it is more difficult to 
assign proper valuation to intangible assets. In response to this issue, the US states 
generally exclude the intangible property factor from the apportionment formula. 
However, excluding intangible property from an apportionment formula would risk 
disregarding a significant portion of the assets of many multinationals, as well as 
failing to reflect the importance of profit-generating factors from the intangible 
assets. 
As capital factors in the form of property, especially the intangible property, 
are very mobile, the formulary apportionment system might be vulnerable to the 
strategic tax minimization by firms through factor-shifting across jurisdictions. 
Consequently, one might argue that the inclusion of a property factor into the 
apportionment formula would not be preferred by the government for the purpose of 
international profit allocation, as they do not want to drive physical investment away 
from the state and to prevent international tax competition (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 
2007; Avi-Yonah, 2010). 
 Based on this conjecture, Durst (2014a) argued that this might explain the 
emerging trend in which many US states have begun to skew towards a heavier 
weight on the sales factor. One of the most commonly proposed approaches is based 
on destination sales-based formulary apportionment (DSFA). In the context of the 
mining industry, the location of the tangible property might not be a tremendous 
issue, as the location is heavily dependent on the availability of the natural resources 
tied to the ground. Thus, it is unlikely for the multinational to relocate the production 
site to another low-tax jurisdiction. However, the ownership of intangible assets, 
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such as the use of mining rights and technology know-how, could easily be assigned 
to the low tax jurisdiction. 
3.6.4.3 The payroll or compensation factor 
The payroll or compensation factor reflects the considerable portion of value-
added activities in the form of labour input for the purpose of profit generation. 
Hellerstein and McLure Jr (2004, p. 209) argued that there seemed to be no strong 
arguments for using the payroll factor. However, payroll is a good indicator of the 
economic activities of a multinational enterprise in a jurisdiction, specifically in the 
context of the service industry, as it does not rely heavily on tangible assets. 
Traditionally, the payroll factor is defined by the total amount paid to the employee 
in the form of salaries, commissions and bonuses and would be attributed to the 
jurisdiction in which the employee carried out his or her work for the generation of 
income for the multinational entities. In addition, businesses typically maintain a 
physical presence and detailed records of their employment payments in different 
jurisdictions as part of achieving compliance with payroll tax rules and laws 
governing conditions of labour. From a practical point of view, the use of the payroll 
factor may be easier to measure compared to the property factor, providing more 
administrative ease. The presence of workforce also correlates with the business’s 
physical capital location. Since the payroll factor is self-valuing, the inclusion of the 
payroll factor does not require a large number of valuation exercises. 
The first issue to address is what should be included in the definition of 
compensation. Under the US system, the valuation of labour depends on existing or 
unemployment insurance definitions. In other words, the measurement of the payroll 
factors depends on the Model Unemployment Act, which stipulates the rules for 
reporting the amount of compensation to each state for the purpose of state 
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unemployment insurance (Weiner, 1999). In the context of the European Union, the 
commission proposed apportionment rules to define employees to include those who 
are not directly employed by a group member, but perform tasks similar to the 
employees. The European Union directive proposal article 91 (4) also provides a 
broad definition of compensation such that it shall include the “cost of salaries, 
wages, bonuses and all other employee compensation, including related pension and 
social security costs” paid by the employers (European Commission, 2011b, p. 52). 
On an international level, one would expect that different countries employ different 
definitions of compensation. Therefore, for jurisdictions without existing guidance 
from the legislation, there is a need to draft rules on which kind of payments are 
considered in the payroll factor in order to prevent under or over representations in 
the payroll factor.  
Durst (2014a, p. 4) suggested the compensation factor should include 
compensation paid to direct employment, as well as those of indirect employment. 
Indirect employment includes independent contractors and personnel firms, 
including temporary employment services through outsourcing firms. In practice, the 
compensation for the direct employment based on the cash-flow based definition of 
the payroll factor seems to be feasible to locate and measure. However, 
compensation paid to indirect employment may be vulnerable to manipulation where 
a multinational enterprise could perpetually outsource certain functions associated 
with the manufacturing activities to third parties, thereby avoiding payroll and 
property factors apportionment. As illustrated by Durst (2014a), it is important for 
the application of the payroll factor to be assigned to the jurisdictions where the 
employee physically performs the business activities, instead of the location of the 
payout human resources cost centre. He further argued that it should not be too 
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problematic, as multinational entities usually maintain records of their employees in 
terms of their location, wages, cost centres. However, entities may need to keep a 
similar detailed record for their indirect employees, but may find it difficult to obtain 
reliable information regarding the services provided by the outsourcing firms. Durst 
proposed that such problems could be addressed by specially designed statutes or use 
of the safe harbor approach (2014a). Safe harbor approach is a statutory provision 
that allows for a certain types of taxpayers and that relieves taxpayers from certain 
obligations otherwise obligatory by the tax code by replacing exceptional, usually 
simpler obligations (OECD, 2010). 
The use of payroll factors would need to deal with two technical issues: (1) 
the wage differentiations between the developed and developing countries, and (2)  
the exchange rates affecting the compensation payout (Durst, 2014a). Although one 
would argue that wage differentials reflect different productivity, some form of 
adjustment would probably be required for practical and political reasons (Mintz, 
2008, p. 133). In order to prevent the manipulation of the location of payroll factor 
elements, wages and salaries paid to employees leased from other group companies 
or performing services sourced out to the other group companies should be attributed 
to the entity and location where the employees actually perform their services. One 
way to deal with such an issue is to adjust payroll factors according to a labour cost 
index or by complementing payroll in the labour factor by the element “number of 
employees” for a transitional period, such as 10 years (Mayer, 2009). 
Regardless of its practical attractiveness, the inclusion of a payroll factor may 
also create unintended economic distortions. For instance, the inclusion of labour or 
a compensation factor would alter the corporate income tax similar to the payroll tax. 
Thus, several academics suggest that the inclusion of the labour factor would create 
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disincentives for the multinational entity to locate their production or labour 
intensive activities within the state, thereby encouraging the firms to relocate their 
labour force into a low-tax jurisdiction (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007; Durst, 
2014a). The distortionary effects on the level of employment associated with the use 
and weighting of the payroll factor could also potentially result in tax competition 
between jurisdictions, as governments use weightage factors as instruments to attract 
foreign direct investment.  
3.6.4.4 The sales factor 
In general, the sales factor constitutes the total sales of the multinational 
entity, with particular sales of the jurisdiction as the numerator, over the total sales of 
a multinational group during the tax period. In others, the sales factor reflects the 
sales contribution of a multinational entity in a jurisdiction, such as at a state or 
country level, as a fraction of the worldwide group profit. The sales factor includes 
the gross sales, all interest income, service charges, carrying charges, time-price 
differential charges incidental to such sales, rent and lease payments, and royalties. 
 In Switzerland, the formulas used by each canton are determined separately 
by each canton. The cantons use different formulas for different industries. Perhaps, 
because of the apparent flexibility in the application of the Swiss apportionment 
system for inter-cantonal profit allocation, the system does not seem to have elicited 
a great deal of discussion over the years in the context of tax policy. In Canada, all 
provinces use the same two-factor formula, which consists of 50% sales and 50% 
payroll, with both factors weighted equally (Weiner, 2005a, 2005b). 
It has been widely accepted and proposed, especially in the context of the 
US, that an apportionment formula should be based on the destination of taxpayer’s 
sales (Durst, 2014b; Morse, 2010). In theory, incorporating the sales factor on a 
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destination basis recognises that external market forces based on demand plays an 
important role in generating income (Musgrave, 1984). Another explanation often 
provided in the literature is that the consumer market is more difficult to manipulate 
and control by the multinational entity. Accordingly, destination by sales factor 
would also be relatively less mobile compared to payroll and property factors. 
Arguably, the DSFA would create less economic distortions. However, such an 
argument is not totally well-supported (Altshuler & Grubert, 2010). On the contrary, 
several authors have proposed that if a single destination based formulary 
apportionment were implemented in a revenue neutral fashion, it would allow a 
further reduction in the corporate income tax rate. The proposed system would also 
simplify the current tax system and help to reduce the corporate tax rate. 
Furthermore, with a reduction in income shifting, developing countries would expect 
to collect more tax revenue (Avi-Yonah & Clausing 2007, Avi-Yonah & Clausing 
2008). 
As most US state governments do not want to discourage investments, there 
has been a shift towards utilising the destination sales apportionment factor as the 
only factor in the apportionment formula. Although DSFA is often deemed as 
superior to other apportionment factors, it has its own conceptual and practical 
issues, given that it is not always easy to determine the location where sales occur. In 
general, the use of DSFA might not be compatible with the current international tax 
norm, in which the source country might have difficulties in establishing a nexus in a 
jurisdiction based on the concept of ‘permanent establishment’. 
In terms of the sales of tangible goods, the US sources income from sales of 
tangible property at the destination of the goods by using the “delivery rule”. There 
are also certain instances where sales occur in no nexus jurisdictions. Under the US 
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experience, many states use “throwback” rules, under which sales revenue from 
tangible property is apportioned to the state from which the property is shipped 
(Hellerstein & Hellerstein as cited in Durst, 2014a, p 4). The underlying theory for 
such an approach is that in the absence of a tax nexus in the state to which the 
property is shipped, the shipment destination would provide the second best 
connection to the sales, thereby being a sensible jurisdiction to which to reapportion 
the revenue. However, Durst (2014) argued that the option of using throwback rules 
was unlikely to be workable for international taxation because the supply of a 
multinational entity often involves numerous natural points of functional connection 
(other than the place from which the property is shipped) to a particular increment of 
sales revenue (Durst, 2014b).  
In the context of international taxation, certain sales arrangements do not 
require the seller to maintain a physical presence to conduct a sales transaction. As 
such, revenue from such transactions would be attributed to the other jurisdiction 
where the taxpayer has no obligation to pay tax because of the permanent 
establishment rule under certain tax treaties or other governing law. In this case, 
Durst (2014) suggested adopting the “throw out” rules, under which sales revenues 
generated in the jurisdiction where the taxpayer has no tax nexus were excluded 
from the calculation of the sales factor. Conceptually, such an approach refers to 
only a portion of the taxpayer’s sales revenue. 
Ultimately, if sales are to be included in the apportionment formula, then 
there is a need to clarify whether the location of sales would be determined at the 
destination or at the origin. Political factors would definitely play a crucial part in 
shaping the sales factor, given that different countries have different interests, such 
that those countries with larger domestic demand would benefit more from sales by 
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destination compared to those countries with smaller domestic consumption. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that natural-exporting countries would approve the sales-
by-destination factor given at least 90% of the tax revenue is collected on a source 
basis (European Commission, 2008, p. 57). A move towards DSFA would 
dramatically reduce their tax revenue and undermine their current taxing rights over 
their own natural resources. As mining multinational entities are required to maintain 
a permanent establishment based on the location of natural resources underground, 
taxing authorities in US states have observed that the natural rich stage (exploitation 
stage) tends to place more emphasis on the payroll and asset factors and that they do 
not worry about business relocations (Roin, 2008).  
3.6.4.5 Sector-specific formula 
Since the introduction of unitary taxation concepts, there have been 
arguments about whether general apportionment formulas should be used across all 
industries, and whether using a general apportionment formula applicable to all firms 
and all industries is appropriate. McIntyre (2012) argued that some industries or 
types of business have special characteristics that may require a sector specific 
formula. 
The general apportionment formula used in the US states almost always 
focuses on apportioning the income of manufacturing and merchandising 
multinational entities based on a combination of property, payroll, and sales. 
Similarly, Canadian provinces employ gross revenue and salaries and wages for 
manufacturing multinationals. As mentioned in Chapter 2, mining multinational 
entities have a business structure, products, and market that are very different from 
traditional multinationals. In terms of the use of a formula in natural resource 
extraction and due to its special importance to some countries, including many in the 
 93 Chapter 3: Literature Review 
developing world, natural resource extraction should receive close attention in the 
design of a system for apportioning taxable income. The appropriate formula to 
apply to the mining industry would be required to reflect the special features of that 
industry. Accordingly, this thesis argues that the traditional formula may not be 
appropriate for all industries, as it may not necessarily reflect the factors that 
generate income for mining multinational entities. 
3.6.5 Weighting the factors in the apportionment formula 
Once the apportionment factor has been determined, the next step is to assign 
the weighting of the factors in the formula. The assignment of weighting can be seen 
as the most difficult hurdle for international adoption of a unitary taxation approach  
(Picciotto, 2012). As mentioned earlier, there is a need to balance the interest 
between production and consumption factors. In theory, if the valuation and location 
issue of the factors can be clearly defined, notably by excluding intangibles, there 
would not be so many opportunities for artificial avoidance (Durst, 2014a). 
International agreement on the weighting of the formula factors would be 
facilitated by the considerable scope for trade-offs. Historically, the general 
apportionment formula consisting of three equally-weighted formula factors based 
on sales, asset and labour with one-third weight assigned to each factor, has been 
widely used in the United States. Nevertheless, in recent years, US states have 
tended to double-weight the sales factors with the use of the single sales destination 
factor as the apportionment formula (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2007). 
 In the context of EU CCCTB, the European Commission initially suggested 
an equally weighted formula using sales, assets, and payroll factors (payroll and 
employees). However, the European Parliament approved an amended version of the 
draft of CCCTB Directive by assigning 45% weighting to asset and labour factors 
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each, and 10 % to the sales factors. The reasoning provided by the Parliament for the 
lower weight assigned to the sales factor was that this would on one hand “make 
sure that the CCCTB system does not deviate too much from the internationally 
accepted principle of attributing ultimate taxing rights to the source state”. 
Furthermore, such an apportionment formula “would ensure that small and medium-
sized Member States with limited domestic markets are not disproportionately 
disadvantaged in the apportionment of tax base” (European Parliament, 2012, p.2).  
Apportionment by formula should carefully consider the political and 
economic interests of different jurisdictions. For instance, countries with higher 
wages, such as those in developed countries, would choose payroll rather than the 
number of employees in the labour factor. In contrast, developing countries would 
prefer employee’s headcount rather than payroll as the factor. Similarly, net-
importing countries would prefer heavily weighted sales based on consumption. 
While net-exporting countries would prefer more weighting on production factors. 
Developing countries may feel the pressure to agree with a formula over-weighted 
towards sales, as they want to attract foreign direct investment. Weighting of 
formulas will likely depend on the acceptance of the generally agreed principle of 
international tax rules.  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
Theoretically, a unitary taxation approach is better at reflecting the 
underlying economic substance undertaken by multinational entities. Yet, there 
remains disagreement as to whether the overall effect of tax reform based on unitary 
taxation would be positive or negative. While there are valid arguments to the 
contrary, it is apparent that most of the arguments against unitary taxation focus on 
the implementation issues in connection with how to define a unitary business and 
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tax base subjected to apportionment. Apart from the definitional issues, determining 
a pre-determined formula to use for the apportionment exercise is also politically 
sensitive. 
 For a starting point, there is a need to balance the factors included in the 
apportionment formula between producing and consuming countries. On the other 
hand, economic feasibility is also an important consideration. In the instances where 
the factors create distortions or promote tax competition, the proposal would be 
deemed not viable. Although the highlighted implementation and technical issues are 
by no means insurmountable, it is unlikely that these problems would be resolved 
without political will or consensus.  
Accordingly, it can be argued that there are neither the right factors nor an 
apportionment formula to satisfy every taxation objectives. Therefore, it is important 
to evaluate the tax system against an appropriate theoretical framework that would 
be instructive enough to provide a reference frame to guide the critical analysis that 
furthers the understanding of how unitary taxation can be made feasible. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to establish a theoretical framework to be used in Research 
Question 1 for comparing the arm’s length, separate accounting to the global 
formulary apportionment system within the context of international profit allocation. 
Section 4.2 reviews related literature and various tax guidelines commonly used for 
evaluating tax systems based on the ‘criteria for a good tax system’. A number of 
common tax policy objectives based on the principle of equity, simplicity, efficiency, 
and neutrality, have emerged from the review process. In addition, underlying a 
number of most recent reform reviews, the policy objective of reducing tax 
avoidance is also commonly used. 
Section 4.3 examines some of the potential interactions and trade-offs 
between the chosen criteria. For pragmatic reasons, this thesis acknowledges that it is 
impossible to satisfy all of these criteria simultaneously. By exploring these 
interactions, this section seeks to clarify and guide the evaluation process by ranking 
each of these principles. Thus, the assignment of ranking is necessary, as a number 
of criteria are in conflict with each other. 
Section 4.4 suggests how to use the integrated framework normatively for 
evaluation purposes by outlining the evaluation process. The normative tax system 
captures the generally accepted elements of the tax system necessary to achieve its 
stipulated objectives.  
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 NORMATIVE EVALUATION: CRITERIA FOR A GOOD TAX 
SYSTEM 
For more than two centuries, there has been a fundamental agreement on 
what constitutes a ‘good’ tax policy. An extract from the dissertation on tax 
principles by Adam Smith demonstrates that a good tax system is vested upon four 
maxims: equality, certainty, convenience, and economy (Smith, 1778). Despite no 
explicit theoretical or conceptual tax framework being available, certain elements of 
a framework are suggested in the literature. Whittington (1995) proposed the need 
for equity, neutrality, and administrative effectiveness. Some of his proposed 
applications of these concepts are not specific to the calculation of corporate taxable 
income. He further suggested that, for tax purposes, reliability was likely to be 
stressed more than relevance to the investor. Green (1995) added that the need for 
the calculation of taxable income had to be certain and cost efficient. Kemp and 
Rose (1983) emphasized the importance of efficiency and risk sharing attributes, 
whereas Dickson (1999) ignored the concept of risk sharing and focused on 
efficiency, neutrality and equity. In 2013, the World Bank’s publication to guide tax 
fiscal policy in the developing country context suggested that tax administration 
performance should ultimately be evaluated with respect to the three requirements of 
simplicity, efficiency and equity (Bird & Zolt, 2013). World governments also hold 
similar views. For instance, Australia in its ‘Issue Paper Number 2 Policy 
Framework for Review’ selection highlighted the importance of equity, efficiency, 
and simplicity in reviewing a tax policy. Other equally important principles are 
important criteria, such as certainty, transparency, neutrality, stability and integrity 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2003). These are the principal criteria of optimal tax 
as argued in previous studies. However, the weight given to each of these criteria 
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differs in the literature, and many studies have limited their analysis to only some of 
those criteria.  
Academic commentators broadly accepted these policy objectives in 
evaluating the effectiveness of the existing tax system and the proposed tax reform. 
In addition, apart from the highlighted policy objectives, governments often consider 
the impacts on tax revenue and the tendency for tax avoidance opportunities as 
critical considerations.  
The rest of this chapter discusses and ascertains the appropriateness of each 
of these criteria, as widespread use does not of itself necessarily mean that the scope 
and the definition of the objectives are appropriate for the context of this thesis. A 
review of the literature in this area demonstrates that the definitions of these criteria 
are used differently across the literature and government publications. A discussion 
of these criteria is, therefore, instructive and will be undertaken later in this chapter. 
The theoretical framework underlying the following analysis consists of basic 
normative criteria for evaluating tax system. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
 
4.2.1 Equity 
4.2.1.1 Tax payer Equity 
It is an indisputable fact that the principle of equity or fairness is widely used 
to assess a tax system. However, despite its common usage, what constitutes fairness 
can have different meanings according to different parties, and varies according to 
the objective of fairness that such a principle hopes to achieve. According to Heady 
(1993), the concept of equity is the main interest of economists and it has been 
widely discussed as one of the key criteria for evaluating tax policy proposals. 
Although equity is deemed an important design principle for the review of a tax 
system, there is no consensus on what exactly equity is or how to measure it. Against 
this background, a fundamental question arises: How to determine a taxpayer’s tax 
liability, in a way that is equitable? In its earliest proposal, the focus on the principle 
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of taxpayer’s equity was usually geared towards the ‘benefit principle’ and the 
‘ability-to-pay principle’. 
The benefit principle argues that a government has the right to levy taxes as it 
provides public goods and services for multinational entities. According to this 
principle, taxation is perceived to be fair if the tax liability depends on the benefits 
received by those entities in connection with consuming and benefitting from public 
goods while generating taxable income (Feldstein, 1976). Taxes could be seen as a 
compensation for the consumption of the provision of public goods and services 
provided by the government (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1973). However, despite its 
theoretical attractiveness, in practice, it is difficult to measure the level of benefit, as 
public goods are intended to be free of direct charge. Thus, it is also difficult to 
ascertain the costs associated with the consumption and the usage of the goods.  
Alternatively, the concept of taxation is also commonly based on the concept 
of “ability-to-pay”. The principle of “ability-to-pay” states that taxpayers should be 
taxed according to their contribution capacity in the form of economic power 
(Musgrave, 1983). Traditionally, the level of income is considered a good nexus for 
the “ability-to-pay”. Unlike the benefit principle, it does not make any connection 
between the consumption of benefits. In general, the principle of ability-to-pay can 
be distinguished further into horizontal and vertical equity. 
The concept of horizontal equity occurs when all taxable entities with the 
same ability-to-pay are subjected to an equal amount of tax. In accordance with the 
criterion of taxpayer equity, each taxpayer is taxed at exactly his ability-to-pay 
without any double taxation, as otherwise, the taxpayer would be taxed if he disposes 
of a higher ability-to-pay. At a corporate level, the corporation’s ability to pay is an 
objective ability to pay (Bird & Oldman, 2000). The business income tax system 
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should meet reasonable standards of horizontal equity (Ralph, Allert, & Joss, 1999). 
This requires that business income earned in similar economic circumstances should 
be taxed in a similar manner regardless of the legal structure- company, partnership 
or trust. 
In contrast, vertical equity is achieved when taxable entities with an unequal 
economic ability-to-pay are to be taxed differently because different earning levels 
create different levels of tax burden. Vertical equity refers to the equivalent 
treatment of companies or resources with different characteristics through methods 
such as progressive tax. Multinational entities, which exploit more valuable 
resources, should have a greater ability-to-pay, and therefore their tax liability should 
be higher. Similarly, mines with high profitability can be taxed more heavily than 
those with low profitability. Additionally, as the State owns the natural resources, it 
should receive a fair payment, especially if it transfers exploitation and ownership 
rights to private companies. 
In the context of international taxation, the taxpayer equity criterion is 
usually interpreted according to the valuations of the source country and the 
residence country, as there are at least two or more different jurisdictions’ tax 
systems involved. In terms of the residence principle, the world-wide ability-to-pay 
is considered in the country of residence and is based on the idea that a taxable entity 
has only a single ability-to-pay. The residence principle is concerned with the 
allegiance a taxpayer has with a jurisdiction. In establishing residence for 
individuals, countries have regarded either the business’ physical presence in the 
country or other factors and circumstances linking them to that country, such as 
economic activity. The residence of companies is usually determined by the place of 
incorporation or management or, in limited cases, the location of shareholders.  
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According to the principle of a source country, the country has the right to 
tax profits generated within its jurisdiction (Musgrave, 2000). In general, different 
interpretations of what constitutes an equitable allocation exist, based on different 
apportionment criteria. The profit allocation can be influenced by the location of 
production, the sales destination, or the location of the workforce. In order to assign 
taxing rights according to the valuation of profit generations in the source country, 
there is a need to identify the location of economic substance. As it is difficult to 
clearly identify the source of income, the usual approach is to depend on agreements 
among the involved jurisdictions. 
In the European Literature, Devereux, Pearson, and Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (1989) examined how to achieve fairness between countries. In this sense, 
the principle of equity was not only applied at corporate-level but also between inter-
nation levels. They mentioned alternatives to the current system, such as cash-flow 
corporation tax that would have 100% allowances for assets but no deduction for 
interest expenses. The Ruding (1992) Report described the European Union’s 
differences in tax bases. It made recommendations concerning the reduction of these 
differences to be driven by the motive of harmonisation instead of fulfilling tax 
principles. As the interest of this thesis is the multijurisdictional income allocation 
issue, it is therefore appropriate to review equity in the context of international 
taxation, namely inter-nation equity. The principle of equity cannot be easily applied 
for the purpose of corporate taxation, as profits are usually taxed regardless of the 
location of the capital provider (Devereux, 2004). Thus, determining the scope of 
analysis and definition of equity is important for the purpose of this thesis, to enable 
logical evaluation of the research problem. 
 103  Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
4.2.1.2 Inter-nation Equity 
Musgrave coined the concept of inter-nation equity in 1972 to analyse tax 
design issues, such as the design of tax treaties and the process of allocating profits 
between states or nations. The concept of inter-nation equity continues to be relevant 
and widely used as a criterion for evaluation of international tax systems. Since 
1972, Musgrave’s original articulation of the concept has been little altered much by 
subsequent academics and has been used extensively by academics working in the 
area of international tax across law, economics, and public policy literature 
(Musgrave, 2000).  
Conceptually, inter-nation equity requires income allocation among the 
international tax base between different source countries to be equitable. When a 
multinational group, or any of the affiliated companies, or branches, trade with each 
other across international borders, each country involved in the cross-border 
transactions has an interest in taxing the income gains from cross-border 
transactions. Problems arise as jurisdictions have taxing rights within their country 
boundaries, while economic activities extend across borders. Therefore, these 
countries have to determine their rights to tax that should allow for legitimate and 
fair allocation.  
Inter-nation equity has been interpreted differently in the existing literature 
and government publications. A country is said to have the rights to levy corporate 
income tax as it has provided public goods and services for the corporation to engage 
in income-generating activities within its borders. In line with the benefit principle, 
each jurisdiction that is involved in cross-border transactions would have the rights 
to levy tax and to share a portion of the overall international income (Musgrave, 
2000). Corporate taxation would then be levied in proportion to the amount of 
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income generating activities that a company engaged in within the boundaries of that 
country. 
In principle, a country should have the right to tax all generated profits whose 
source is within its borders where the activities contributing to the generation of 
profits take place. A multinational generates profits by engaging in the economic life 
of the source country through public and private services. In order to exercise the 
taxing rights, the source of profits has to be identified. However, in theory, it is 
sometimes difficult to ascertain the location where the income is generated. 
Consequently, there is no universally agreed upon definition of the source of income 
for tax purposes. In general, two approaches – the demand method and the supply 
method – are commonly used in identifying profit-generating factors (Spengel & 
Schäfer, 2003). 
The evaluation of the two approaches is based on how the jurisdictions’ 
entitlements to tax are viewed. From the demand perspective, it is debatable whether 
a part of the taxable income should be assigned to the demanding jurisdiction, as it 
provides a consumer market for income generating purposes. According to current 
tax law, the supply approach is the prevailing doctrine, as the provision of a 
consumer market does not entitle the source jurisdiction to tax. Kaufman (1997) 
analysed the concept of inter-nation equity and argued that fairness in international 
tax did not necessitate a worldwide tax base.  
Another relevant concept of inter-nation equity in relation to a jurisdiction’s 
rights to tax multinational entities is based on the argument that these companies 
generate income based on public investments and natural resources provided by the 
country (Musgrave & Musgrave 2000, p 315). In a less widely accepted concept of 
inter-nation equity Zuber, (as cited in Spengel & Wendt, 2007) argued that a 
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jurisdiction should have the rights to tax income arising out of cross border 
investments and these should be used as an instrument of international redistribution. 
He argued that the allocation of taxing rights could then be used for the adjustment 
of the unequal distribution of resource endowments and per capita income among the 
countries involved. In order to achieve inter-nation equity, the tax share of profits 
earned from cross border transactions that were allocated to the source jurisdiction 
could be reversed if it was found to be disproportionate against the level of per capita 
income and resource endowment in the source country. He further suggested that the 
adjustment of allocated profit could be achieved if the corporate tax rate in the 
source country was higher in low income countries than high income countries. 
However, it is worth noting that the notion of redistributing income among countries 
through allocation of taxing rights has yet to be accepted by the international 
community.  
A closer scrutiny of the literature reveals that subsequent authors attempted 
to use the concept of inter-nation equity differently. First, some authors sought to 
distinguish different approaches to the conceptualization of the concept of inter-
nation equity. For example, Ault and Bradford (1990) distinguished between the 
economists and legal approach to an inter-nation equity, referring to the work of 
Musgrave and the approach from an economic perspective. To illustrate, the use of 
an inter-nation equity to discuss the fairness of the tax revenue allocation between 
jurisdictions in the context of international tax avoidance and tax treatment and 
international tax treatment partnerships reform of the permanent establishment 
principle (Cockfield, 2003), the general criteria for international tax fairness 
(Brokelind, 2006; Eden, 1998), the possible design for profit split (Li, 2003), the 
evaluation of alternative proposals for taxing multinational entities (Fernandez, 
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2003), and the design principles employed by the OECD (Aley & Bentley, 2005, p. 
602). While Avi-Yonah (1995) employed the concept of inter-nation equity in the 
context of tax allocation or tax base determination between jurisdictions, or the 
consequences of the decision to impose a source tax.  
Some studies use the concept less comprehensively than Musgrave’s version. 
For example, Baker argued for a reinterpreted form of source taxation using 
residence as a proxy to determine the location of where the income was producing 
value originated and leaving the host country within the context of economic rent 
(2001, p.185). Similarly, Avagliano (2004) applied Baker’s analysis and suggested 
that inter-nation equity was largely about source taxation of rent. 
In the context of information technology, Schäfer (2006) built her arguments 
based on an inter-nation equity as criteria for evaluating possible reforms to 
multinationals’ worldwide income taxation, given the changes in information and 
communication technologies. In examining a bilateral tax treaty, Fuller (2006) 
explored the concept to argue her analysis of the Japan-US tax treaty. The principle 
of inter-nation equity is also used to justify source taxation. In the European 
Commission economic paper, it is used as a justification for source taxation of 
company income (Devereux & Maffini, 2006), similarly Spengel and Schäfer 
(2003), used inter-nation equity as the justification for source taxation in their study 
on a consolidated corporate tax base for the European Union (2007). 
Lastly, some other scholars have suggested a different meaning for the 
concept. For example, Avi-Yonah suggested assigning practical meaning to the 
concept of inter-nation equity by embracing its redistributive aspects and using it as 
a decision rule, where there are: ‘two otherwise comparable alternative rules, one of 
which has progressive and the other regressive implications for the division of the 
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international tax base between high-income and low-income nations, the progressive 
rule should be explicitly referred to as the regressive one’ (Avi-Yonah, 2010). 
Similarly, Agundez-Gracia proposed linking inter-nation equity to corporate 
taxpayer equity in her analysis of the appropriateness of fair apportionment of a 
European Union consolidated tax base (2006). In order to assign taxing rights 
according to the concept of profit generation, the source of profits have to be 
identified. As it is not possible to clearly identify the source of income according to 
the economic substance, it can be decided based on the stipulated agreements with 
the involved jurisdictions. 
As discussed, in the inter-jurisdiction context, it is more difficult to apply the 
concept of equity as there is no consensus regarding what ‘fairness’ means. 
Musgrave (2001) suggested that "Which rule is followed, as in most other equity 
issues, has to be a matter of judgement by national consensus.” For the purpose of 
this thesis, the general nexus for fairness is whether the tax system could achieve a 
fair allocation of taxing rights between countries and fair allocation of income 
between countries based on whether the tax system allocates income to the 
jurisdiction that gives rise to it. Each country should receive an equitable share of tax 
revenue that depends on the allocation tax base between the source and residence 
countries and the tax rate in the source country. This line of reasoning, therefore, is 
being used to support the taxation of income in the source countries. Similar 
considerations would also seem appropriate to use within this thesis. The use of this 
framework within this thesis would entail the continued application of source based 
taxation under the principle of inter-nation equity (OECD, 2012). 
In order to achieve inter-nation equity, there is a need to address the issue of 
what to consider as income, both its composition and measurement – and who the 
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taxable entity is. At the same time, tax administrators have to ensure that the 
definition of income is such that the various different methods and evaluation 
processes employed in its determination are applied equally across different 
jurisdictions. 
4.2.2 Simplicity 
Several international organisations and governments express the need to have 
a simple tax system (Avi-Yonah, 2010; Avi-Yonah & Tinhaga, 2013; Ralph, Allert, 
& Joss, 1999). The simplicity of a tax system can be viewed from the technical, 
compliance, and administrative aspects. As stated by the American Institute of 
Certified Practicing Accountants (AICPA, 2009): “Simplicity in the tax system is 
important to both the taxpayer and those who administer the various taxes. Complex 
rules lead to errors and disrespect for the system that can reduce compliance. 
Simplicity is important both to improve the compliance process and to enable 
taxpayers to better understand the tax consequences of transactions in which they 
engage in or plan to engage in.” McCaffrey identified that in the absence of 
simplicity, taxpayers were faced with complexity at technical, structural, and 
compliance levels (2002). 
Similarly, the European Commission has acknowledged the importance of 
simplicity through the introduction of the CCCTB (European Commission 2007). 
The consolidated tax base under the CCCTB should be simple in order to reduce the 
operating costs of the tax system for both tax administrators and taxpayers. 
Operating costs are usually incurred by the corporate taxpayers in the form of 
compliance costs that arise from fulfilling tax reporting requirements and from the 
efforts made to evaluate the legitimacy of different business decisions (Slemrod, 
1996; Slemrod & Sorum, 1984). Taxpayer compliance burden is the value of the 
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taxpayer’s own time and resources on top of the expenses paid by tax preparers and 
other tax advisors, invested to ensure compliance with tax laws.  
 Multinational entities incur operating costs to enforce the tax law, such as 
monitoring costs. These administrative costs should be reasonably proportioned to 
the tax revenue, as it reduces the taxable profit  (Nobes, 2004, p. 40). Simple tax 
systems impose less of a compliance burden on the taxpayer than more complex 
systems. Hence, tax simplification would be efficiency-enhancing as it would induce 
a reallocation of capital away from relatively low pre-tax returns and relatively high 
pre-tax returns. In a simple taxation system, taxpayers would have little difficulty 
understanding their obligations. The laws would be capable of straightforward 
comprehension and certainty in their application. Simplicity is usually associated 
with low costs of compliance and administration. In fact, the literature shows that a 
simple tax system should contribute benefits, such as lower compliance and 
administration costs, higher rate of compliance, higher accuracy in determining 
liabilities, and improved awareness of decision consequences. 
Although it is important to achieve simplicity in any taxation system, the 
pursuance of simplicity in the context of multinational group taxation can be 
challenging for governments. One example is highlighted in the Ralph Review of 
Business Taxation Reform (1999) by the Australian Government. This report 
summarised the challenge in pursuing simplicity in a corporate taxation system as 
follows (Ralph, Allert & Joss, 1999): 
“Because of the inherent complexity in many business transactions, the 
business tax system will always contain complex provisions. The objective of 
implications should be applied in two ways: 1. The business tax system should be 
designed in as simple a manner as possible, recognising economic substance in 
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preference to legal form. 2. Where the tax treatment of particular transactions is 
likely to be complex, such additional complexity in the tax law should be justified by 
the improvement in equity or economic growth that may be achieved.” 
4.2.3 Efficiency 
There are various definitions of efficient taxation. An efficient tax system 
should be designed to keep tax distortions to the minimum necessary for raising 
revenue and maintaining an equitable tax allocation. Efficiency is widely recognized 
as a fundamental economic principle of optimal taxation. Despite being widely 
recognised as one of the key fundamentals in designing a good tax system, the 
concept of efficiency is a controversial concept to define. In general, efficiency can 
be viewed from the perspective of national and international levels. 
From the economical perspective of achieving national efficiency, efficiency 
is often viewed from the notion of production efficiency. As efficiency is necessary 
to achieve Pareto optimum, where the production factors cannot be relocated to 
another project that enables an increase in overall output (Devereux & Pearson, 
1995, p. 1658). In other words, if the tax system distorts consumer choices, it is 
better to leave the input choices of firms undistorted by taxes, thereby allowing a 
minimisation of aggregate production. In order to achieve efficiency, tax regimes 
should not create distortions to the economic agents, in this case the corporate 
taxpayers’ decisions (European Commission, 2001, p. 26). Therefore, a tax system 
should be designed to keep tax distortions to the minimum necessary for raising 
revenue and maintaining an equitable tax burden. When there is no consistency in 
tax treatments of the same economic situations, various economic distortions will be 
created. 
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Raja (1999) explained that it could be difficult to distinguish the difference 
between social and private optimal levels of efficiency. He argued that if a tax 
regime distorted economic decisions, this would create production inefficiencies and 
welfare losses. From the corporation perspective, the focus of taxation effects on 
economic decisions is contingent upon the principle of neutrality. In this sense, 
neutral taxation does not influence the managers’ decision in undertaking business 
decisions. Managers’ decisions should be purely driven by business goals. 
Otherwise, if taxation affects decision-making, it may result in a lower level of 
productivity and reduced international competitiveness. 
Although one may argue that the current definitions of efficient and neutral 
criteria can be interpreted from different perspectives, Spengel and Schäfer (2003) 
argued that both criteria actually complemented each other. As a tax system does not 
interfere with firm-level decisions, this implies production efficiency and thus, 
enables it to achieve the optimal allocation of resources. When evaluating whether a 
tax system is efficient, there is a need to analyse instances as to whether such a 
system influenced the firm’s decision-making.  
4.2.4 Neutrality 
The principles of equity and efficiency focus on achieving a non-distorting 
neutral outcome. In other words, tax neutrality has its foundations in the principles of 
economic efficiency and equity. A neutral tax system would reduce disposable 
income, while not affecting consumption, trade, or production, where it has no effect 
on real business decisions, such as ownership decisions, investment decisions, 
production decisions, and business structure (Desai & Hines, 2003). The distinction 
between corporate structures becomes irrelevant. The application of the doctrine to 
112       Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
multinational groups in which subsidiaries are under the common control of a parent 
company is, therefore, consistent with the neutrality principle (Ting, 2013). 
From the microeconomic point of view, the concept of neutrality focuses on 
the effects of taxation regarding single companies and their shareholders, rather than 
on the taxation effects on the national welfare (Spengel & Schäfer, 2003). Similarly, 
an optimal tax system would not influence decisions on the allocation of production 
factors within and between companies. If a tax system does not distort entities 
economic decisions, there are no incentives for tax planning purposes. In general, 
imposing taxes reduces the level of foreign direct investment in the jurisdictions 
compared to those without it. However, this effect is not considered a violation of 
efficiency criteria. Instead, neutrality can be viewed with respect to different types of 
investment. In this sense, the principle of neutrality requires a tax regime to impose 
the same effective tax rate across all sectors, assets types, and modes of financing, 
regardless of the business or organisational structure.  
International tax regimes are usually evaluated based on their scope and 
effectiveness (Krasner, 1983). The scope of the regime refers to the issue of the tax 
scope and the geographical boundaries. The purpose of an international tax regime is 
to avoid over or under-taxation of multinationals’ worldwide income earned in 
different jurisdictions based on the concept of residence or source taxation. The 
presence of the distortions effect would mean the resources were not allocated 
efficiently, thus reducing the efficiency of a global economy. An international 
economic neutrality tax system is traditionally framed in terms of capital-import 
neutrality, capital-export neutrality, and capital-ownership neutrality (Desai & Hines, 
2003; Kane, 2006). From a world-wide efficiency viewpoint, ideally the capital-
export neutrality and capital-import neutrality criteria would all be met. As there are 
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different possible definitions of the neutrality concepts, for evaluation purposes, this 
thesis only uses the definition discussed in this chapter.  
4.2.4.1 National-neutrality 
A tax system is considered to be nationally-neutral if it does not distort the 
investment decisions of domestic firms and the post-foreign tax return on foreign 
investments. In other words, regardless of where the world taxable income is earned, 
it is taxed in the same way as the taxpayer’s national tax authority. In theory, a 
nationally-neutral tax system is equitable as taxpayers with similar conditions are 
being taxed in the same manner (Desai & Hines, 2003). National-neutrality can be 
seen as a variant of capital-export neutrality, but with a preference for domestic 
investment, as a nationally-neutral tax system disregards the credit for foreign tax 
paid by multinational entities and their foreign subsidiaries, so that there is no 
incentive that could otherwise exist to invest offshore in low-tax jurisdictions and 
defer taxation at the resident shareholder level. In this sense, foreign tax paid can be 
viewed as an additional expense or cost of doing business. In this way, national-
neutrality promotes national welfare. 
4.2.4.2 Capital-export neutrality 
The normative objective of capital-export neutrality is to ensure the equal 
treatment of investors in that country to pay the same amount of tax whether they 
invest domestically or internationally. Capital-export neutrality is argued to be 
desirable as it does not distort locational decisions of multinational entities. Under a 
capital-export neutrality oriented tax system, investors would incur the same amount 
of tax on investments with equal pre-tax yields from foreign or domestic investment. 
In other words, foreign and domestic investors or capital providers in a given country 
are being taxed with the same effective tax rate on investment invested in the county, 
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such that the residency of investors does not create tax differentials (Spengel & 
Schäfer, 2003, p. 23). An ideal capital-export neutrality tax should not distort a 
taxpayer’s decision to locate its investment activities, as investors face the same tax 
treatment regardless of the geographical location of their investment, thus, promoting 
decision neutrality. 
Under a capital export neutral system, the residence country treats taxes paid 
to the source country as a credit against the taxpayer’s residence country tax 
obligation. The residence country collects a tax on transactional income only if and 
to the extent that its tax claim exceeds that imposed by the source country. The US 
worldwide taxation system is more related to the concept of capital-export neutrality, 
although, in practice, the system is in between the spectrum of capital-export 
neutrality and capital-import neutrality. European nations use capital-export 
neutrality systems for taxation of non-business income. 
Capital-export neutrality is usually adopted in capital-importing countries, 
and is rarely used in traditional exporting-countries. Even when a foreign tax credit 
is used, countries defer the taxation of income accumulated in foreign companies 
until repatriation, except for specific cases such as those covered by various 
controlled legislation. A long enough deferral period is equal to an exemption of the 
foreign-source income. In theory, capital-export tax systems encourage business 
investments to be made in the location in which they generate the largest pre-tax 
return and thereby discourage tax-included distortions in business locations that 
would reduce productive efficiency and create deadweight economic losses. 
Richman (1964) argued that international taxation based on capital-export neutrality 
would promote the greatest worldwide income and productivity. Additionally,     
Avi-Yonah (2005) also shared similar sentiments where capital-export taxation 
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systems would reduce or eliminate tax competition, allowing source countries to 
impose taxes on foreign investment. Among various neutrality concepts, the 
literature generally shows a preference for capital export neutrality (Pinto, 2009 
,p.68). Capital-export neutrality is pivotal to achieving an efficient allocation of the 
world’s investments, while capital-import neutrality, which considers the efficient 
allocation of savings, is considered to be a less significant goal. However, despite the 
fact that capital-export neutrality does not distort location decisions, if national tax 
rules differ, distortions of business decisions will likely remain. For instance, a 
multinational group is able to locate its headquarters (or residence) in a low tax 
jurisdiction in order to escape a high tax burden on its worldwide income. 
In spite of its theoretical justifications, the fact remains that no single 
government prefers foreign to domestic investments, as revenue generated by local 
investment stays in the coffers of that government, whereas if that investment was 
made abroad, it would be the source country which would derive immediate tax 
revenue (McIntyre, 2003). Therefore, any government is more likely to support 
domestic firms that are capable of achieving a high degree of competitiveness in 
world markets. In practice, countries are unable to fulfil all of the criteria to achieve 
capital-export neutrality. 
 
4.2.4.3 Capital-import neutrality 
From the economic literature, capital-import neutrality is achieved when a 
tax system does not create distortion for companies in terms of investment decisions. 
Capital-import neutrality implies that the tax burden placed on the foreign subsidiary 
of a multinational group by the host country should be the same regardless of where 
the multinational entity is incorporated, and the same as that placed on domestic 
firms. Therefore, the decision to set up branches or subsidiaries should be irrelevant. 
116       Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
The normative goal behind capital-import neutrality is that tax considerations should 
not affect investment decisions made by domestic or foreign investments.  
If a tax system satisfies capital-import neutrality, business considerations will 
drive the investment decision. This also implies that every business earns the same 
after-tax return at the margin. As for marginal investments, all investors will earn the 
same before tax rate of return in any location; capital-import neutrality requires all 
investors in a jurisdiction to pay tax at the same rate. In other words, the tax burden 
placed on the foreign subsidiary of a multinational entity by the host jurisdiction 
should remain the same, regardless of where the multinational group is incorporated 
and the same as that placed on domestic firms. Musgrave discussed capital-import 
neutrality in terms of business competition and expansion opportunities. She 
described capital-import neutrality as all companies in a jurisdiction being taxed at 
the same rate, regardless of their residence. Then taxation should not affect 
competition in that jurisdiction (Brooks, 2008).  
From the perspective of tax law literature, capital-import neutrality is 
associated with competitiveness or ownership neutrality. Capital-import neutrality 
will result in the same tax payable expense irrespective of the location of the capital 
provider. This principle typically guides the design of national tax systems. Most 
countries apply the same tax rule for domestic companies irrespective of which 
country the owner is located in or resides. As a matter of fact, many tax reforms have 
tried to enhance equal treatment of different sources of finances and investor types. 
There can still be local differences, but at a national-level, taxes are typically 
designed based on capital-import neutrality. In general, source taxation that 
correlates with capital-import neutrality distorts neutrality, as different tax rates will 
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determine the returns on an investment depending on the jurisdiction in which it is 
made. 
The traditional argument in favour of capital import neutrality as a tax 
objective stems from its possible reduction of distortions in savings levels. In a 
capital-import neutral regime, all taxpayers would presumably receive the same 
amount of after-tax return and thus, face the same trade-off between current and 
future consumption (Graetz, 2001; Kane, 2006). The proposed CCCTB regime 
within the European Union defines the taxable unit to be a group of companies’ 
residing within the European Union, and the tax base to be the aggregate taxable 
income or losses of all these resident group companies (Ting, 2013). Most European 
countries have adopted the capital-import neutral method of taxing foreign income. 
In contrast, the US employs a tax credit system by allowing the deferral of income 
through foreign business operations of foreign subsidiaries to fall between the 
capital-import and capital-export neutrality spectrum (Ting, 2010). 
4.2.4.4 Capital-ownership neutrality 
Desai and Hines (2003) discussed the concept of capital-ownership neutrality 
as an additional concept of economic efficiency. The basic argument being that 
productivity of investments depends on the ownership of assets and therefore 
taxation should not distort ownership decisions. If all jurisdictions disregard foreign 
income for taxation purposes, the tax treatment of foreign income should be the same 
for all investors. Capital-ownership neutrality can be obtained when countries do not 
tax offshore investments of resident companies. Instead, corporate income taxation 
tends to levy taxes on domestic sources of income. 
However, capital ownership-neutrality creates two types of competition 
between investors or companies that would influence economic decisions. When the 
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competition is between investors, the distortion is not always in favour of the lowest-
taxed investor. Instead, the advantage belongs to the investor who has the lowest 
total tax rate on the investment under consideration, relative to that same investor’s 
total tax rate on readily available alternative investments (Desai & Hines, 2003). 
Knoll (2010) argued that the finance literature indicated that companies do 
compete for investors’ resources that they use to buy assets. Thus, the competition 
for resources can be translated into competition to acquire or control assets. From 
this perspective, it has to be recognised that foreign direct investments in developing 
countries are often in the form of merger and acquisitions or joint-ventures with the 
local companies. In summary, capital ownership neutrality can be achieved through 
source or residence based taxation with foreign tax credits. However, it is difficult to 
use capital-ownership to determine the efficiency of a tax policy, as from an 
ownership perspective, capital-ownership neutrality does not necessarily promote 
global and national welfare (Kane, 2006). 
4.2.4.5 Relative merits of neutrality principles 
Ideally, in order to achieve perfect neutrality, the requirements of capital 
export neutrality, capital ownership neutrality, capital import neutrality, and national 
neutrality have to be met. However, it is unlikely that a tax system will satisfy all of 
these neutrality principles.  
Capital-export neutrality is commonly proposed to maximize global welfare 
and is consistent with the principle of horizontal and vertical equity. National 
neutrality, on the other hand, maximises domestic welfare. Desai and Hines (2003) 
argued for capital-ownership neutrality as a means to promote global welfare from 
the perspective of efficiency of ownership. 
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In a similar view, McLure Jr (1992) argued that capital-neutrality promoted 
the efficient allocation of the world’s investments. Therefore, it is superior compared 
to capital-import neutrality that emphasizes efficient allocation of savings. In the 
view adopted by the US Treasury, it does not matter whether a tax system promotes 
domestic or global welfare; capital-export neutrality should be pursued instead of 
capital-import neutrality, as it provides the greatest economic output to the world. 
The US Treasury contended that there has yet to be convincing economic analysis 
that a country should levy corporate taxation in the same manner for domestic and 
foreign investment (The US Department of the Treasury, 2000, p. 23).  
The relative merits of these principles are a matter of debate, and it is not the 
purpose of this section to justify which is the superior principle, or design a tax 
system that could satisfy all. In practice, given the complexity of the 
interrelationships between countries' tax systems and sophisticated tax planning 
arrangements, achieving even one neutrality principle can be challenging. As there 
are many interpretations of neutrality of which Knoll (2010) provided an excellent 
summary of the neutrality-framework distortion. He summarized the types of 
distortion into 1. location distortion; 2. savings distortion; 3. ownership distortion, as 
presented in Table 2. It is clear that neither residence based achieving capital-export 
neutrality taxation, nor source based taxation achieving capital-import neutrality are 
capable of achieving full neutrality. When evaluating separate accounting and global 
formulary apportionment regimes from the perspective of the neutrality concept, this 
thesis proceeds to critically analyse and compare both regimes based on Knoll's 
(2010) summarised neutrality framework. 
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Table 2. Knoll’s tax neutrality framework 
Distortion Neutrality Proposition Standard for 
Neutrality 
Systems that 
satisfy 
Location Capital-export neutrality For each investor, the 
before-tax rate of 
return is equal 
everywhere 
Worldwide 
Savings Capital-import neutrality 
(economist 
interpretation) 
All investors have the 
same after-tax return 
Territorial 
Ownership Capital-import neutrality 
(traditional interpretation 
of Capital-ownership 
neutrality) 
For each investor, the 
after-tax of return is 
equal everywhere 
Universal 
Worldwide or 
Universal 
Territorial 
 
4.3 CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CHOSEN CRITERIA 
This section examines the relationships among the principles that form the 
basis of the ‘criteria for a good tax system’. As it is not realistic to satisfy all of these 
criteria, this examination allows the assignment of rankings attributed to each of 
these criteria to guide the analysis on which criteria should take precedence should 
there be any conflict. 
4.3.1 Equity and Efficiency or Neutrality 
In designing a tax system, it is inevitable for a government to be faced with 
trade-offs between the principles of equity and efficiency. Specifically, the OECD 
states that there are many instances where conflict arises between equity and 
efficiency inherent in the taxation of income generating activities (OECD, 2010c). 
For instance, efficiency-enhancing tax reforms may create drawbacks to effective 
implementation. To illustrate, tax reforms that aim at improving equity may appear 
to be in favour of a particular groups, while other groups pay a disproportionate 
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share of the costs. The adverse redistribution impacts arising out of these reforms 
would reduce the equity aspect of the tax system. Similarly, a neutral tax system 
would require an equal treatment for those taxpayers with the same economic 
circumstances, such that decision-making is solely driven by economic purpose and 
not tax. In some cases, it is impossible to achieve full neutrality and governments 
need to accept a certain level of behavioural distortion.  
Furthermore, the improvement in efficiency arising from tax reform would 
not be reflected immediately. Thus, governments would not be able to immediately 
use these efficiency gains to compensate the losers from tax reform. Therefore, the 
issue here is to seek balance between these two objectives. Similarly, the measure 
that promotes tax equity also simultaneously complicates the system. The increase in 
complexity makes it difficult for the taxpayer to understand and apply the 
appropriate rules surrounding the tax system, which in turn may also create 
economic distortions.  
4.3.2 Equity and Simplicity 
In order to achieve equity, a tax system may need to be designed in such a 
manner as to capture individual tax circumstances and attributes in order to achieve 
the appropriate level of fairness. Such an attempt may complicate the tax system. 
Thus, in an attempt to achieve equity, the underlying legislation and administrative 
requirements for a tax system would become so complicated that a taxpayer would 
be required to engage expert advice, thereby increasing compliance and technical 
costs. 
4.3.3 Efficiency and Simplicity 
The conflict between equity and simplicity is conceptually irreconcilable. A 
simple tax can provide administrative advantages, such as reducing the time spent on 
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tax planning activities, tax litigation, and tax administration. Simplicity also 
encourages more time on real business activities rather than planning pointless tax 
strategies, thus reducing economic distortions. However, in order to achieve 
efficiency, a tax system is required to be technically precise enough to reflect the 
specific tax objective that it hopes to achieve, which increases its complexity in 
terms of administration feasibility and the ability for the user to understand the 
legislation. Compliance burden is difficult to ascertain given the ambiguity in 
quantifying the amount of time taxpayers spend planning and preparing tax returns 
and the value of that time. 
4.3.4 Summary 
As it is impossible to satisfy all criteria simultaneously, any violation of each 
principle would create possibilities and opportunities for tax avoidance behaviour. 
The OECD is increasingly concerned with the extent of tax base erosion and tax 
avoidance, which have had a significant economic impact on its member and non-
member countries (OECD, 2013). From the perspective of equity, the extent to 
which a tax system prevents income-shifting from income-producing jurisdictions to 
low tax or tax haven jurisdictions would promote fairness among different corporate 
taxpayers and tax collecting governments. 
The relationship between equity, neutrality/efficiency, and simplicity can also 
be viewed as interconnected and interrelated, despite the fact that they might be in 
conflict with one another. A neutral system would promote fairness, as taxpayers 
receive equal tax treatment. On the other hand, different jurisdictional governments 
should be able to collect revenue according to the observable profit generating 
activities conducted within their taxing borders. A simple system provides certainty 
to taxpayers, thereby reducing the attempt to engage in tax avoiding behaviour. 
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Incremental reduction in profit-shifting and base erosion would promote equity to 
the taxing jurisdictions.  
4.4 CRITERIA FOR A GOOD TAX SYSTEM: AN INTEGRATED 
EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The basis for the theoretical framework is subjected to limitations, for 
example the fact chosen criteria might be in conflict with one another. Therefore, it 
is important to seek some form of compromise by assigning relative importance to 
each criterion. It is clearly highlighted in the literature that any positioning of the 
criteria is subjected to debate.  
While some tax policies are in conflict with one another, others are more 
complementary. It is apparent that among those chosen criteria, the equity criterion is 
seen as fundamental (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2010; Avi-Yonah, 2007; Avi-Yonah 
& Margalioth, 2007; Dirkis, 2004; Musgrave, 1983). In the approach adopted in this 
thesis, where it is demonstrated that one or more of the criteria are in conflict with 
one another, the equity criterion will be the primary evaluating criteria in assessing 
the adequacy of existing system versus the global formulary apportionment 
approach. The equity criterion is chosen because from the public finance perspective, 
the aims of taxation is to promote equity for the greater good of the society (McGee, 
2011). 
 In contrast, in the conditions or situations where the equity objective leads to 
a negative outcome in terms of simplicity and complexity, the reform option that will 
prevail is that the one that provides a balance between the equity tax policy 
objectives and simplicity objectives. In conclusion, the objective of a tax system is to 
strike a balance between the ‘criteria for a good tax system’, while at the same time 
being mindful of competing economic and political interests.  
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a theoretical framework for evaluation of arm’s length-
separate accounting and global formulary apportionment. Even without an absolute 
consensus on the choice and the ranking of evaluative criteria, most literature and 
governments have endorsed these commonly agreed principles. Confronted with the 
theoretical and implementation problems of the arm’s length principle, and the 
economic consequences as evidenced by base erosion profit shifting (OECD, 2013), 
it is worthwhile to explore different income allocation methods. Although the 
ranking of the evaluative criteria might be subjected to criticism, it can be argued 
that as the theoretical framework is synthesised from commonly used principles, 
these principles are a reflection of international consensus towards the guidelines on 
whether to support or reject a tax reform option. 
International cooperation is needed if international tax reform is to have 
incremental progress. Thus, this analysis is important to provide objectivity in 
examining the prospects of the respective tax regime by reviewing its potential 
adherence and violation against the theoretical framework. If tax systems are 
carefully analysed and reviewed against the criteria of a good tax system, one could 
subtly infer the possibility of determining the extent to which a tax reform could 
achieve international acceptance and cooperation over the issue of profit allocation. 
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Chapter 5: Research Design 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is underpinned by a constructivism paradigm (Yin, 2012). From 
the perspective of the constructivism paradigm, qualitative research methodology is 
appropriate, as the research attempts to understand, explain, and discover the 
implications associated with the decision to retain or reform the current tax system. 
The objective of this research is to understand and explain whether global 
formulary apportionment is a suitable alternative to replace the current separate 
accounting method. The first research question of this thesis aims to evaluate the 
current arm’s length, separate-entity approach, and the alternative approach referred 
to as the global formulary apportionment, against the criteria of a good tax system 
developed in Chapter 4 and draws conclusions as to the appropriateness of the 
existing income allocation system in today’s economic environment.  
For this reason, Section 5.2 justifies why comparative methodology is 
suitable for evaluating both unitary taxation and separate accounting regimes. 
Critical analysis involves comparing both taxation regimes and considers the claims 
and findings of existing literature, governments, and authorities and so on, what they 
are based on, and how far they seem to apply or be relevant to a given situation.  
The second part of this chapter discusses a case-study methodology, with a 
multiple-case, embedded design (Yin, 2012), drawing on two mining multinational 
companies with mine operations in Indonesia. The Indonesian mining industry is 
dominated by a few multinational entities (Devi, 2013, p. 63). For this reason, the 
second research question employed a case study approach by studying Freeport-
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McMoran and Rio Tinto, the analyses should provide a reasonable insight into the 
industry. Section 5.3 describes the case study methodology for the context of this 
thesis in further detail. The use of a case study allows for the prediction of an 
outcome, as Babbie (1995, p.19) noted “Often, we are able to predict without 
understanding.” Accordingly, one might be able to predict the tax outcomes and to 
see how a tax regime interacts with different stakeholders in the arena of 
international corporate taxation, which can be complex, multi-faceted and difficult to 
approach systematically (Christians, 2010).  
Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 
Among the different approaches in comparative research methodology, the 
one adopted in this thesis views comparative taxation as a descriptive tool conducive 
to the design of a tax policy approach grounded in an evolutionary concept of tax 
change. The goal of such an approach is to identifying similarities and differences 
between the systems under review and inform potential alternative solutions to 
common issues for the purpose of developing a new system. Given the qualitative 
focus of this thesis, the comparative analysis was conducted by identifying instances 
where there appeared to be incidences that violated or adhered to the chosen criteria 
in the form of a theoretical framework. 
A functional comparison to explain how the chosen tax reform addressed tax 
problems in different countries, and thus, adopted a diagnostic approach, such that a 
set of tax rules could be defined as “tax mechanisms” based on “tax models” aimed 
at solving a specific “tax problem” was conducted using case study methodology. 
The researcher wanted to find a tax substitute functionally equivalent to that reform 
interest within the context of the case study (Garbarino, 2010). It is beyond the scope 
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and ability of this thesis to determine a complete solution to resolve the problems 
with regards to international taxation. Rather, this thesis hopes to advance the policy 
debate to address problematic key issues by addressing the key question of what is 
the best way to achieve an equitable and efficient allocation of multinational income. 
To guide the scope of the analysis, the researcher assumed that the arm’s length 
principle and formulary apportionment were mutually exclusive and acknowledges 
that these two taxation regimes have their own strengths and weaknesses. 
Table 3. Comparative methodology 
 
5.3  CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The main purpose of using a case study is to draw analytical generalisations 
to theoretical prepositions. The analytical generalisations to theoretical propositions 
made in a case study are in the context of the subjects (or cases) studied. Thus, there 
is no “sample” as would be expected in quantitative research. Tax scholarship is 
typically normative rather than scientifically inquisitive in nature. One typology 
suggests that case studies are undertaken “for identity, for an explanation, or for 
control” (Christians, 2010). Case studies would help tax scholars more effectively, 
test established international tax theories and assumptions, reveal information that 
Function: Multi-jurisdictional income allocation 
Tax regime Current  Plausible tax reform  
Taxable Unit Separate Accounting Unitary Taxation 
Apportionment 
Mechanism 
Arm’s length principle Formulary Apportionment 
Theoretical 
cornerstones 
The principles of Source 
and Residence-taxation 
The principles of Origin 
and Destination-taxation 
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will help new theories and assumptions to emerge, and create new spaces for policy 
development in international tax law (Oats, 2012). 
Additionally, the inherent global nature of cross-border taxation means the 
arena consists of different local tax systems that interact with one another. More 
specifically, the researcher was also interested in exploring the extent to which the 
status of a country as developing or low-income constituted a unique factor in this 
allocation process. For this reason, the case acts as a vehicle both for demonstrating 
that the given theory is insupportable in the context given the facts, and for 
advancing an alternative theory.  
5.3.1 Data Collection 
In the first part of the analysis, the method of description and analysis were 
applied in order to research the methods of group tax base analysis of Freeport-
McMoRan as a whole multinational group comprised from the company level-data 
from Osiris, provided by Bureau van Dijk. Data were extracted on 24th October 
2014, with the specification of 10thlevel subsidiaries. Given that the global formulary 
apportionment approach entails the highest spectrum of consolidation approach, this 
test consisted of two layers-control, which assumed the controlling company held at 
least 50.01% in the controlled company and ownership rights amounted to more than 
75% of the company’s capital. To assess the effects of the proposed global formulary 
apportionment, this thesis drew on the Freeport-McMoRan’s firm level data 
available on Osiris, provided by Bureau van Dijk. This included all subsidiaries at 
level 10. Next, the sample of companies within the group was obtained in order to 
determine its subsidiaries. 
Based on that analysis the distribution of the subsidiaries were obtained and 
categorised into financial secrecy jurisdictions or non-financial secrecy jurisdictions 
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according to the Financial Secrecy Index compiled by the Tax Justice Network. The 
Financial Secrecy Index has been widely covered in the international media; the 
index is increasingly cited in academic and policy research (Tax Justice Network 
Australia, 2013). Lastly, the subsidiaries within the multinational group were 
categorized according to the level of ownership (more than 50% and 75%).  
5.3.2 Case selection criteria 
Using the within case-study analysis approach, this thesis hopes to locate and 
explain the role of the tax system in international profit allocation within the broader 
dynamics of globalisation and the pursuit of profits, so as to seek a better 
understanding of whether the stronger application of enterprise doctrine through the 
use of global formulary apportionment would necessarily imply a better taxation 
regime. The first step to operationalizing the case-study approach was to determine 
the case selection criteria that involved the assessment of the applicability or 
explanatory value of the case studied. Indonesia was chosen as a suitable country 
context as its economy and policies are similar to that of other developing countries, 
thus providing generalizability to other developing countries. In order to address 
potential selection bias, the case study criteria were driven by the existing empirical 
findings that allowed the use of focus representative cases, which helped to explain 
the event or phenomena being studied.  
The chosen multinational entities were headquartered in OECD member 
countries or secrecy jurisdictions according to the Financial Secrecy Index compiled 
by Tax Justice Network (Beamish & Banks, 1987). Two of my chosen companies 
have subsidiaries located in British Virgin Island, which is considered tax haven 
according to FSI (Tax Justice Network Australia, 2013). 
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There are many alternative notions of what constitutes a tax haven. One of 
the most commonly used definitions was provided by Hines Jr and Rice (1994), 
which stated that tax havens were jurisdictions with coexistence of a low business 
tax rates and identification as a tax haven by multiple authoritative sources. Some 
regulatory criteria such as secrecy and low or zero taxes, appear in one form or 
another in each definition.  
Tax haven affiliates appear both to facilitate the relocation of taxable income 
from high to low-tax jurisdictions, and to reduce the cost of deferring home country 
taxation of income earned in low-tax foreign locations. As such, the second criteria 
would require multinational entities to have affiliates in tax haven jurisdictions 
(Desai, et al., 2006; Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr, 2004).  
In order to categorise whether the jurisdictions are considered tax havens, the 
OECD has provided several factors for identifying tax havens, as part of the project 
against ‘harmful tax practices’ of its Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA). According 
to the OECD, a tax haven jurisdiction is defined to have: 
 No, or only nominal taxes (generally or in special circumstances), and 
offers itself, or is perceived to offer itself, as a place to be used by 
non-residents to escape tax in their country of residence. 
 Laws or administrative practices that prevent the effective exchange 
of relevant information with other governments on taxpayers 
benefitting from the low or no tax jurisdiction. 
 Lack of transparency, and 
 The absence of a requirement that activity be substantial, as it would 
suggest that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract investment or 
transactions that are purely tax driven. For instance, transactions may 
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be booked there without the requirement of real economic substance 
(OECD, 2009). 
Other notable lists include the Financial Secrecy Jurisdiction developed by 
the Tax Justice Network Australia (2013), which are more detailed and include 
different types of tax haven jurisdictions. Each of these methods in classifying a list 
of tax havens has its own objective and goals. These lists of tax havens or offshore 
financial centres are based on different methods and indicators to identify such 
jurisdictions. 
Desai, et al. (2004) conducted analysis on the affiliate level data for 
American multinational entities and found that larger and more global firm networks 
and those with high R&D were most likely to use tax havens. The use of a tax haven 
allows multinational entities to allocate taxable income away from high-tax 
jurisdictions, thereby reducing the tax payable in the home country of foreign 
income. Hence, the second criteria for the case selection considered multinational 
entities with subsidiaries in tax haven jurisdictions. 
The differences in tax rates and profit shifting strategies described in this 
study are considered to be lawful, until challenged in court proceedings and 
regulatory bodies. It must be noted that it is extremely challenging to obtain data on 
profit shifting strategies engaged in by corporations, due to their secretive nature. As 
individuals are usually reluctant to divulge such sensitive information, this thesis 
refers only to publicly available materials and evidence. Finally, the multinational 
entities needed to have mine operations based in Indonesia. With these criteria, this 
thesis elected to build case studies based on Freeport-McMoRan’s and Rio Tinto’s 
business operations in Indonesia. 
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5.4 CONCLUSION 
In this section, the justification for why a qualitative research methodology 
based on comparative analysis and case study methodology was suitable for the 
context of this thesis was presented. 
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Chapter 6: Comparative Evaluation 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together the review of the literature 
with respect to separate accounting and unitary taxation with apportionment in the 
context of international profit allocation. The pursuance of tax reform requires 
comparative evaluation between the existing system and the potential alternative. 
Requirements for evaluating both separate accounting and unitary taxation with 
formulary apportionment will be analysed to determine their benefits and drawbacks, 
and to establish whether the existing tax system could be fixed or whether potential 
reform based on unitary taxation is needed. 
The aim of this chapter is to address the first research question of this thesis: 
When comparing both separate accounting and unitary taxation with formulary 
apportionment against the ‘criteria for a good tax system’, which taxation approach 
is better for the purpose of international profit allocation? 
This chapter compares the respective theoretical cornerstones and practical 
implementation issues of a separate accounting and a unitary taxation approach 
against the ‘criteria for a good tax system’ for international profit allocation. From a 
pragmatic viewpoint, it is impossible to satisfy all criteria. A trade-off approach is 
inevitable for the purposes of this thesis, to address instances in which the criteria are 
in conflict with one another. As such, this section inevitably relies on a subjective 
judgement (Dirkis, 2004). Throughout the course of this thesis, the researcher has 
covered the discussion of the relative merits and drawbacks of the arm’s length 
principle and global formulary apportionment. For this reason, this chapter may 
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seem to overlap partially with Chapter 2 – Institutional Background orienting the 
background for the arm’s length principle and Chapter 3 – Literature Review on the 
global formulary apportionment, in undertaking the comparative evaluation exercise. 
6.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 1: COMPARATIVE EVALUATION BASED 
ON THE CRITERIA FOR A GOOD TAX SYSTEM 
This section examines separate accounting and unitary taxation with 
apportionment based on the criteria for a good tax system – equity or fairness, 
neutrality and simplicity, as discussed in Chapter 4. A review of the literature and 
government tax guidelines reveals that there seems to be a consensus on what 
constitutes a good tax system. From this perspective, comparative evaluation against 
the criteria of a good tax system provides valuable insights into the plausibility of 
international agreement and acceptance. 
It is also worth noting that the perspective undertaken for this analysis is that 
of the government, as a good tax system for multinational entities is the one that 
allows for profit maximization, in which a tax system allows for tax reduction. 
6.2.1 Equity or Fairness 
What constitutes equitable and fair might be difficult to ascertain, as different 
perspectives of tax fairness may give different results about how corporate income 
should be collected and distributed. Nevertheless, equity remains an important 
consideration. One of the crucial perspectives of fairness in this thesis involved the 
issue of tax avoidance. Tax avoidance and profit-shifting from high tax jurisdictions 
to low or zero tax jurisdictions is inequitable (Durst, 2013b), as tax avoidance 
deprives the jurisdictions of their fair share of income from those companies that 
earned their income in that jurisdictions. 
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In the context of corporate income tax, each corporate taxpayer is liable to 
pay tax to the government that levied the taxes. From the perspective of international 
taxation, inter-nation equity is concerned with the relationship between the country 
in which the taxpayer is a resident and the country in which a taxable event is 
realised. Thus, the issue of tax avoidance under the arm’s length standard also 
violates certain principles relevant to the fairness of a tax system. 
As a starting point, the principle of ‘ability-to-pay’ suggests that each tax 
payer should pay a similar amount of tax if they have a similar economic ability. 
Under the arm’s length system, vertical equity would also be violated, as the driving 
principle that requires those with greater tax paying ability to contribute more than 
those with lesser ability would not happen if the tax system allowed income shifting. 
Multinational entities usually have more expertise and aggressive tax planning 
strategies, which would have been anticipated by the tax administrators in 
developing countries. These entities are able to artificially reduce their respective 
‘ability-to-pay’ by lowering the taxable income in high tax jurisdictions, and vice 
versa. From the economical perspective, if tax is considered an expense, the 
manipulation of one’s ability to pay disrupts the fairness among different paying 
corporate taxpayers, leaving those who choose to serve the rightful amount less 
resources to compete fairly in the marketplace. If viewed in this way, the arm’s 
length principle would also be unlikely to satisfy horizontal equity.  
A tax system that satisfies the horizontal equity principle would have 
corporate taxpayers paying the same rate of tax. Horizontal equity can be difficult to 
assess given that tax loopholes, deductions, and incentives, means the presence of 
any tax break ensures similar corporations do not pay the same rate. It is unlikely 
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that the arm’s length principle distributes corporate income fairly to the respective 
jurisdictions. 
According to the principle of equity, global income serves as the indicator to 
pay taxes, if income is recognized more than once for tax purposes and thus, is 
subject to double taxation (overcome by foreign tax credits), this violates the group-
wide ability to pay. From the taxpayer equity perspective, if double taxations indeed 
occur, the recognized income is being taxed more than once. Thus, a multinational 
entity may be taxed more than domestic firms. Accordingly, group-wide ability to 
pay under formulary apportionment should not change tremendously, although under 
this alternate regime, high-tax jurisdictions would collect more tax revenue. In other 
words, the average or marginal tax rates of multinational entities would remain 
unaffected, thereby not violating the principle of ability to pay (Avi-Yonah & 
Benshalom, 2010). 
Of equal importance, inter-nation equity is also an elusive goal for the arm’s 
length principle to achieve. The basic notion underlying the arm’s length principle is 
fundamentally flawed, as it is based on the assumption that the affiliated entities 
would trade with each other independently. In applying the arm’s length principle, 
there is a need to extract pricing information based on the capital market. More often 
than not, in the event where the capital market is inefficient, it is impossible to find 
reliable market prices.  
Furthermore, there is an increasing heterogeneity in the nature of the goods 
and services being traded internally among affiliated groups. It is very unlikely that 
the profit allocation among related parties generates the same figure as those among 
unrelated parties. Although one would argue that under perfect market conditions, 
where prices of traded goods are reliable and readily available, the probability of 
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such cases would be small. One of the key elements of the fairness of a system of 
rules for dividing income, especially from the perspective of the taxpaying public, is 
the extent to which the rules succeed in preventing the shifting of income from 
jurisdictions where companies conduct business to other jurisdictions. 
As the theoretical and implementation difficulties of the arm’s length 
principle in a globalised economy are becoming more common, the allocation 
method, using unitary taxation with apportionment or global formulary 
apportionment is becoming a more viable alternative. There is an increasing need to 
consider new international tax principles. Global formulary apportionment treats the 
worldwide profits of a multinational entity as being earned from its branches and 
associated entities. Apportionment is used to allocate the worldwide profits of a 
multinational entity to the jurisdictions in which it operates using a formulaic 
approach. The use of a formulaic approach in allocating global profits helps to 
address the transfer pricing problems of the current tax treaty system based on source 
and residence jurisdictions. 
Another valid point is that the existence of a multinational group is worth 
more than sum of its parts. As such, when the profit allocation process is based on 
the notion of separate legal entities, it disregards the benefits of earning larger profits 
by being an integrated group. Accordingly, the arm’s length principle fails, or is 
unable to address the issue of allocating these excess profits. In order to achieve 
inter-nation equity, the arm’s length principle should allocate profits according to 
their source, which is defined as the location where the profit-generating activities of 
a company take place. Thus, it is unlikely that separate accounting under the arm’s 
length principle addresses the issue of allocating these excess profits arising out from 
the benefits of being integrated. Accordingly, the principle of permanent 
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establishment creates ambiguity in drawing clear lines between which parts of the 
entity are synergised together to produce taxable income. 
Because of the outdated theoretical cornerstones, the arm’s length principle 
would then create economic distortions channelled through profit-shifting strategies. 
When profit shifting occurred, the affected jurisdictions would lose their fair share of 
tax while another jurisdictions would gain income that otherwise belonged to them, 
disregarding the right to the tax of the source jurisdictions. Under the arm’s length 
principle, the distributed income among the international tax base would not be 
equitable. It also appears that the arm’s length principle operationalized through the 
use of comparable data, which depends upon capital market, is illogical as it is based 
on the perfect efficient market. Thus, the current arm’s length principle has failed to 
allocate the profits of multinational entities in an efficient and equitable manner. 
In summary, profit shifting undermines the benefit principle of taxation. In 
fact, firms can benefit from a high supply of public goods in countries that levy high 
tax rates, but at the same time escape this tax burden by means of profit shifting to 
low-tax countries. Together, these arguments mean that the fundamental principles, 
based on the principle of source and residence, upon which the arm’s length 
principle is founded, cannot allocate the international tax base appropriately to the 
jurisdictions that give rise to those profits. For the foreseeable future it is highly 
unlikely that the arm’s length principle will be able to deliver equity and fairness 
among the corporate taxpayers and different jurisdictions. The growing participation 
of developing countries in international trade, in turn translates into a greater need 
for a major reform of the current tax system that must address the needs of such 
nations. 
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Avi-Yonah and Ian Benshalom also argued that formulary apportionment 
was not fundamentally different from the arm’s length standard, as market prices and 
formula factors can only act as proxies, but do not provide absolute “correctness”. 
However, capital market is often inefficient and that market reflects prices that do 
not determine the firm-specific sources of profitability. On the other hand, an 
apportionment formula attempts to approximate the firm-specific sources of 
profitability (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2010). 
Alternatively, can global formulary apportionment provide an equitable 
allocation of the international tax base? Ideally, if a formulary apportionment was to 
be applied to the scope of the tax base that entails the entire consolidated incomes of 
a commonly controlled group of taxpayers, then it could prevent profit-shifting. In 
theory, as income can only be allocated to the jurisdictions according to the 
observable economic activity, such an allocation approach makes it impossible for 
taxpayers to shift large amounts of taxable income to low-tax jurisdictions in which 
there is limited economic activity, thereby making it superior to the arm’s length 
standard. 
Global formulary apportionment promotes greater equity as it better reflects 
the underlying economic substance of a multinational entity. Bird and Brean 
provided a convincing argument against the current arm’s length principle of treating 
branches or subsidiaries as separate entities for income allocation purposes (Bird & 
Brean, 1986, p. 1392):  
“The underlying rationale of this approach is that the affiliated entities 
constitute a ‘unitary’ business, the profits of which arise from the operations of the 
business as a whole. It is therefore misleading to characterize the income of such a 
business as being derived from a set of geographically distinct sources… As already 
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noted, the unitary approach has in its favour the fact that it recognizes income as the 
fungible product of a set of income-producing factors under common control, 
regardless of location. The apportionment of tax base, once it has been determined, 
is founded in some fashion on the geographical distribution of property and 
activities that are presumed to contribute to the integrated income-producing 
process.” 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the United States’ experiences have 
shown that formulary apportionment is not entirely effective in preventing tax 
avoidance through income shifting. The insight here is clear and consistent. In order 
for formulary apportionment to be equitable, there is a need for the apportionment to 
pursue a full-fledged consolidation in the form of a combined-reporting basis, 
instead of applying formulary apportionment on a separate-accounting basis. 
Accordingly, if formulary apportionment is to be applied at the international level, 
the apportionment formula should be applied to the taxpayer’s worldwide 
consolidated income, inclusive of all sources without any attempt to distinguish 
between business and non-business income. Although some might argue that 
worldwide consolidation is challenging, it has yet to be applied in practice. However, 
it is necessary in order to curtail profit shifting and base erosion more effectively, 
thereby delivering more equity into the taxation system.  
Global formulary apportionment has the possibility to address such issues if 
it is based on the principle of destinations, as the transactions routed through the tax 
haven jurisdictions would be disregarded. To illustrate, if a multinational entity 
routes its export from Country A to Country B through a tax haven – which has a 
zero tax rate, Country A would levy a zero tax rate as the export is destined for a tax 
haven. The tax haven would tax the export at zero tax rates. Ultimately, Country B 
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would levy a tax rate according to its tax rate; and the entity would pay taxes in 
Country B where it earns revenue with the destination principle (with nexus on sales 
revenue). Thus, the use of tax havens becomes redundant as the amount to be taxed 
is the same as if the export had not been structured to pass through the tax haven 
(Devereux & Feria, 2014, p. 21). Nevertheless, there is a need to consider the 
principle of origin for developing countries, as an ultimate focus on destination 
(sales) would result in minimal tax revenue for the developing countries where the 
sales consumption is relatively low. For this reason, global formulary apportionment 
based on the principle of origin and destination promotes greater equity among the 
taxing jurisdictions. 
Another important consideration in determining whether formulary 
apportionment is equitable depends on how the consolidated income is to be divided. 
First, this issue is closely associated with the use of a pre-determined formula. The 
apportionment formula against which it is to be applied to the tax base would require 
approximating the observable economic activities undertaken by the multinational 
entity and its affiliates. Thus, corporate taxpayers and governments may find it 
unequitable if the pre-determined formula is in favour of certain types of 
multinational entities, or a certain type of jurisdiction, such as those depending more 
on exporting or importing. The issue of approximation with the use of formulary 
apportionment can be compared to the use of artificial comparable data under the 
arm’s length regime. In fact, within the arm’s length regime, the use of the 
transactional net margin method (TNMM) is somewhat similar to the method for 
dividing income based on a formulaic approach. For this reason, some may argue 
that the arm’s length regime is more equitable than formulary apportionment. 
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However, this problem could be addressed by formulating a special sector formula 
that is better at reflecting the unique economic activities of that sector. 
6.2.2 Neutrality 
At this stage, the use of neutrality criteria in evaluating the effects of tax 
mechanisms to allocate the international tax base under formulary apportionment and 
transfer pricing under the arm’s length standard has yet to produce a conclusive 
result. Klemm (2001, p. 45) suggested that neither formulary apportionment nor the 
arm’s length principle had a clear effect on capital-import neutrality and capital-
neutrality. Similarly, statistical evidence based on the United States was insufficient 
to provide a satisfactory verdict. Spengel (2007) applied the concept of consolidation 
under formulary apportionment and suggested that it failed to satisfy Capital-
ownership neutrality.  
Given that the arm’s length principle is subjected to discretion and that 
different jurisdictions may have different interpretations with regards to the 
appropriateness of transfer prices involved in the cross-border transactions, the arm’s 
length standard influences investment neutrality due to the risk of double taxation, 
Newlon (2000). Double taxation occurs when another jurisdiction fails to agree to 
the necessary adjustment with regards to the transfer price. The risk of double 
taxation would negatively influence the principle of neutrality as corporations would 
then prefer domestic investments over foreign investments by altering the net present 
value of domestic and foreign investment, thereby distorting an investment decision.  
In general, the current attempts to analyse formulary apportionment in terms 
of its capability to achieve tax neutrality have been based on very specific 
assumptions, such as perfect capital mobility, certain substitution elasticity between 
production factors, or a specific relationship between the costs of transfer price 
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manipulation and the amount of economic rents (Mayer, 2009), hence, undermining 
the validity of the presented arguments. 
At the conceptual level, Knoll’s (2010) neutrality-framework can be analysed 
from the perspective of the extent that a tax regime promotes tax competition and tax 
avoidance, in which these loopholes influence multinational entity location, savings, 
and ownership decisions of a multinational entity. As discussed earlier, the arm’s 
length, separate accounting approach established a taxing nexus based on the concept 
of residency and permanent establishment to establish a taxable presence within a 
taxing jurisdiction, creating opportunities for a multinational entity to structure 
artificial legal arrangements to avoid tax.  
On the other hand, global formulary apportionment seeks to establish the 
presence of a taxable concept based on the economic presence within the jurisdiction 
in the form of ‘factor presence’. Accordingly, formulary apportionment recognises 
that income production is dependent upon the economic concept of demand and 
supply. For this reason, global formulary apportionment divides profit fairly through 
reference to inputs at origin and outputs at destination. In this sense, global 
formulary apportionment can help to achieve neutrality, as domestic and foreign 
firms are faced with the same tax treatment according to the same tax base definition 
and pre-determined formula. 
In a similar way, the ownership-neutral framework is related to the extent of 
tax competition a tax system creates, as tax competition influences multinational 
entity investment location decisions, as the decision to invest (or own) implicitly 
influences tax neutrality. Under the arm’s length principle, governments are faced 
with ‘race to the bottom’ principles, where the effective tax rates of the OECD 
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member countries have been going down in order to attract foreign direct 
investments of the multinational entities. 
Conceptually, global formulary apportionment is more resistant to profit 
shifting and tax competition, as the apportionment factor is relatively immobile 
compared to shifting profit via legally separated affiliates into tax havens. For this 
reason, even if profit shifting occurs within a unitary taxation regime, it requires the 
multinational entities to shift real business activities. Conceptually, global formulary 
apportionment seeks to achieve a modest approximation of real economic activities. 
Essentially, it approximates the input based on the principle of origins using 
production, asset and labour factors, and output based on destinations in the form of 
sales factors. The location of customers, labour and physical assets, especially those 
tied to underground resources, in this instance, are harder to relocate for the purpose 
of profit shifting. Therefore, this helps to promote capital-import, capital-export, and 
national neutrality. 
6.2.3 Simplicity 
As mentioned earlier, a simple tax system is desirable. As a simple system is 
easier to understand and apply by the taxpayer. Correspondingly, a tax levied 
government would find it easier to monitor, enforce, and administer the tax. With a 
simple tax system, the associated operating costs would be reduced. Accordingly, the 
arm’s length principle falls short against the simplicity criterion. The application of 
the arm’s length principle in determining the arm’s length transfer prices requires 
corporate taxpayers to prepare extensive financial information, one of which is to 
perform a functional analysis that requires compilation and maintenance of a large 
number of contemporaneous documentation. A simple tax system would also require 
fewer requirements for data demands on taxpayers (Durst, 2013b), and that the 
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respective operating costs should fall within a reasonable proportion to the tax 
revenue, as the generation of the desired level of revenue is the main objective of 
taxation (Nobes, 2004). 
Given that the application of the arm’s length principle is becoming more 
complex, there would also be an increasing burden associated with documentation in 
justifying the chosen transfer pricing rules and maintaining the relevant transfer 
pricing documentation. Since the use of the arm’s length principle is subjective, as 
the use of comparable data for controlled transactions creates complexity, 
subjectivity undermines the simplicity criterion. Yet, in the current economic 
environment, it would be impossible to find a suitable comparable. As a result, 
companies and governments would continue to spend large amount of money on 
compliance and enforcement efforts in connection with the preparation of 
contemporaneous documentation by corporate taxpayers and attempts at 
comprehensive examinations by tax authorities involving expertise and 
professionals. Despite the extensive efforts in compliance and enforcement, 
companies and tax authorities are unable to determine the appropriate arm’s length 
pricing.  
Due to this subjectivity, companies would also need to deal with uncertainty 
in their financial statements. There are no clear standards for compliance, and this, 
coupled with the ability under the arm’s length standard to apportion income to low-
tax countries through legal means involving the use of intangibles and shifting who 
should bear the risk of a transaction, makes it impossible for governments to predict 
with reasonable accuracy their actual amount of corporate tax revenue. Furthermore, 
if a taxpayer finds it difficult to interpret, it might have a negative influence over 
investment decisions, thereby distorting the firm’s economic decisions. 
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On the contrary, formulary apportionment is dependent upon a pre-
determined formula that reduces the need for subjective judgements and allows for a 
more objective decision-making process. Accordingly, global formulary 
apportionment simplifies the taxation system. Since a formulary apportionment 
method depends on a pre-determined unitary tax definition, tax base, and formula, 
taxpayers and authorities alike would have a certain degree of certainty in dealing 
with the tax system. For instance, taxpayers could assess information about the pre-
determined formula across multiple jurisdictions in which the business activity is 
conducted, so that the corporation is able to weigh the total effective tax rate that is 
likely to apply to the income from the cross-jurisdictional investment (Durst, 2014a). 
However, although the pre-determined formula can be attractive in curbing 
uncertainty, there could be an issue associated with this system if the jurisdictions 
applied the formula inconsistently. This problem could also extend to the 
interpretation of the tax base definition on which the apportionment formula would 
be applied. Another aspect of a simple tax system is that it is easier to enforce. In 
contrast, the current arm’s length system is much too complex, such that the tax rules 
can be difficult to evaluate by both taxpayers and tax authorities. This complexity 
also contributes to rules that are difficult to enforce, and thus can easily be 
manipulated in order to evade or erode tax. While, this might seems a gold standard 
to achieve, the tax authorities have shown that enforcing the arm’s length principle 
through the current method would prove unworkable in many instances. 
The information requirement under formulary apportionment would also be 
relatively simple compared to the arm’s length regime. The information required is 
often available from the books of account that multinational entities already maintain 
for each of the associated subsidiaries and branches despite being legally separated. 
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Information such as total payroll, property, and sales in the country of issue is 
usually maintained for financial reporting purposes. On the other hand, the arm’s 
length method requires all transactions within the group, which can be tremendous. 
Take for example the costs under separate accounting, as evidenced by the trial in 
the Barclays case where the bank’s costs of preparing its combined report for each of 
the three years at issue in the case ranged from a low of $900 to a high of $1,250. 
The cost of preparing a combined report, which can serve as a basis for unitary 
taxation, is low compared to the millions of dollars spent on an arm’s length transfer 
pricing audits (McIntyre, 2012). 
 Another important aspect of formulary apportionment is the relative ease of 
technical issues associated with consolidating a worldwide tax base. As discussed 
earlier, the consolidation approach could be built upon the existing accounting 
standards, despite the need to alter certain standards in order to fit for taxation 
purposes. Compared to the arm’s length standard, formulary apportionment technical 
difficulties would be unlikely to surpass the current technical difficulties.  
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Table 4. A comparison between arm’s length, separate accounting and unitary 
taxation regimes 
Evaluation Arm’s Length Principle Unitary Taxation 
Equity  
If the apportionment 
formulary is applied to 
common consolidated tax 
base for all income 
sources, without 
differentiating business 
and non-business income 
√ 
Vertical equity X √ 
Horizontal equity X √ 
Inter-nation equity X √ 
Neutrality  
Depends on the formula 
choices 
Capital-export neutrality X - 
Capital-import neutrality X - 
Capital-ownership 
neutrality 
X - 
Simplicity   
Compliance costs X √ 
Technical costs X X 
Administrative costs X √ 
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
Upon reviewing the analysis, instead of advocating a specific solution, this 
section outlined considerations for why policy makers should consider a move 
towards unitary taxation using formulary apportionment. The simplicity criterion is 
related to the principles of equity and neutrality. Despite acknowledging the trade-off 
 149 Chapter 6: Comparative Evaluation 
between improvements in the precision of a tax system that is required to improve 
the equity and neutrality aspect of a tax system, a relatively simple tax system is still 
required given that a precise system would increase administrative and compliance 
costs. On the other hand, a neutral system would reduce compliance and 
administrative costs. Under a neutral system, the incentives and opportunities for tax 
planning would not be available. This raises the issue that an alternative tax system 
should be relatively simple and easy to enforce, while providing sufficient precision 
to achieve a fair and neutral allocation for an international tax base among countries.  
 Against this background, this thesis’s analysis strongly suggests that 
adopting unitary taxation with apportionment has emerged as a compelling 
alternative that may provide an incrementally better solution than the current system. 
The analysis of this section also shows that adhering to the arm’s length principle 
will be increasingly difficult as the volume and complexity of transactions continue 
to rise. Additionally, the current transfer pricing rules based on the arm’s length 
principle are increasingly difficult to apply and uphold with the increasing use of 
intangible assets, while risk-bearing creates additional complexity in the 
international tax system. The above table suggests that unitary taxation with 
apportionment offers a more equitable, neutral and simple system compared to the 
arm’s length rules. The theoretical cornerstones of arm’s length principle that are 
based on the concept of permanent establishment and source and residence taxation 
can be easily circumvented by the multinational entities. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The section aims to address the second research questions: 
Research question 2a.  How should a theoretically sound unitary taxation regime 
with formulary apportionment be designed? 
Research question 2b.  How should unitary taxation in the context of developing 
countries be implemented? 
Research question 2c.  Is there a need for a sector-specific formula? 
Section 7.2 examines how to design an ideal unitary taxation regime.  
Section 7.3 discusses and suggests the implementation issues in the context of 
developing countries, while Section 7.4 examines whether there is a need for a 
sector-specific formula. Thereafter, a case study approach further illustrates 
suggestions through which a unitary taxation on a formulary apportionment regime 
can be implemented for the mining sector in the context of a developing country.  
Section 7.5 and Section 7.6 report the results of the study two of the largest 
mining multinational entities – Freeport McMoRan’s and Rio Tinto’s operations in 
Indonesia. These cases can offer reasonable insights into corporate income taxation 
for the industry given both entities have complex corporate structures. At the same 
time, this thesis acknowledges that each country will pursue its own tax regime while 
considering the role of the extractive sector in its economy, along with the 
international tax system (Mullins, 2010), which is discussed in the context of 
Indonesia in Section 7.7. Section 7.8 provides suggestions for the transition to 
unitary taxation in the context of Indonesia. Lastly, Section 7.9 concludes the 
chapter. 
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7.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2A.  HOW SHOULD A THEORETICALLY 
SOUND UNITARY TAXATION REGIME WITH A FORMULARY 
APPORTIONMENT APPROACH BE DESIGNED? 
This section analyses how to design a theoretically sound unitary taxation 
regime with apportionment by examining the definitional issues of how to define a 
unitary business for a multinational entity, how to establish the taxable connection of 
a multinational entity, and how to define a unitary business group. 
7.2.1 How to define the unitary business for a multinational entity 
From a theoretical point of view, the definition of a unitary business seems 
straight forward. An ideal unitary business should consider all operations and 
businesses under common controlled entities regardless of the organisational 
structure chosen to engage the business and contribute to the group-wide overall 
profit. A unitary business should also have a taxable nexus with the jurisdiction that 
wants to levy tax on it, usually through ownership or legal tests. In practice, 
however, the process of identifying what constitutes the common controlled 
definition can be difficult to trace, especially when multinational entities are engaged 
in complicated or opaque business structures through the use of financial secrecy 
jurisdictions. Thus, it is likely that a narrow definition of a unitary business based on 
legal status would not be sufficient to reflect the underlying economic substance of 
multinational entities. An ideal definition of unitary business will have to incorporate 
the legal and economic relationships among the affiliated entities. 
7.2.2 The taxable connection of a multinational entity 
As discussed earlier, there is a need to establish a nexus to tax based on a 
legal and economic substance nexus. The current international tax regime generally 
adopts the ‘permanent establishment’ concept to determine whether there is a taxable 
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connection. In this case, the OECD states in Article 5 para 1 to 4, a permanent 
establishment has to be a fixed place of business (OECD, 2010a). The nexus to 
establish a taxable presence should remain the same under a unitary taxation 
approach, as a taxable presence indicates economic activities undertaken by the 
multinational entities to produce assessable income. This specifically includes, 
among other fixed places, places of management, an office, and a mine. For certain 
industries with a strong physical presence, such as mining, the taxable connection 
can be identified easily.  
7.2.3 How to define a unitary business group 
In general, a unitary business can be defined based on an ownership control 
test and a relationship test. A unitary business could include branches, subsidiaries 
and joint ventures, while foreign operating subsidiaries are excluded from the 
definition of a unitary business. However, it can be useful to define the unitary 
business based on worldwide relationships and tax accordingly, so as to capture the 
integrative relationship among the entities, while providing foreign tax credits to 
prevent double taxation. In addition to satisfying the control test, the group must 
have business activities or operations that (1) result in a flow of value between or 
among persons in the group, or (2) are integrated with, are dependent upon, or 
contribute to each other. 
Although the definitional issues of the unitary business can be approached 
from an overarching analysis that covers a spectrum of industries, this thesis 
contends that the mining industry presents a suitable context to assess the 
applicability of a unitary taxation regime, as a move towards full-fledged unitary 
taxation internationally and across industries would be difficult to achieve in the 
short-term.  
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7.2.4 The scope of an multinational entity 
The attempt to roll out a full-fledged international tax reform across all 
industries is more likely to receive opposition than just focusing on a specific 
industry in a federal level of jurisdiction. From a theoretical point of view, full 
consolidation is superior because it reflects the whole underlying economic 
substance undertaken by the multinational entities. An important issue is to decide 
whether to apply full or proportional consolidation. In the view of the European 
Commission (2007b), if the parents own less than 100% of the shares in a subsidiary, 
the treatment of minorities should be considered. According to the criteria of tax 
payer equity, there is a need to ensure fairness between majority and minority 
shareholders, if the tax paid by the companies they own is potentially determined by 
the companies’ ownership within the group. In addition, the current proposed EU 
CCCTB tax base consolidation is based on two ownership threshold tests at 50% and 
75%; arguably, this sub-standard creates opportunities for distortions. For a more 
stringent approach, a single ownership threshold test at 50% is more desirable so to 
prevent distortion opportunities associated with two threshold ranges. Single 
ownership threshold maintains application consistency and reduces the chances of 
distortions. 
7.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 2B.  HOW SHOULD UNITARY TAXATION 
IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BE 
IMPLEMENTED? 
A theoretically sound unitary taxation regime has to consider the unique 
political and economic context of developing countries. As such, there is no one 
unitary taxation regime that could be applied uniformly for all countries. The 
theoretical superiority of this system is likely to be reduced, as the uniform approach 
is likely to better reflect the integration of multinational entities. As discussed earlier, 
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any diversion in definition and apportionment rules will inevitably create distortions 
and opportunities for profit shifting.  
The ability of multinational entities to shift profits from one jurisdiction to 
another using the arm’s length principle clearly violates inter-nation equity. 
Nevertheless, a unitary taxation regime can be seen as a potential solution to address 
such a loophole and the tax base erosion experienced by the developing countries. 
The design of the apportionment formula must seek a balance between production 
(origin) and consumption factors (destination), while at the same time considering 
the effects and implications of such a regime to the principles of inter-nation equity, 
neutrality, and simplicity into the taxation system.  
From the administrative perspective, developing countries governments 
would need to collect sufficient information to assess income tax accurately. As 
such, a combined report to reflect all income-producing activities under a 
consolidation approach is ideal. From a taxpayer perspective, it is likely that they 
have maintained such information for accounting purposes. At this point, 
governments of developing countries should consider whether the scope of 
consolidation should be within the boundaries of taxing jurisdictions or based on all 
jurisdictions worldwide. Theoretically, worldwide consolidation is superior, as it 
provides a more holistic view of the taxpayer’s worldwide income producing 
activities. Thus, unitary taxation promotes simplicity and reduces administration, as 
well as compliance costs of both taxpayers and administrators of developing 
countries. 
7.3.1 Definitional issues 
The definitional issues of the unitary business can be approached from an 
overarching analysis that covers a spectrum of industries. Nevertheless, this thesis 
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contends that the mining industry presents a suitable context to assess the 
applicability of a unitary taxation regime, as a move towards full-fledged unitary 
taxation internationally and across industries would not be achieved in the short-
term. Even if a general unitary taxation regime was applied across industries, some 
alterations would be required for the mining sector due to its inherent characteristics 
and economic significance.  
Furthermore, the mining industry has always been subjected to separate 
taxation. For instance, fiscal regimes for the extractive industries include corporate 
income taxation on the business profits in addition to rent taxes. Rent taxes include 
resource rent tax and royalties. According to IMF (2013), the fiscal regimes in 
favour of developing countries should include a combination of corporate income 
taxes; resource rent tax, and ad valorem royalty. Before suggesting a possible 
consolidation approach and apportionment formula suitable for developing countries, 
it is important to consider the interaction between corporate income taxation regimes 
with other applicable mining taxes. Analysing this interaction is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, this thesis contends that examining the definitional issues 
of the mining industry is highly relevant to the mining sector, as many developing 
countries rely heavily on the mining industry to collect tax revenue. The next section 
discusses the definitional issues of the extractive or mining industry.  
7.3.2 How to define the extractive or mining industry? 
The first implementation issue is to define the scope of that industry or 
market sector. As a starting point, it can be useful to look at the existing reporting 
disclosure requirements and those proposals for accounting reporting requirements 
specifically targeted at the extractive industry and determine how the impacted 
industries are being defined - (1) Dodd-Frank Act Section 1504 SEC Rule 13 (q) –
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Vacated and to be rewritten by the SEC, (2) EU Accounting and Transparency 
Directive, (3) Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and (4) Canadian 
recommendations paper- (draft). The reporting requirements could provide useful 
guidelines to define the scope of a mining multinational entity in the context of a 
unitary taxation regime. 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress added Section 13 (q) to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which mandated the SEC to issue a rule requiring issuers 
engaged in the ‘commercial development of oil, gas, or minerals, or the license for 
any such activity’ to disclose the amount of expenses payments by type, by project 
and by government annually. The Dodd-Frank Act scope excludes the following as 
the impacted industries: marketing, transportation, refining or smelting activities, and 
logging activities (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2012c). 
Under the EU Accounting and Transparency Directive, Article 36 defines 
mining as ‘undertaking active activities in the extractive industry’ as an undertaking 
with any activity involving ’exploration, prospection, discovery, development, and 
extraction of minerals, oil, natural gas deposits or other materials within the 
economic activities’ which include: (1) mining or certain metals and minerals; (2) 
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gases; (3) quarrying; (4) operation of 
gravel and sand pits. In particular, “support activities” for extraction, mining and 
quarrying are excluded from the definition of the mining sector. 
In the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), EITI repeatedly 
refers to oil, gas, and mining as part of extractive industries. Each enacting 
jurisdiction may expand the scope of other extractive industries not specifically 
mentioned (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, nd). 
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The Working Group of the Canadian Government recommends the definition 
of a mining company as a company that engages in the commercial development of 
minerals that makes any of the payments required, and is a reporting issuer under 
Canadian securities legislation (The Resource Revenue Transparency Working 
Group, 2014). The working group states that the definition of a mining company is 
aligned with US Dodd-Frank Act and EITI’s definitions. “[t]This definition is 
appropriate for meeting the intent behind new disclosure requirements, and is in line 
with the requirements outlined in the EU Transparency and Accounting Directives 
and those in Section 1504 of the US Dodd-Frank Act.” (The Resource Revenue 
Transparency Working Group, 2014, p. 6). 
In the United States, Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 930-10-20 
stipulates that mining entities include entities involved in finding and removing 
wasting natural resources. In this sense, Financial Accounting Standards Board’s 
definition suggests a broad spectrum to define the mining industry (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, 2011). 
The combined income approach through the use of a worldwide combination 
of tax bases is superior as it prevents artificial profit shifting. On the other hand, as 
the mining industry is often involved in a tremendous amount of transactions, it is 
likely that the administrative burden involved in preparing tax reporting and 
collecting relevant information will increase reporting requirements for PT. Freeport-
McMoRan. For developing countries such as Indonesia, when dealing with United 
States based multinational entities, it is likely that the information required for a 
unitary taxation approach could be built on Dodd-Frank Act s.1505, which requires 
as extractive multinational entities to provide information on the type and total 
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payments made to governments by projects for filing purposes with Securities 
Exchange Commission (KPMG, 2014, p. 2 & 3). 
In conclusion, it can be observed that the general definition of the mining 
sector considers a broad definition approach that includes all upstream activities 
within the mining value chain, while the downstream activities (such as processing) 
are generally excluded from the definition of the industry. 
7.3.3 The unitary business of a mining multinational entity 
Although the definitional issues of the unitary business can be approached 
from an overarching analysis that covers a spectrum of industries, this thesis 
contends that the mining industry presents a suitable context to assess the 
applicability of a unitary taxation regime, as a move towards full-fledged unitary 
taxation internationally and across industries is unlikely to be achieved in the short-
term. Nevertheless, even if a general unitary taxation regime was applied across 
industries, some alterations would be required for the mining sector due to its 
inherent characteristics and economic significance.  
A unitary taxation approach requires full consolidation of profits of related 
entities engaged in a unitary business, which raises the key question of the definition 
of the unitary business or the appropriate level of consolidation. In this sense, the 
definition of the traditional multinational entities that depend on a physical presence 
can be extended to mining multinational entities. However, many mining 
multinational entities have been setting up multiple subsidiaries located in tax haven 
jurisdictions, and the opaque economic relationships between these affiliated entities 
could mean that the narrow definition based on physical presence may not always 
capture the economic substance of this sector, as in the current separate accounting, 
arm’s length approach. In addition, joint ventures are also common in this industry. 
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In this sense, if sales are attributed to the tax haven jurisdictions, tax authorities 
should request consolidation of tax bases of those affiliates located in tax haven 
jurisdictions. 
In general, the mining industry falls within the extractive industry, which 
includes entities that are engaged in exploration, extraction, and processing of 
natural resources and focused on upstream-activities. Accordingly, it is important to 
consider timing issues with regards to movement from upstream activities to 
downstream activities, as entities engaged in downstream activities are excluded 
from the definition of the mining sector. In addition, the use of subcontractors is also 
common in this industry. Thus, it is important to ascertain the timing issue of 
whether there is economic substance between these entities. Income taxation in the 
mining industry is unlikely to happen at the early stages of the mining value chain, as 
it is unlikely that the nexus of permanent establishments can be established. 
At the operational stage, both the OECD and the UN include mines as a place 
of extraction of a permanent establishment. At this stage, it is important to examine 
the fees paid and revenues earned from licensing, as if the license rights belong to 
another affiliated party, such as subsidiaries located in low tax jurisdiction, there is a 
need to examine whether those parties “are under common control” and/or “engaged 
in activities to achieve a common goal as one economic entity”. 
The nexus of having a permanent establishment is unlikely to be established 
during the exploration stage. However, during the second and third stage, the 
permanent establishment of the mining industry can be easily observed in the form 
of a mine or any other place relating to the exploration or exploitation of natural 
resources. In general, a permanent establishment should also include a building site 
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or construction, drilling rig or ship, installation of new equipment, on site planning 
and supervision. 
Thus, a unitary group of a mining multinational group should include all 
branches, subsidiaries, and any other entities where the parent exerts direct or 
indirect influence. Certain criteria could be formulated to determine the presence of 
control or influences based on the requirement stated in IFRS 10. In the context of 
joint control through a joint venture, mining multinational entities could consolidate 
based on a proportionate basis according to IFRS 11 (The Resource Revenue 
Transparency Working Group, 2014). 
Differing from traditional industry, the mining industry generally has several 
stages of a business cycle: (1) exploration; (2) development and construction; and (3) 
operational. Although the presence of permanent establishment exists in the form of 
‘presence of activities’ during exploration, the OECD states that there is “No 
common view on basic questions of the attribution of taxing rights and qualification 
of income from exploration activities”(OECD, 2010a). However, Contracting States, 
such as Indonesia, may choose to insert specific provisions. Alternatively, Indonesia 
may agree that the enterprise: 
a) Shall be deemed not have a PE in that other State; 
b) Shall be deemed to carry on such activities through PE in that other 
State;  
c) Shall be deemed to carry on such activities through a PE in that other 
State if such activities last longer than a specified period of time; 
d) Or to any other rule. 
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7.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 2C.  IS THERE A NEED FOR A SECTOR-
SPECIFIC FORMULA? 
As a general principle, an ideal apportionment formula should fully reflect 
the economic activities of the multinational entities, while at the same time providing 
administrative ease. From the perspective of neutrality, an apportionment formula 
should be used across all industry sectors in order for a system to be uniform. In 
other words, the same formula is applied to allocate income from all industries as 
uniformity encourages economic efficiency. Economic efficiency is achieved as 
capital providers will not distort their investment decisions based on the tax 
difference, but rather on the ability for the investment to yield profits.  
Similarly, from the viewpoint of taxpayer equity, a taxpayer should receive 
equal tax treatments for similar kinds of investments. However, the attempt to 
compare the similarities between investments across industries is unlikely to produce 
satisfying comparisons. Nevertheless, the design issue has to balance a reasonable 
trade-off in achieving the ‘right’ formula and a formula that is politically feasible in 
achieving international consensus and cooperation. Depending too much on an 
economic theory that involves complex technical considerations would reduce the 
simplicity of formulary apportionment. The question here is to decide whether there 
is a need for a sector-specific formula that would rely on the economic and political 
structure of the country. Some jurisdictions, such as the US states, pursue sector 
specific formula, while Canada maintains the same uniform formula across 
industries.  
The design of the apportionment formula and weighting of factors need to 
take into account the conditions of the developing countries. As a general guide, 
many developing countries depend heavily on export. Thus, there is a need to 
include production and asset factors into the formula. Over emphasis on the sales 
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factor would be less than ideal for developing countries, although they may be faced 
with pressure to pursue a sales apportionment factor. If the apportionment formula 
skews towards equally-weighted sales and labour factors, such as the general 
apportionment formula used in Canadian provinces, it is likely that the smaller 
consumer market and lower compensation levels would be unlikely to allocate much 
income to developing countries. As such, it is recommended that the labour factor 
should strike a balance between remuneration and headcount, with a necessary 
compensation rate adjustment to promote inter-nation equity, because it considers 
the disparity between wage levels in developed and developing countries. 
This thesis contends that it is useful to look at the definitional issues in the 
context of the mining industry separately due to its inherent industry characteristics 
as described in Chapter 2. Before suggesting a suitable consolidation level and an 
apportionment formula suitable for developing countries, it is useful to examine the 
current domestic regimes that apply a unitary taxation regime in the extractive 
sector. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that if a general unitary taxation regime was 
applied across industries, some alterations would be required for certain sectors, such 
as the mining industry, due to its inherent characteristics and economic significance. 
The next section examines the current domestic regimes that apply to unitary 
taxation in the mining sector. 
7.4.1 The current consolidation and apportionment formula used for the 
extractive industry 
7.4.1.1 The Canadian System 
The uniformity of Canadian unitary taxation with a formulary apportionment 
system is also extended to the mining sector (Picciotto, et al., 2013, p. 9). All 
provinces consolidate the multi-provincial tax base based on a legally separated 
entity approach and use an equally-weighted 2-factor apportionment formula of 
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payroll and destination-based sales. Given that the tax base is consolidated using a 
separate accounting approach, the problem of profit-shifting is likely to remain.  
7.4.1.2 The US States System 
Unitary taxation with formulary apportionment can be observed in several 
US states with a strong presence of the extractive industry - with different levels of 
consolidation and formula choices. The state of Minnesota adopted a limited scope 
of consolidated tax base through ring-fencing (a portion of a company's assets or 
profits are financially separated without necessarily being operated as a separate 
entity), which is based on project or wellhead. While the states of Alaska, North 
Dakota, and West Virginia, choose to pursue consolidation approaches more in line 
with full-fledged consolidation, which consolidates the tax base based on a unitary 
business principle using an ownership and control test, while disregarding all intra-
group transactions. 
In terms of the apportionment factor, the general trend is in favour of using 
sales or sales destination as the sole apportionment factor, such as those in Arizona, 
California, Pennsylvania, Florida, Kentucky, and West Virginia. The state of Alaska 
uses a 3-factors apportionment formula based on sales, property, and payroll 
(Picciotto, et al., 2013). 
7.4.1.3 The European Union Common Consolidated Tax Base (EU 
CCCTB) 
The Europe Commission proposal for CCCTB does not specify a specific 
formula for the extractive sector. However, the EU CCCTB proposal suggests a 
definition of the sales factor with regards to the place of extraction and production of 
the oil and gas that could be extended to the mining sector. Sales can be defined in 
the situation where:  
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1) There is no group member located in the state of extraction or 
production, or production is conducted in another jurisdiction, or  
2) If the group member engaged in the exploration and production of oil 
and gas does not maintain a permanent establishment; the sales shall 
be attributed to the group member who carries on the extraction and 
production (Directive 98-101 as cited in Siu, et al., 2014, p 28).  
7.4.2 Possible apportionment formula for the mining sector 
The design of a formula should be based on an overarching emphasis on 
‘economic activity’ as the primary determinant of where income should be taxed, 
and economic activity is associated with such easily measurable indicators as sales, 
physical assets, and labour. Accordingly, the distinctive features of the mining 
industry can represent the economic substance of the sector. Ideally, having 
international consensus on mining taxation, in the form of agreeing to a pre-
determined formula, could promote greater certainty, stability, and efficiency, as 
well as promote incentives for governments to improve tax administration. It is 
important to consider the distinctive features of the mining industry when designing 
an income allocation system. All of these factors mean that designing an appropriate 
formula for the mining industry would be a challenging endeavour. 
One of the main features of the mining industry is the observable physical 
operations and outputs, the presence of standard measurements and benchmarks for 
international prices, and the common features of a joint venture structure with local 
governments. Accordingly, these distinctive features of the mining industry should 
provide guidance for a suitable apportionment factor. 
It is apparent that the US states favour sales or sales destinations as the sole 
factor for formulary apportionment in the mining industry. Although a resource rich 
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country may be pressurised by tax competition arising out of burgeoning regions 
adopting a sales only apportionment factor, focusing solely on a sales factor for some 
developing countries - such as Indonesia, where the purpose of mineral extractions is 
solely for export purposes, may result in minimal income or no income to the 
country. Therefore, the use of a sole sale factor apportionment formula is unlikely to 
achieve inter-nation equity. By the same token, multinational entities might not 
prefer the use of a sales-only factor as a suitable means for allocating income in a 
mining multinational, as it would likely be inappropriate, as commodity prices are 
volatile.  
On the other hand, Durst (2014) proposed a two-factor system - labour and 
sales - for use in extractive industry. The sales factor is suggested as it may 
effectively apportion income to the country where the resources are extracted in 
original or refined form (origin principle) and that these resources are sold to 
unrelated parties. However, the use of two-factors might not be suitable for 
developing countries. 
 First, there is a need for a for tax regime that is less responsive to commodity 
prices, so that the multinational entities gain the most upside, while the government 
is protected on the downside. Thus, the sales factor should be included into the 
formula, but it should not be overly depended upon. In the case where sales revenue 
is attributed to the tax haven or low tax jurisdictions, the “throw-out rule” can be 
applied to that revenue where the entity fails to present substantive documentation to 
support the destination of sales. Similarly, the sales revenue of intangible assets 
should also be excluded, as intangible assets are generally mobile and subjected to 
manipulation. 
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 Second, although mine operations involve a lot of labour, the compensation 
rate in the developing countries is likely to be low. Hence, it is necessary to include 
both compensation and headcount into the labour factor. In this sense, the EU 
CCCTB approach to the labour factor, which includes equally-weighted 
compensation and headcount, is more equitable for developing countries. 
 The use of the production factor in mining involves physical operations with 
outputs that can be analysed, weighed, and measured, with prices in most cases 
quoted on international exchanges. In addition, the presence of a physical mine and 
heavy equipment for extraction can be easily identified. Furthermore, the mining 
industry employs a large number of ground employees to work in the mine area. 
Thus, it is more difficult to shift the compensation factor to other jurisdictions. 
However, there is a need to adjust the compensation rate accordingly, as the 
compensation rate is very low in developing countries.  
Apart from sales and labour factors, the asset property factor is also 
appropriate for the mining industry due to its prominent tangible property in the form 
of mines. Although Durst (2014a) acknowledged the relevance of asset factors, he 
argued that the use of these factors created opportunities for ‘double-dipping’. The 
inclusion of the asset factor based on the origin principles provides a natural 
reference point to the jurisdiction that creates the income. It is likely that excluding 
the asset factor in the apportionment formula would reduce much of the income for 
developing countries. Nevertheless, the use of the property factor would contend 
with the issue of subjective valuations, as each mine and its depository are unique, 
and it would be difficult to obtain reliable and comparable data. 
On the one hand, it is arguable that using a three-factor equally weighted 
apportionment formula based on asset, labour, and sales, should provide modest 
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approximation to the economic activities of the mining multinational entities. The 
determination of an asset factor for the mining sector should be straight forward, but 
the valuation of mines and various intangible properties, such as the rights to use 
certain technologies and licences, may suffer from the same valuation problems that 
exist under the arm’s length principle. 
For this reason, it is not necessary to have a sector specific formula for this 
sector. Nevertheless, if developing countries want to strengthen origin based 
taxation, it can be suggested that the use of the extraction factor tied to the volume of 
production could provide a reasonable approximation, while at the same time 
reducing the risk of the production uncertainty of the mining sector. Accordingly, 
since the amount of production indirectly affects the sales price and revenue, the use 
of an extraction factor also reflects the demand or the principle of the destination of 
income producing output. 
International agreement on the pre-determined formula is crucial to avoid 
double taxation. In this case, the inclusion of the extraction factor into the pre-
determined allocation formula for the mining industry should be considered during 
the negotiation phase by both developed and developing countries. 
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Table 5. Possible formula for the mining multinational entities in developing 
countries 
 
Ti = t, II [ 
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 ] 
 
Where: 
I= jurisdiction 
T = tax liability in jurisdiction 
II= tax base 
Si = consolidated sales from mine 
Li = labour in jurisdiction 
Ei  = extraction in jurisdiction 
S = total worldwide sales 
L = total labour 
E= total worldwide extraction volume 
 
This section has discussed the possible suggestions to approach the 
implementation and design issues of a theoretically sound unitary taxation regime, 
with a special focus on the context of developing countries and the mining sector. An 
incremental reform by one industry can act as a precursor for an industry-wide or 
worldwide international tax reform. Specifically, the application of the arm’s length 
principle can be problematic in the extractive industry. Thus, there appears to be 
significant scope and benefits for developing countries to move towards a unitary tax 
regime, or to consider a unitary taxation approach for corporate income taxation in 
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the mining sector, as the current arm’s length principle fails to allocate profit to 
developing countries. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the analysis in this 
section is intended to advance the current understanding about the possible outcomes 
and implications arising out of the design and implementation options of a unitary 
taxation regime. Some aspects of the analysis will inevitably rely on subjective 
judgement and the circumstances of the individual country or jurisdiction. If a 
unitary taxation approach is to be applied in the mining sector, there may be a need 
to modify certain aspects of the design issues due to the inherent characteristics of 
this industry. The next section applies suggestions for a theoretically sound unitary 
taxation regime to the taxation of the two mining multinational entities in Indonesia. 
7.5 CASE STUDY I: FREEPORT-MCMORAN 
Freeport-McMoRan is an international mining and processing company of 
the minerals copper, gold, and molybdenum. Freeport-McMoRan (FCX) is 
headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona with mines and production facilities in North and 
South America, Europe, Africa, and Indonesia (Freeport-McMoRan Inc, nd). 
Freeport-McMoRan operates in Indonesia in the form of mine operations that 
fall into the category of permanent establishment under Article 5 of the OECD 
Model Convention. Indonesia’s mining businesses include the PT. Freeport 
Indonesia’s (PT-FI) Grasberg minerals district. The company owns 90.64% of PT-
FI, including 9.36% owned through its wholly owned subsidiary, PT Indocopper 
Investama. PT-FI produces copper concentrates, which contain quantities of gold and 
silver. Indonesia’s business employs 9,536 employees, while according to Form 
10K, only 62 people are employed in the Netherlands, out of the total workforce of 
36,100 employees (Freeport-McMoran, 2013). 
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The focus of this analysis is the issue of profit allocation of the income 
earned by mining multinational entities such as Freeport-McMoRan and how 
developing countries such as Indonesia are able to apply unitary taxation regimes to 
levy the income generated by the economic activities within its taxing jurisdictions. 
The mining industry makes up approximately 5 percent of Indonesia’s total gross 
domestic product. For certain resource-rich provinces such as West Papua, East 
Kalimantan and West Nusa Tenggara, mining contributes a higher percentage of tax 
revenue compared to other sectors (PWC, 2012a). However, the attempt to tax 
mining multinational entities is often challenging, as current international tax law 
using separate accounting fails to reflect the business structure of this industry.  
As unitary taxation is based on a pre-determined rule, it could also simplify 
the current regime and allow more effective tax administration. An interesting trend 
can also be observed in that most of the world’s largest extractive companies within 
which the mining industry is vested, maintain financial holding companies in the 
Netherlands. Freeport-McMoRan is not an exception. These companies either have 
the ownership of, or a control relationship with, operations in this high risk 
environment. 
 Freeport maintains three subsidiaries in the Netherlands – Freeport-
McMoRan Company B.V, Freeport-McMoRan European Holdings B.V, and Climax 
Molybdenum B.V. However, despite having three subsidiaries with $480 million 
USD in total assets, there are zero employees working in those subsidiaries (Os, et 
al., 2013). In the case of Freeport-McMoRan, a separate analysis in categorising the 
number of subsidiaries, according to the data from Bureau van Dijk, has revealed 
that approximately 85% of the subsidiaries (those with >50% ownership level) are 
located in the Financial Secrecy Jurisdictions. The Dutch Freeport Finance Company 
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Bv owns almost $500 million in assets. Freeport has higher chances to engage in 
profit shifting activities and with the link to tax havens, Freeport is generally more 
capable of shifting income out of developing countries than those who do not have 
the ability, thereby violating taxpayer equity. 
The separate accounting approach yields a fragmented system of tax 
allocation that fails to take account of the realities of multinational entities. In 
general, the theoretical weakness of the arm’s length principle for international 
taxation also extends to the mining sector, although their impact and methods to 
address such deficiencies differ. The current tax regimes and treaties that guide the 
rights to tax, are built on principles addressing the issue of double taxation. In 
general, such rules depend on the presence of a permanent establishment. The 
measurement of profits to be allocated to that jurisdiction with the right to tax is 
grounded in the presence of permanent establishments. It depends on the arm’s 
length principle that the separate legal entities in the form of foreign subsidiaries will 
deal with each other independently, while being under common control. 
It has been internationally condemned that maintaining such a conduit regime 
allows corporations to evade taxes on source states, thereby harming other countries’ 
tax bases. The mining industry, a part of the extractive industry, is often regulated by 
developing governments that lack stringent tax systems. As such, taxing authorities 
of such governments run greater risks of becoming involved in a tax avoidance 
platform, warranting additional scrutiny over the current tax system. Current 
jurisdiction and allocation principles fail to accurately reflect the economic reality of 
the mining industry, and due to its importance to developing countries, guiding 
principles such as the criteria for a good tax system provide reasonable guidance in 
designing the formulary apportionment regime.  
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The cornerstone of separate accounting also depends on the principle of 
source and residence taxation. Source taxation of business profits can be minimized 
through the use of tax-deductible related party transactions. These payments can be 
transferred to ‘conduit’ affiliates to avoid withholding taxes at the source, and the 
income can be assigned to offshore holding companies to defer taxes in the parent’s 
company’s state of residence (Picciotto, 2005). These profit shifting strategies rely 
on arm’s length separate accounting by forming subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions. 
Separate accounting with the arm’s length principle, which underlies the role 
of double tax treaties - a central feature of Dutch conduit companies, allow mining 
multinational entities to engage in complex business structures and transactions that 
allow for ‘double non-taxation’ or ‘stateless income’ and significantly minimize tax 
obligations (Dijk, Weyzig, & Murphy, 2006). 
According to the IMF (2011, p.4): 
 
“Furthermore, the issue of measuring profitability based on the arm’s length 
principle is seriously flawed in the mining sector. Given that the mining sector often 
engages in a vertically integrated structure, this would create frequent trading 
between the integrated affiliates for transfer pricing”.  
Although comparable prices for certain mining products exist (such as crude 
oil), those prices may not accurately reflect the quality and the specificity of the 
product involved or its real value to the entity (Otto, 2001; Picciotto, 2013). 
Unitary taxation based on formulary apportionment has the potential to 
address the existing problems of the arm’s length principle. Under this regime, 
Freeport-McMoRan would be required to consolidate worldwide income that reflects 
the group-wide ability to pay, instead of altering the ability to pay in different 
jurisdictions to benefit from profit-shifting strategies. The use of a unitary business 
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and tax base definition would also allow for vertical and horizontal equity, since 
different multinationals, domestic or foreign, would be taxed according to their own 
ability to pay and receive the same tax treatment, thereby levelling the playing field 
for domestic and international firms, promoting capital neutrality. 
When it comes to the allocation method, unitary taxation would reflect the 
underlying economic substance of the integrated nature of multinational entities. The 
consolidation approach would eliminate any gains or losses associated with intra-
trade transactions. Thus, there is no incentive to maintain conduit subsidiaries in tax 
haven jurisdictions that have no clear observable economic activities.  
From the income-producing perspective, formulary apportionment is less 
arbitrary because the factors within the formula are more difficult to manipulate by 
multinational entities. Without the presence of value adding activities such as labour 
and mine operations, and a relatively small market to consume mineral resources, 
and a relatively low level of environmental and political risk, one would expect 
revenue generation in Indonesia to be significantly higher than those subsidiaries in 
the Netherlands. A reasonable conjecture would suggest that income allocated from 
the consolidated tax base would apportion more to Indonesia than those haven 
jurisdictions. 
For instance, if the location of sales is taken into account by the formula, the 
multinational entities would finalize their sales in a low tax jurisdiction. However, 
this issue could possibly be mitigated by defining the sales factor according to 
consolidated sales from the mine’s produce in both refined and unrefined form and 
when it is first sold to an unrelated party. It is important that the unrefined form is 
included as well, given that mining multinational entities could sell the unrefined 
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form to subsidiaries in a low tax jurisdiction with a strong refinery industry, such as 
Singapore, before selling the final form according to market prices. 
Using a three-factor formulary apportionment also minimizes the incentives 
and ability for the multinational entities to manipulate each of these factors, 
compared to a dual-factor system. If there are no tax gains from moving the factor, 
such as mine operations and labour, to other jurisdictions, the likelihood that 
multinational entities would shift location and capital investments (ownership) 
would be low, thereby aligning with part of CEN and CIN. The key here is that 
three-factors based on sales, value added and risk would be difficult to manipulate 
and yet relatively easy to observe, such that it would provide an indication of the 
economic activities undertaken by the mining multinational entities. In terms of the 
labour factor, Freeport is unlikely to move the human capital employed in Indonesia, 
which is relatively easy to observe.  
The point to highlight, is that compared to the arm’s length principle based 
transfer pricing regime, a unitary taxation using formulary apportionment should 
perform better across equity, efficiency/neutrality, and simplicity. From the 
perspective of equity, under the proposed formulary apportionment system, firms 
would no longer have an artificial tax incentive to shift income to low-tax locations. 
Freeport-McMoRan’s subsidiaries in Bermuda or the Netherlands, being small 
countries, have a limited ability to attract large economic activity such as mining into 
the jurisdictions. This would help curb the tax base while reducing the distortionary 
features of the current tax system. As under formulary apportionment, tax payable 
would be calculated based on a fraction of their worldwide income, it is likely a tax 
haven would lose its existing tax base that was gained at the expense of other high to 
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middle income nations, injecting more equity into the tax system. For this reason, the 
complexity and administrative burden of the system would be ameliorated. 
The theoretical weakness of the arm’s length principle also results in 
inefficient tax administration. To achieve efficient tax administration, there is a need 
to increase the accuracy of reported liability, which would also reduce the risk of tax 
disputes and lawsuits. In this sense, unitary taxation using formulary apportionment 
would help to align taxpayer reported liability and tax authorities measurement of 
ability, as there would be an increase in transparency with regards to the existing 
opaque and complex business structure. The information gap between multinational 
entities and taxing authorities would also be immensely reduced, and savings from 
compliance costs should outweigh the costs of preparing and collating information 
for tax purposes. 
In terms of disputed tax payments, as reported in Note 12 of FCX’s annual 
report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2013, PT-FI has received 
assessments from the Indonesian tax authorities for additional taxes and interest 
related to various audit exceptions for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2011 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2012a,b; Freeport-McMoRan, 2013 p.113). 
PT-FI has filed objections to these assessments, as it believes it has properly 
determined and paid its taxes. A Form 10-K is an annual report required by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), that gives a comprehensive summary 
of a company's financial performance. 
 During the second-quarter of 2014, the Indonesian tax authorities issued a 
tax assessment for 2012 and refunded $151 million (before foreign exchange 
adjustments), another payment was made in August 2014 associated with income tax 
overpayments made by PT-FI ($303 million was included in other accounts 
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receivable in the condensed consolidated balance sheets at December 31, 2013). PT-
FI expects to file objections and use other means available under Indonesian tax laws 
and regulations to recover the remaining 2012 overpayments that it believes it is due. 
As of June 30, 2014, PT-FI had $379 million included in other assets for amounts 
paid on disputed tax assessments, which it believes are collectable (Freeport-
McMoRan, 2014). 
Although there is no concrete evidence that the tax dispute is related to the 
application of the arm’s length principle, a reasonable conjecture would suggest that 
there is a disagreement between Indonesian tax authorities and Freeport-McMoRan 
with regards to the calculation of appropriate tax obligation. A unitary taxation 
approach would facilitate more open information sharing, as Freeport-McMoRan 
would have to prepare worldwide consolidated income and expense reports.  
It is arguable that a tax base consolidation approach would put a greater 
alignment between the taxation system and jurisdictions that create that income, 
especially when it is difficult to ascertain the real business structure currently 
engaged by multinational entities. At first glance, one would expect that increasing 
the information requirement to the consolidated income for tax purposes would 
increase compliance, technical and administrative costs. Counter-intuitively, from 
the point of view of simplicity, formulary apportionment would bring more certainty 
into the tax system, as the agreement of allocation is based on a pre-determined 
formula. Thus, tax disputes incidences could be resolved more efficiently, as 
consolidated accounts eliminate artificial profits and loss from shifting strategies. 
This would also benefit the mining industry as it would no longer exhaust too many 
resources on unnecessary lawsuits, which often stretch for a long period of time. 
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Under the proposed formulary apportionment system, Freeport-McMoRan 
would no longer have the incentive to artificially maintain subsidiaries in low tax or 
tax haven jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands. In addition, a clear definition of the 
unitary business increases transparency in the seemingly opaque business structure 
that is currently being maintained by Freeport. Accordingly, the proposed system 
would be better suited to an integrated and globalised economy, thereby promoting 
simplicity and reducing associated administrative costs. If a unitary taxation 
approach is to be applied in the mining sector, there is a need to modify certain 
aspects of the design issues due to the inherent characteristics of this industry. First, 
there is a need to define what constitutes the mining industry. Accordingly, the 
mining industry may warrant a separate tax regime, possibly based on a unitary 
taxation approach. 
Lastly, there is no claim regarding whether the use of ‘mailbox’ or ‘conduit’ 
companies reviewed here are legally liable for the extraterritorial impacts of their 
subsidiaries. While not claiming to establish legal liability in the case study 
companies, this illustration does suggest that the current international tax system is 
deeply flawed, and there is increasing urgency for remedial efforts to protect further 
deteriorating effects that could possibly be addressed by a unitary taxation approach. 
7.5.1 The scope of tax base consolidation 
An important issue to address here is to decide whether to apply full or 
proportional consolidation to determine the taxable unit. In the context of this study, 
the taxable unit is defined to include both resident and non-resident group members 
under the common control of a parent company. A broad-based approach could 
include joint ventures, minority undertakings, and undertakings managed on a 
unified basis by parent undertakings, or other scenarios or arrangements in which the 
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parent exercises a dominant influence over another. Business or non-business 
income should not be distinguished for the purpose of consolidation. 
From a theoretical point of view, full consolidation through worldwide 
consolidation for PT. Freeport-McMoRan is superior because it reflects the whole 
underlying economic substance undertaken by multinational entities. If full 
consolidation based on worldwide reporting is pursued, it can provide a better 
picture of taxable income and prevent profit shifting more effectively than the 
activity-by-activity approach. However, this approach could result in an 
administrative burden, as it requires more reporting information for the purpose of 
consolidation. 
Alternatively, proportional consolidation can be achieved through activity-
by-activity consolidation, mine-by-mine consolidation, and a contract-by-contract 
consolidation approach. Another common feature of the income taxation of the 
mining sector is ring-fencing. The purpose of ring-fencing is to impose a limit on the 
consolidation of income and deductions for tax purposes of different activities, and 
projects undertaken by a mining multinational entity (Sunley & Baunsgaard, 2001, p. 
5). However, the option of consolidation based on ring-fencing can be complicated if 
a project involves both upstream and downstream activities extraction, processing 
and transportation activities. Sunley and Baunsgaard (2001) further argued that the 
multinational entity could seek to classify the related projects as downstream 
activities, which is beyond the scope of the mining industry. Alternatively, if those 
activities were treated separately, the entity could shift profits to the lightly taxed 
downstream activities. Thus, consolidation approach based ring-fencing, could 
undermine the equity and the efficiency of the tax system. The right choice to 
 179 Chapter 7: Analysis 
determine the extent of ring-fencing is a matter of balance within the fiscal regime 
and the degree of the government’s preference. 
 Ultimately, the decision to determine the scope of consolidation for 
Freeport-McMoRan based on revenues and costs generated by the Grasberg mine 
can also be based on contract-by-contract, project-by-projector, or full pursuance of 
a worldwide consolidation basis.  
7.6 CASE STUDY II: RIO TINTO 
7.6.1 Background 
Rio Tinto entered into a production sharing agreement in the 1995-1996 
expansion of PT. Freeport Indonesia‘s Grasberg mine in Papua, Indonesia. Under the 
agreement, Rio Tinto is entitled to a 40% share of production revenues when the 
mine’s daily production exceeds 118,000 tonnes per day until 2021 and 40% of total 
production and total earnings after 2021 (Rio Tinto, nd). Rio Tinto states that it has 
the ability to exert influence in operating, technical and sustainable development 
committees over the Grasberg mine operations. 
It is common for a mining multinational to enter into a number and variety of 
joint ventures and joint arrangements. This influences the extent of economic 
activities that companies in this sector are engaging in, in order to produce assessable 
income, which raises the question of how to determine the appropriate scope of tax 
base for mining multinational entities that should account for such business 
arrangements. 
7.6.2 The scope of tax base consolidation 
The term joint venture is a widely used operational term in the mining sector 
that can refer to a variety of risk-sharing arrangements that will not necessarily meet 
the IFRS 11 definition. Accordingly, the issue of tax base consolidation lies in 
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determining whether the business arrangement is a joint venture or joint operation. 
The classification of business arrangement typically follows the general rule of legal 
and economic ownership tests. 
As a starting point, a reference towards IFRS 11 Joint Arrangement is useful 
to guide the analysis process. Under IFRS 11, joint arrangements are defined as an 
arrangement over which there is joint control.  IFRS 11 requires the determination of 
a joint effort between two legally separated entities into a joint venture or joint 
operation (Deloitte, n.d). Mining multinational entities such as Freeport-McMoRan 
and Rio Tinto, often use joint arrangements to share risks and costs. The form of 
arrangements varies considerably, and therefore determining the appropriate level of 
consolidation would require a certain degree of judgement. 
The first step is to determine the presence of control. There are often a 
number of different agreements that may influence this assessment, including terms 
of reference, joint operating agreements and even agreements with operators. An 
operator of a mine, for example, may determine day-to-day decisions about the 
arrangement, but that will not necessarily mean that the operator has control. In fact, 
in many cases the operator is clearly subject to key strategic decisions made by 
partners.  
The legal test is dependent on the legal form of such an arrangement and the 
contractual terms related to it. If these give the controlling parties rights to assets and 
obligations for liabilities, then the arrangement is a joint operation. In some 
jurisdictions, partnership arrangements offer the parties no legal separation between 
them and the vehicle itself. As a result, such cases would be considered joint 
operations under IFRS 11. Otherwise, most separate vehicles will provide legal 
separation between the parties and the vehicle. 
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Contractual arrangements associated with a joint arrangement can differ 
widely (KPMG, 2012). For instance, parties commonly provide guarantees to third 
parties for financing provided to the arrangement. However, a guarantee alone is not 
in itself an indicator that the arrangement is a joint operation, as it does not provide 
the parties with direct rights to assets and obligations for liabilities. 
When the mining multinational entity decides to share its business 
operations, IFRS 11 sub-categorises arrangements into: (1) joint operations, whereby 
the parties with joint control have rights to the assets, and obligations for the 
liabilities, relating to the arrangement; and (2) joint ventures, whereby the parties 
with joint control have rights to the net assets of the arrangements. 
7.7 COUNTRY SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION: SPECIAL ALLOCATION 
RULE 
In 2010, the Indonesian government introduced a new Mining Act requiring 
all foreign controlled companies to have at least 51% of the ownership of the mine 
held by Indonesian investors following the 10th year of production. This implies that 
there would be a stronger alignment to source tax jurisdiction as the resident – being 
the capital provider, is located in Indonesia (PWC, 2012a).  
 There is no presence of an International Taxing Authority that assigns the 
international tax base to Indonesia. In this case, if the unitary taxation approach is to 
be applied at the federal level, Indonesian tax authorities could request a worldwide 
tax base consolidation according to Indonesia’s business arm’s contribution to the 
worldwide profits. Once it is allocated, 80% of the tax base is apportioned to Papua - 
where Grasberg mine is located, and the remaining 20% to the central government, 
as stipulated under special revenue allocation according to Laws on Special 
Autonomy of Papua Province (Law 21/2001) (Morgandi, 2008, p. 47). 
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Figure 2. Possible tax base definition, consolidation, allocation and apportionment in 
Indonesia 
 
            
7.8 TRANSITION TOWARDS A UNITARY TAXATION REGIME 
In general, the income of multinational entities in Indonesia is subjected to 
Article 16 of the Indonesian Income Tax Law (IITL), which accounts for taxable 
profits by deducting allowable expenses from gross income. However, according to 
Article 15 of the IITL, the Minister of Finance has the authority to issue the method 
of taxation, such as using ‘the deemed profit method’ for selected taxpayers whose 
tax cannot be calculated based on Article 16 (Directorate General Of Taxes, 2012). 
The deemed profit method does not account for each individual transaction 
when determining the source of income, as the attribution of profits to each branch 
relies on its overall contribution as one economic entity. Under the deemed profits 
method, the source state determines the attribution of profit without considering 
whether those profits are earned based on each branches contributions to the whole 
economic entity. Under the deemed profit method, losses of multinational entities are 
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not recognised and consolidated. Regardless of the profitability of the entity, the 
permanent establishment has to pay income tax based on the predetermined net 
profits.  
Furthermore, that the deemed profits method attributes profits to a permanent 
establishment in the source state based on a predetermined amount creates the risk of 
double taxation when the tax rate between the resident and source states are different 
(Siu, et al., 2014, p. 16). Unlike unitary taxation, in the deemed profits method, the 
source arbitrarily determines the rate of profit for the multinational entity. From the 
viewpoint of equity, unitary taxation is superior to the deemed profit method, as 
unitary taxation requires full disclosure and consolidation of income and expenses. 
From the perspective of neutrality, unitary taxation allows for a more neutral system, 
as it unilaterally relies on the source authority to determine the amount of taxable 
profit and selects which entities are subjected to the deemed profits method. Against 
the criteria of simplicity, a unitary taxation regime could also ease the administrative 
burden through better tax compliance. Nevertheless, the deemed profits method can 
be useful to serve as a platform upon which a unitary taxation regime can be built. 
7.9 CONCLUSION 
The first part of this section illustrated the conditions and circumstances 
under which the income of the multinational entities was able to avoid being taxed in 
both residence and tax jurisdictions. The case study demonstrated that the arm’s 
length principle and separate entity approach put too much emphasis on the legal 
structure of multinational entities, while neglecting the integrated economic nature of 
these entities. It also demonstrated that the concept of a permanent establishment 
could easily be circumvented by multinational entities. The second part of the case 
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study provided plausible suggestions on how to implement unitary taxation in the 
mining sector from the perspective of developing countries.  
The cases presented a comprehensive picture of the role of the arm’s length 
principle in misallocating income in international tax planning, thereby seriously 
undermining the criteria for a good tax system – the principles of equity, neutrality, 
and complexity. It also demonstrated why the eradication of income misallocation 
and BEPS is highly improbable within the framework of the arm’s length regime. 
For this reason, international taxation requires a paradigm shift, including a move 
towards a unitary taxation regime.  
The second part of this chapter provided suggestions regarding how to design 
a theoretically sound unitary taxation regime and suggested that the definitional issue 
of a unitary taxation regime could be approached from the accounting standard 
viewpoint, while bearing in mind the differences between accounting and tax 
treatments. The scope of an industry should consider the inherent characteristics of 
that industry that should be able to reflect the underlying economic activities. 
Accordingly, as a starting point, this thesis argues that an attempt at tax reform is 
more achievable from an industry perspective, rather than applying unitary taxation 
to all industries. 
 As the extractive industry is less complicated than those of finance and 
telecommunications due to its prominent physical presence, it would appear to be a 
good choice on which to ‘test’ the unitary taxation approach. From the perspective of 
the mining industry, the definitional issues of what constitutes the part and scope of 
the industry can be built upon the existing accounting and reporting guidelines for 
that sector. In terms of the apportionment formula, traditional equally weighted 
formula should be able to provide an approximate precision to the profit allocation, 
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although developing countries could benefit more by incorporating the extraction 
factor instead of asset factor into the apportionment formula. International agreement 
and acceptance over the definitional and apportionment factors are crucial to the 
success of a unitary taxation system in order to avoid double taxation. For this 
reason, both developed and developing countries might be more likely to 
compromise part of their national interests to promote global welfare. 
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the main discussions of the study presented in 
previous chapters of this thesis and provides some suggestions for future research. 
Section 8.2 presents the research aim of this thesis. Section 8.3 discusses the main 
findings of this study. Section 8.4 acknowledges the research limitations of this 
study and provides suggestions for future research. Finally, Section 8.5 provides the 
final remarks for this thesis. 
8.2 RESEARCH AIM 
This thesis aimed to examine the adequacy of the current income allocation 
system based on the arm’s length, separate entity approach and examine whether 
there was a need for tax reform in the form of a commonly proposed alternative 
system referred to as unitary taxation (Picciotto 2012, Avi-Yonah & Clausing 2007). 
For this purpose, the first research question was identified.  
Research Question 1: When comparing both separate accounting and unitary 
taxation with formulary apportionment tax regimes against the ‘criteria for a good 
tax system’, which taxation approach is better for the purpose of international profit 
allocation? 
 
Before comparing both taxation regimes, the starting point of this thesis was 
to set out institutional backgrounds to assess the arm’s length, separate accounting 
system based on the existing theoretical and empirical arguments in Chapter 2.  
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Chapter 3 provided background on unitary taxation with apportionment in 
terms of its theoretical and practical advantages and disadvantages, as well as 
providing the context for the implementation issues based on existing literature and 
government publications. 
In order to pursue a sensible tax policy, it is essential to assess the tax system 
as a system (Alt, Preston, & Sibieta, 2008). The purpose of Chapter 4 was to 
establish a theoretical framework against which separate accounting and unitary 
taxation with apportionment could be evaluated. In chapter 5, this thesis provided the 
rationale for why comparative evaluation was meaningful and outlined the case 
study process.  
Research Question 2: What should a theoretically sound unitary taxation with 
formulary apportionment regime look like for the purposes of allocating the profits 
of the unitary business?  
Research question 2a. How should a theoretically sound unitary taxation regime 
with formulary apportionment be designed? 
Research question 2b. How should unitary taxation in the context of developing 
countries be implemented? 
Research question 2c. Is there a need for a sector-specific formula? 
 
8.3 KEY FINDINGS 
The first research question attempted to critically evaluate both taxation 
regimes and to determine the incremental advantages between the two systems. To 
frame the scope of analysis, this thesis views the reform decision from a public 
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finance perspective, where income allocation mechanisms should promote fairness, 
neutrality and simplicity. 
Chapter 6 of this thesis argued that arm’s length, separate accounting as the 
preferred method of income allocation endorsed by the OECD has failed to achieve 
its dual objective of securing the appropriate tax base in each jurisdiction and 
avoiding double taxation, thereby violating the principles of equity, neutrality and 
simplicity that are required for a good tax system. This thesis has argued that in order 
to deal with the profound implications of globalisation, a change in the income 
taxation method for multinational entities to some form of unitary taxation is not 
only desirable, but necessary. 
Unitary taxation is a plausible alternative, as it recognises the underlying 
economic integration of the multinational entities in producing taxable income. It is 
argued that unitary taxation would promote greater equity, neutrality and simplicity 
because it better aligns the tax system with the economic reality of a multinational 
entity. 
Despite its theoretical superiority over arm’s length, separate accounting, the 
unitary regime, like any other tax method of tax base division, is not a panacea for all 
problems. A move towards a unitary taxation regime requires strong political will 
and cooperation to reach agreement with regard to the fundamental technical issues 
of the definition of the tax base, the scope of consolidation, and formula factors and 
weighting.  
Furthermore, each jurisdiction or country has unique historical, economical, 
and jurisdictional frameworks that shape its fiscal needs. For this reason, it is 
necessary for unitary taxation to reflect the market integration, while at the same 
time considering the need for the jurisdiction to maintain its sovereignty. If unitary 
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taxation can be implemented successfully, global formulary apportionment could 
ameliorate the problem of base erosion profit shifting.  
The findings from the second set of research questions (through the use of 
case study illustrations of PT. Freeport-McMoRan and PT. Rio Tinto Indonesia) in 
Chapter 7 provided suggestions regarding how to design a theoretically sound 
unitary taxation regime. To begin with, the definitional issue of a unitary taxation 
regime can be approach from the accounting standards viewpoint, while bearing in 
mind the differences between the accounting and tax treatments. Arguably, the most 
feasible step in the near future is to incorporate elements of unitary taxation with 
formulary apportionment within the current framework of separate accounting. 
Alternatively, unitary taxation with apportionment could be applied to a specific 
sector and not across all industries. For some industries, inherent characteristics 
result in complicated transfer pricing rules for tax administrators, which those in 
developing countries may find it challenging to enforce. This thesis has identified the 
mining sector as a potential industry to apply a unitary taxation regime and provided 
suggestions for implementation issues. 
The scope of an industry should consider the inherent characteristics of that 
industry that should be able to reflect the underlying economic activities. In the case 
of the mining industry, this thesis argues that the industry should include entities 
from both upstream and downstream activities. In terms of the apportionment 
formula, the traditional formula of equally weighted sales, property and labour 
factors should provide a reasonable apportionment and there is no need for a sector-
specific formula. However, in order for developing countries to strengthen their 
source taxation, the extraction factor tied to the production level could be used 
instead of the asset factor.  
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In proposing this point, however, it is important to bear in mind that both 
developed and developing countries should come to agreement about a uniform 
apportionment formula in order to avoid the issue of double taxation. In this case, 
political forces would play a larger role in determining the apportionment factor 
compared to achieving economic precision in allocating the international tax base. 
Country-specific laws and regulations could also pave a path for the transition 
process to a unitary taxation regime, such as the Indonesian’s deemed profits 
method.  
8.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
One of the key limitations of tax research is that the effects of transition and 
the implementation issues of unitary taxation with apportionment have yet to be fully 
comprehended. Thus, the analysis of this thesis involved subjective judgements. In 
terms of future research, there is clearly considerable scope to review in detail the 
technical and design issues in relation to the transition and implementation of a 
unitary taxation regime.  
8.5 FINAL REMARKS 
At the current moment, the OECD is focusing on diverting resources and 
expertise to strengthen the current international tax regime, while rejecting unitary 
taxation outright. Naturally, the current rules present some scope for improvements 
that would lead to a better tax system; these would include applying restrictions on 
the deductibility of payments to tax havens and avoiding the offshoring of 
intellectual property. These and other measures could certainly allow developing 
countries to increase their tax revenues, but they would not address the underlying 
causes of the problems identified. Instead, this thesis argues that a gradual move 
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toward a unitary approach to the taxation of multinational entities should be 
considered, while acknowledging that a unitary taxation approach would not be a 
flawless solution.  
A unitary approach would assess tax liability based on a set of consolidated 
accounts for its worldwide activities and apportion the profits on the basis of an 
agreed formula that better reflects a multinational entity. Addressing those technical 
issues will require considerable commitment from the OECD, as well as those of the 
UN, IMF, and World Bank.  
Nevertheless, global formulary apportionment is unlikely to be adopted in the 
short term given the strong political opposition and unresolved technical issues. In 
terms of technical issues, it is important that the design of a unitary taxation regime 
adheres to the ‘criteria for a good tax regime’, which requires a totally different 
conceptual background to those under the arm’s length regime. It is also important 
for future research to address the impact of declining revenues and allocation of 
losses to the various jurisdictions where the multinational entities operate their 
mining activity. While a significant tax reform may well be impractical for the 
immediate future, considering and reviewing a proposal for an alternative income tax 
allocation regime could be important for informing choices made now. 
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